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Reviews of American Sämoa and
Niue are not included in this issue
but, for the ﬁrst time, a review of
Rapa Nui is included. 
Cook Islands
The period under review began with
the fortieth anniversary of the achieve-
ment of self-government in free asso-
ciation with New Zealand. Scott Rob-
ert of New Zealand won the popular
Round Rarotonga Road Race for
2005, and a 197-kilogram northern
blueﬁn tuna caught by Willie Farani
of the Gypsy Trade was sold to Japan
for a record us$62,000 (CIN, 2 July
2005, 1).
But soon the rejoicing turned into a
year of political sackings: Sir Geoffrey
Henry as deputy prime minister in
August 2005, then Tupou Faireka and
Tom Marsters as cabinet ministers in
September 2005, in what Prime Min-
ister Jim Marurai called “clearing dirt
from my government” (CIN, 10 Sept
2005, 1). The outgoing ministers were
replaced by Dr Terepai Maoate (as
deputy prime minister), Mr Tangata
Vavia, and Mrs Ngamau Munokoa.
Further possible changes in cabinet
and rumors of new coalitions contin-
ued to emerge from time to time
throughout this period. Local media
magnate George Pitt was also sacked
in October 2005 from his position as
chairman of the board for Rarotonga
Island’s electricity provider, Te
Aponga Uira O Tumutevarovaro. Sev-
eral heads of department positions
were re-advertised. The Cook Islands’
most senior diplomat, the high com-
missioner to New Zealand and Aus-
tralia, former Cook Islands Prime
Minister Dr Robert Woonton, was
ﬁred for allegedly interfering with
local politics in the Northern group,
an accusation Dr Woonton denied.
Prime Minister Marurai asked Minis-
ter Peri Vaevae Pare to resign after he
was accused of misusing public funds.
Vaevae was later found guilty, subse-
quently losing his seat in Matavera.
The by-election that emerged
between three contestants—Vaine
Teokotai for the Democratic Party,
Kiriau Turepu for the Cook Islands
Party, and Mereana Taikoko as an
independent—should be decided by
July 2006. However, it is doubtful
that the result of the Matavera by-
election will stabilize a coalition-
based government that has seen many
shifts in allegiance by several of the
twenty-four member parliamentarians
insensitive to the party supporters
who voted them in. An earlier vacated
parliamentary seat in Atiu Island
initiated three hopeful candidates,
including former mp Norman George.
Standing this time as an independent,
George won the by-election, poten-
tially shifting the power base his
way—a situation he is familiar with,
having been a key player in many pre-
vious coalition governmental changes.
The possibility of a hung parliament
also hangs over the small nation.
Initial efforts by Jim Marurai at
creating a government of national
unity were viewed as unrealistic by
most local longtime political leaders
(CIN, 13 August 2005, 1). But the
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prime minister later “walked the
talk,” as he and members of his
department trekked into the Taku-
vaine valley as part of a team-
spirit–building exercise. Local media
described the activity as an effort to
overcome the negative impact of per-
sonnel changes in the department
resulting from several past leadership
adjustments. Sadly, Prime Minister
Marurai’s wife Tuaine passed away
after a long illness and was laid to
rest in her home island of Mangaia
in September 2005.
The ﬁrst newspaper of the Cook
Islands, published 26 January 1895
under the label Te Torea, was remem-
bered (CIN, 17 Aug 2005, 7). Sir
Geoffrey Henry, the leader of the old-
est political party in the nation, the
Cook Islands Party, conﬁrmed that he
would step down from national and
party politics in 2006 (CIN, 28 Sept
2005, 1), although most observers
remained skeptical at the announce-
ment. Meanwhile there is increasing
pressure from women leaders for
more access to positions of political
power. A regional conference was
held in Rarotonga, aimed at advanc-
ing women’s representation in Parlia-
ment. One suggestion was the enact-
ment of legal quotas for special
measures for women as parliamentary
members. Women leaders and the
general public have long perceived
that existing parliamentarians did
very little legislative work for their
salaries and special beneﬁts. Some
noted that by January 2006 Parlia-
ment had only sat for thirty days
since the general election in 2004
(CIN, 31 Jan 2006, 1).
During the year, the so-called
“Sheraton debacle” continued to
reemerge in a variety of forms, ﬁrst
as part of the ongoing struggle over
national overseas debt, and second
as an element of a controversial Unit
Titles Bill. The Cook Islands govern-
ment’s debt with the Italian govern-
ment to build a hotel, which at one
time amounted to nz$150 million,
had been reduced to nz$48.6 million
in 1998. The debt was ﬁnally settled
with the government of Italy at
nz$12.9 million in February 2006.
The Cook Islands’ capacity to pay
and Italian breaches of banking regu-
lations were bargaining issues that led
to the ﬁnal settlement (CIN, 24 Feb
2006, 1). A second Sheraton connec-
tion was the Tim Tepaki–sponsored
Unit Titles Bill—labeled by some as
selling airspace to foreigners (CIN,
22 July 2005, 1). This bill underlined
New Zealand–based property devel-
oper Tepaki’s hope for a major pro-
ject at the Sheraton hotel site in Taki-
tumu, Rarotonga, and another project
on Ootu in Aitutaki. Tepaki declared
that he had spent over nz$2 million
since 2000 but continued to express
interest in the building of ﬁve-star
hotels in both Takitumu and Ootu. 
Public and landowner concerns
focused on the Unit Titles Bill’s
encroaching on the activities of the
lease approval tribunal, the develop-
ment investment board, immigration,
and the national building code (CIN,
19 July 2005, 1). The Are Ariki
(National House of Chiefs) and the
Koutu Nui (National House of Sub-
chiefs) expressed concern about the
ﬁnal draft of the bill, alleging that it
was being rushed and that crucial
recommendations over the height of
buildings had not been considered
(CIN, 19 Sept 2005, 1). However, 
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Pa Ariki, the paramount chief of Taki-
tumu in Rarotonga (who stood to
beneﬁt directly from the bill because
of Tepaki’s proposed development on
her Vaima‘anga property and a prom-
ise to help build her palace), ques-
tioned Parliament’s delay in passing
the bill. The cabinet had earlier sup-
ported the bill but it took some time
for Parliament to consider it. Aitutaki
people were even more vocal; they
rallied in opposition to the Unit Titles
Bill, presenting a petition to Parlia-
ment. Despite widespread opposition,
Parliament eventually passed the bill.
Hotel developer Tim Tepaki was
also drawn into another development
controversy, which emerged in the
public media when the cabinet agreed
to sell him government assets in Wel-
lington for nz$4 million without any
transfer of cash, but rather a security
deposit (CIN, 15 Sept 2005, 1). The
government company holding the
New Zealand assets, Cook Islands
Property Corporation (NZ) Ltd,
signed the deal on 12 September
2005. The arrangement became even
more contentious when the Cook
Islands government audit director
declared in his report that there were
perceived conﬂicts of interest and a
lack of thorough and intensive due
diligence. Tepaki reacted to the com-
ments by labeling the audit director’s
report as ﬂawed and slanderous (CIN,
16 Jan 2006, 6). Seemingly taking a
180-degree turn, by April 2006 the
cabinet had thrown out Tepaki’s
diplomatic project (CIN, 5 April
2006, 1).
Another major government project
proposal initiated during the year
involved a nz$10 million dollar par-
liamentary complex to be built in the
Avatiu valley of Rarotonga. Plans
included a three-story building to
house central administration, minis-
terial ofﬁces, and support staff,
opposition and mayoral ofﬁces, cafe-
teria, gym, and conference area. The
concept design reﬂected a canoe with
sail design rooﬁng. Some public com-
mentary pointing to hidden future
increases in actual costs and the
difﬁculty of guaranteeing funding
have so far placed the plans on hold. 
In the meantime, new Chinese aid
projects were announced in January
2006, including a cyclone-proof high-
way alternative to the Nikao seawall
in Rarotonga and an enclosed sports
stadium. During that same month the
Cook Islands government also signed
a contract to build the island nation’s
police station with full funding by the
People’s Republic of China. Some
sixty Chinese workers were expected
on the construction site at its peak.
By April 2006 China was offering the
Cook Islands nz$4 million more for
infrastructure projects (CIN, 8 April
2006, 1). It did not go unnoticed that
165 countries worldwide had diplo-
matic ties with the People’s Republic
of China. In July 1997, the Cook
Islands had become one of nine
Paciﬁc Island countries to recognize
China and its “One-China policy.”
China had clearly been expanding its
diplomatic presence in the Paciﬁc
region with embassies in Fiji, Papua
New Guinea, Vanuatu, Tonga, Feder-
ated States of Micronesia, and Kiri-
bati. In fact, China now has the
largest number of diplomats in the
region (CIN, 21 Sept 2005, 6).
During the period under review,
the government approved a second
television station to be run by The
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Digital Factory. The ﬁrst station, for-
merly run by the government, is now
managed by the Pitt Group. Three
new fm radio licenses were also
issued by the government, for the
Cook Islands Seventh-Day Adventist
Mission (tk ana 3 radio fm), Nicho-
las Henry of The Digital Factory
(Tumutevarovaro radio fm), and
Jeane Matenga, Ellijah Communica-
tions Ltd (Radio Cook Islands fm).
By March, The Digital Factory was
on air with fm88.1, and the Seventh-
Day Adventist radio with tk ana 3
on fm 98.7.
The government continued its
crackdown on state houses, requiring
expiring tenancy contracts to demon-
strate qualiﬁcation for any renewal
consideration, as private money-
lenders received much public criti-
cism for deals that took away peo-
ple’s lands (CIN, 14 July 2005, 4).
Loan sharks were reportedly charging
24 percent interest plus additional
illegal charges, such as real estate 
fees (CIN, 9 July 2005, 6).
The government continued appoint-
ing justices of the peace based on
political favors and general accep-
tance without prior legal training,
standards, or testing. This practice,
as opposed to a more merit-based
approach, is particularly problematic
because justices of the peace have
increasingly been allowed to sit on
criminal and land cases, supposedly
as a way of saving money. Bringing
in judges from New Zealand dra-
matically reduced irregularities but
drained the government budget. But
allowing an untrained justice of the
peace to decide on far-reaching crimi-
nal and land cases is clearly a disaster,
given the family orientation and
potential conﬂicts of interest that
plague many small societies. I sat in
on three cases involving a justice of
the peace, and was frankly amazed at
summations that reﬂected the justice’s
personal or religious opinions with
no bearing on the case. In private
discussions, a senior policeman on
Rarotonga shared his frustration 
over situations where criminals were
allowed to walk free or receive a
mere slap on the hand and a ridicu-
lously low ﬁne. On the other hand,
defense lawyers argue that sloppy
police work was more often the
weakness of such cases.
The challenges facing Cook Island-
ers also include a continuing rise in
the cost of living. The Cook Islands
Workers Association tried to revive
the cost-of-living adjustment for
workers, a system established in 1970
by a Democratic Party government
but later removed by a Cook Islands
Party government. Public servants had
had no cost-of-living adjustment since
April 1992, when a 7 to 8 percent
increase was adopted. It was not until
May 2006 that the cabinet approved
12 percent pay rise and a nz$5 per
hour minimum-wage package. 
Rising fuel costs continued to affect
everyone, although they did not pre-
vent Air New Zealand from achieving
nz$180 million record proﬁt by the
end of July 2005. During the year
under review, Air New Zealand
announces plans to withdraw its
Christchurch to Rarotonga service,
causing some concern among tourist
operators in Rarotonga. It was
expected that the dependence on oil-
run power generators would mean
that local power costs would rise 14
percent to 25.8 percent by June 2006
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(CIN, 25 May 2006, 1). In fact fuel
prices forced local airline Air Raro-
tonga to increase fares by 10 percent
while Virgin Blue Airlines focused on
announcing plans to introduce twice-
weekly ﬂights from Auckland to
Rarotonga, thus breaking Air New
Zealand’s monopoly on the route. 
A newly formed Cook Islands
Black Pearl Jeweler Manufacturer’s
Guild held its ﬁrst meeting in January
2006, and by March work began on
the nz$1.5 million Avatiu Western
Harbor Extension Program. 
In May, Kainuku Kapiriterangi was
invested as Ariki, ﬁlling the vacancy
left by a previous holder who had
passed away. Kainuku is one of two
paramount chiefs for Takitumu dis-
trict in Rarotonga. The island has a
total of six paramount chiefs: Makea,
Karika, Vakatini, Tinomana, Pa, and
Kainuku. Also in the month of May,
the new Cook Islands–based South
Paciﬁc School of Medicine opened its
doors with four international students
and much criticism about its legiti-
macy and credibility. Less controver-
sial and more widely supported was
the announcement of a million-dollar
Paciﬁc Islands Studies campus in
Rarotonga for the University of the
South Paciﬁc.
A unesco report, released earlier,
indicated that although the Cook
Islands has 80 percent enrollment for
early childhood education (preschool),
a mere 50 percent of these students
made it to grade ﬁve. The ﬁgures
undoubtedly reﬂect continuing out-
migration of Cook Islanders, although
the unesco report does not comment
on this (CIN, 22 Aug 2005, 1). While
visiting the Cook Islands in September
2005, New Zealand’s Manukau City
Mayor Sir Barry Curtis promised
three more trades-based scholarships
for Cook Islanders to attend the
Manukau Institute of Technology.
Also during the year under review,
the Cook Islands government decided
to remove import levies except on
particular items such as pork, soft
drinks, pearls, fresh fruit, vegetables,
alcohol, tobacco, fuel, and vehicles.
Entomologist Dr Peter Maddison
visited Rarotonga to help the Cook
Islands Natural Heritage Project iden-
tify insects, and some one hundred
new insects were soon documented; it
was expected that the number would
rise to 1,000 (CIN, 18 Aug 2005, 5).
One hundred and ten applications
were received by the end of May 2006
for fourteen advertised heads of min-
istry positions. In the health area, a
new initiative to encourage hiv/aids
prevention in the Cook Islands pro-
moted a discount purchase card, on
which were printed reminders about
healthy living. Curiously, card holders
are asked to promise to keep their
bodies safe, to respect themselves, to
care for themselves and those they
love, to respect others and treat all
people with dignity, and to help
make their community a healthy and
vibrant place. There are currently two
reported cases of hiv in the Cook
Islands (CIN, 29 Aug 2005, 1). A
couple of residents I spoke to while
in Rarotonga recently suggested that
similar cards ought to be issued to
politicians, who seem to quickly
forget their promises once they win
election.
On the agriculture front, there was
some panic when immigration ofﬁ-
cials found seven Giant African snails
on board an Air New Zealand ﬂight
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that had ﬂown from Sämoa via
Auckland. The destructive snails are
found widely in Sämoa but have yet
to become established in the Cook
Islands. Meanwhile, the nono (or
noni [Morinda citifolia]) industry
continued to struggle with price
undercutting from Asia, and pearl
farming was not doing as well as
expected.
During the year, the Cook Islands
patrol boat Te Kukupa joined with
Sämoa patrol boat Nafanua and Kiri-
bati patrol boat Teanoia to carry out
exercises in their regional waters (CIN,
30 July 2005, 1). Te Kukupa later set
off to Australia for a nz$3 million
reﬁt funded by the Australian govern-
ment. While visiting New Zealand,
French Polynesia President Oscar
Temaru suggested that regional gov-
ernments consider a Paciﬁc passport,
modeled after the European Union
passport (CIN, 19 July 2005, 1).
Temaru, who is part Cook Islander,
received guarded support for this idea
among Cook Islanders.
In a year of constant controversy,
Cook Islands Religious Advisory
Council leaders also spoke out.
Church leaders openly contested the
possibility of the Rev Sun Myung
Moon’s Reuniﬁcation Church (also
known as the Moonies) being regis-
tered in the Cook Islands. Overseas
trips to Korea by politicians funded
by the church were particularly criti-
cized. The Rev Tutai Pere, president
of the religious council, was very out-
spoken on the issue. Other citizen con-
cerns focused on the national Maire
Maeva Nui celebrations, and the
apprehension that the media might
continue to be disallowed from cover-
ing the competitive dancing event
(CIN, 29 July 2005, 1). There were
also other moments for celebration,
such as when Sarah Noomaara won
two gold medals for free sparring and
special technique at the world tae
kwon do championships in Australia,
placing the Cook Islands sixth out of
forty-nine participating countries
(CIN, 21 July 2005, 8).
During the year, the visit of a con-
man from Africa, who entered the
Cook Islands under a false passport,
continued to receive attention from
senior public ofﬁcials. While in Raro-
tonga the man had apparently tried to
sell chemicals that would clean bank-
notes painted black by the banks for
disposal. He was found guilty and
sentenced to a year in jail, but before
he could be deported his false pass-
port was discovered. He also seemed
to conveniently forget his country of
origin, leaving the Cook Islands gov-
ernment wondering what to do with
him. Suspected to be a Nigerian, he
is the country’s ﬁrst stateless person
(CIN, 24 Jan 2006, 1).
Also visiting were representatives
of the US reality television show Sur-
vivor, who chose Cook Islands as
their next venue. The island of Aitu-
taki soon became their main location.
Aitutaki landowners were given
nz$100,000 by the Cook Islands
government and the island council
issued various restrictions on local
movements to ensure the success of
the program. The island council’s
restrictions faced legal challenges but
are not expected to affect the Survivor
participants and ﬁlm crew on Aitu-
taki, an island well known for its hos-
pitality. The Survivor ﬁlming should
be completed by July 2006 for subse-
quent release. This ﬁlming program in
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Aitutaki will more than likely further
inﬂate land and consumer goods
prices, adding to the woes of locals. 
jon tikivanotau m jonassen
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French Polynesia
Political life in French Polynesia dur-
ing the review period was still charac-
terized by instability and uncertainty
about the future, and had only cooled
down slightly after the political crisis
of 2004–2005. The new government
under President Oscar Temaru, who
had been inaugurated in March 2005,
seemed to be ﬁrmly in power during
most of 2005, but 2006 brought
another attempted overthrow, follow-
ing a split in the governing coalition.
Among the general population, the
original euphoria of a new policy of
Taui Roa (Big Change) has to a large
degree become replaced by a more
sober sentiment as taui (change) is
happening slower than people had
hoped. Meanwhile, the relationship
between the local government and the
French state ﬂuctuates between con-
frontation and reconciliation. Rela-
tions between French Polynesia and
other Paciﬁc Islands, on the other
hand, are becoming closer and more
frequent.
In July, the president’s uneasy atti-
tude toward France became once more
apparent, when he ﬁrst announced
his intention to boycott the ofﬁcial
celebration on 14 July (Bastille Day,
the French national holiday) but then
ﬁnally agreed to participate (TP, 14
July 2005). Earlier that month, on
4 July, he had hosted a United States
Independence Day celebration in the
presidential palace, a gesture that was
perceived as a provocation by the pro-
French opposition (TP, 6 July 2005).
Temaru also participated as a guest
of honor in the national holiday cele-
brations of Vanuatu, Cook Islands,
and Niue, each time underlining the
importance of the achievement of
independence (or full self-govern-
ment), which his country still lacks.
Meanwhile, when new French High
Commissioner Anne Boquet arrived
on 10 September, replacing Michel
Mathieu (who had tended to favor
former President Gaston Flosse and
his party and shun the Temaru gov-
ernment), hope rose for a more har-
monious relationship between Papeete
and Paris. Indeed, the initial relations
between Boquet and the Temaru gov-
ernment were very friendly. On 15
September, the new high commis-
sioner was greeted by Temaru and
Assembly Speaker Antony Geros with
a kava ceremony in the hall of the
assembly building—an event that was
perceived as a symbol both of recon-
ciliation with the French state and of
the country’s cultural “reintegration
into Oceania,” since kava drinking
had become virtually extinct in
Tahitian culture (TPM, Oct 2005).
Reintegration into Oceania remains
one of the main agenda items for the
Temaru government, in the cultural
as well as the political sense. At the
annual Paciﬁc Island Forum meeting
in Port Moresby on 25 October, pro-
posals were made to upgrade French
Polynesia’s status from that of
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observer to that of “associated mem-
ber.” In an interview, the president
said that he hopes to achieve a better
political status for his country, calling
the present Statute of French Poly-
nesia just “a scrap of paper.” These
statements gave rise to renewed politi-
cal controversy. High Commissioner
Boquet criticized the president, argu-
ing that he was “not mandated to
talk about independence on foreign
soil,” because foreign policy was the
responsibility of the French state,
not of the local government. Temaru
replied that while perhaps he was not
mandated to do so, he was certainly
qualiﬁed to talk about these issues
(TPM, Nov 2005). Moreover, Temaru’s
party, Tavini Huiraatira (People’s
Servant), said in a 22 November
press release, “When the president
expresses himself in the Paciﬁc, he is
not on foreign soil. We are people of
the Paciﬁc,” and that the statute is
indeed just a scrap of paper until it
becomes a constitution, on the
achievement of sovereignty (Tavini
Huiraatira 2005).
Another aspect of the new Paciﬁc-
oriented foreign policy of the Temaru
government was its very close rela-
tionship with New Zealand. President
Temaru traveled there frequently, and
in late December, the government of
French Polynesia purchased the his-
torical Rocklands Hostel in central
Auckland for 535 million Paciﬁc
francs (about us$5.4 million) as their
future embassy in New Zealand (TPM,
Jan 2006). Outside Oceania, the
Temaru government maintains close
contacts with Japan, China, and the
United States.
Whereas relations with France
remained tense, the Temaru govern-
ment consolidated its power within
the country as the opposition became
weakened through internal splits and
dissent. Three Tuamotu Islands repre-
sentatives—Temauri Foster, Michel
Yip, and Teina Maraeura—left
Flosse’s party, Tahoeraa Huiraatira
(People’s Rally), and approached the
governing Union pour la Démocratie
(upld) coalition. Tahoeraa’s former
secretary general, Jean-Christophe
Bouissou, had renounced his party
membership in July and later founded
his own party, Rautahi (Unity),
together with another former Tahoe-
raa assembly member. By mid-Septem-
ber, Tahoeraa’s number of representa-
tives in the Assembly of French
Polynesia had been reduced to only
21, compared to 29 for upld, and
7 independents (TP, 16 Aug; 16 Sept
2005).
The Temaru government was also
able to quiet Hiro Tefaarere, known
as a dissident within the upld, by
appointing him minister of small and
medium businesses and mining on 16
September (TP, 16 Sept 2006). The
appointment removed Tefaarere from
the assembly and replaced him with
another more loyal upld member,
thus reinforcing the coherence of the
majority.
With their majority in the assembly
apparently consolidated, the Temaru
government began working on its ﬁrst
major reform project: On 25 Novem-
ber, the government presented a pro-
jected tax reform, elaborated by Vice
President Jacqui Drollet and econo-
mist Christian Vernaudon, called Te
Autaeaeraa (Solidarity). Essentially, it
would generalize and increase the Ter-
ritorial Solidarity Contribution (cst)
and thus create a sort of income tax
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(which does not exist in French Poly-
nesia), while decreasing health insur-
ance contributions. The project soon
became very controversial, however,
as it was perceived by many as a
simple tax increase. On 30 November,
about 3,500 people led a protest
march against the reform, after sev-
eral trade unions had called for a gen-
eral strike. The strikers then built
roadblocks on the main entry roads
to Papeete, forcing the government to
withdraw the cst increase and thus
virtually killing the tax reform pro-
ject. The affair exposed the dubious
role of the unions in local politics,
with several of the strike leaders being
cronies of Flosse or political oppor-
tunists rather than representatives of
the working population (TPM, Dec
2006). This would become even more
apparent in May 2006, when the same
unions organized a strike against a
law that would reform union repre-
sentation in companies and thus erode
their power base (TPM, May 2006).
The vote for the 2006 budget of
137.8 billion Paciﬁc francs (about
us$1.4 billion), of which 102.8 billion
was for maintenance and 37 billion
for investment, provoked yet more
polemic debates. The opposition criti-
cized the budget as too expensive and
threatened legal action against it
(TPM, Jan 2006). The 2006 budget
was ﬁnally adopted by the assembly
on 13 December 2005, but had to be
reduced in March in order to avoid a
deﬁcit (TPM, April 2006).
On 4 January, Finance and Econ-
omy Minister Emile Vanfasse resigned,
citing health reasons. Vice President
Drollet, a close conﬁdent of Temaru,
took over the portfolios in addition to
his own portfolio of tourism. The
move was protested by Emile Ver-
naudon, minister for postal services,
telecommunications, and sports, and
leader of the Ai‘a Api (New Mother-
land) party, who argued that his party
was entitled to the vacant portfolios
(TPM, Feb 2006). With this issue, deep
ﬁssures became apparent between the
Ai‘a Api and Tavini Huiraatira parties
within the upld coalition. Already on
9 November, Vernaudon had begun to
distance himself from Temaru by pub-
licly criticizing the latter’s pro-inde-
pendence declarations (TPM, Dec
2005). While Vernaudon had signed
the upld petition for the reinscription
of the country on the UN list of
non–self-governing territories in 2004,
he now declared himself in favor of
French rule and approached Flosse.
Vernaudon has had a history of con-
stantly switching his allegiance
between Flosse and Temaru.
Another major decision made at
the beginning of 2006 concerned the
Groupement d’Intervention de la
Polynésie (gip, Polynesian Interven-
tion Grouping), a presidential service
agency for public works founded
under Flosse. During the previous
year, the gip had constantly caused
trouble, as its former commander,
Léonard Puputauki, refused to com-
ply with orders from the new govern-
ment and periodically had gip mem-
bers block the bridge to Papeete’s port
facilities, cutting off the country’s fuel
reserves and threatening the popula-
tion. On 11 January 2006, the cabinet
ﬁnally decided to take action and the
gip was dissolved. The several hun-
dred employees were to be transferred
to other government departments or
maintained as employees of an
“administrative ﬂotilla” whose mis-
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sion is entirely depoliticized and lim-
ited to public works (TPM, Feb 2006).
However, the core of the problem
remained unresolved, as Puputauki
still exercised considerable inﬂuence
over many members, and new con-
frontations continued sporadically in
the following months. Flosse, who
had founded the GIP as some sort of
personal militia, is apparently behind
these activities as he attempts to
destabilize the Temaru government.
Strangely enough, Puputauki has
never yet been arrested for his illegal
activities (TPM, July 2006).
Meanwhile, Emile Vernaudon once
more entered the headlines on 26
January, when the Papeete court of
appeals conﬁrmed his suspended sen-
tence of one year in prison and a ﬁne
of 3 million Paciﬁc francs (about
us$30,000) for embezzling public
funds. Vernaudon had built a private
house with municipal funds in the
township of Mahina, where he is the
mayor. However, because his voting
rights were not suspended (as is usual
in political corruption cases under
French law), he was able to keep both
his mayoralty and his ministerial port-
folio. At the same time, Vernaudon
continued to occupy a public piece of
land on the Taiarapu peninsula as a
“party house,” thereby blocking
access to an economically promising
shrimp-breeding project in an adja-
cent valley (TP, 26 Feb 06).
While the latter project would cer-
tainly be beneﬁcial to the country’s
economy and create many jobs, the
development of new tourist facilities
is becoming more and more contro-
versial within the pro-independence
movement. Seeing tourism as one of
French Polynesia’s main economic
resources, Temaru and Tourism Min-
ister Drollet are keen on increasing
the numbers of tourists, as they sup-
port new hotel projects. However, as
many grassroots independence activ-
ists are strongly opposed to a further
expansion of the tourism industry,
confrontations took place at hotel
sites: in December with hard-line pro-
independence leader Charlie Ching on
Bora Bora (TPM, Jan 2006), and on
8 February with two upld assembly
members on Moorea (TPM, March
2006). A government-supported golf
course project on the island of Hua-
hine is also seen by the local popula-
tion as controversial.
Studying the consequences of the
1966–1996 nuclear testing program
was another important issue during
the period under review. On 15 July
2005, the upld majority in the assem-
bly had voted to establish a special
committee of inquiry about the issue,
covering the aboveground tests from
1966 to 1974 and their effects on the
country’s population. A proposal
introduced by Gaston Flosse for
another committee on nuclear testing
that would have been limited to
Flosse’s home island of Mangareva
was not adopted. For seven months
the committee of inquiry, headed by
upld representative Tea Hirshon,
worked in close cooperation with the
nuclear test victims association Moru-
roa e Tatou (Moruroa and Us) and
several French and international
experts, in order to counter the denial
by the French government of any
negative consequences of the testing.
Members of the committee visited the
inhabited islands closest to the former
testing center but were denied access
to Moruroa and Fangataufa, the two
atolls where testing took place, which
are still military security zones.
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On 9 February 2006, the commit-
tee presented its ﬁnal report, contain-
ing detailed accounts of the studied
islands, as well as evidence from ofﬁ-
cial reports of deliberate misinforma-
tion and concealment of irradiation by
the military. The report demonstrates
conclusively that the atmospheric tests
exposed the population to radiation
(TPM, Feb 2006).
While the sad truth about nuclear
testing is being uncovered and will
have to be admitted by France sooner
or later, abuses of power by the Flosse
government are also being revealed.
On 22 February, the Territorial Cham-
ber of Accounts presented a report on
Flosse’s presidency from 1991 to
2004. According to that document,
the Ofﬁce of the President had 626
employees in 2004, and included an
intelligence section that carried out
illegal surveillance operations against
political opponents. The report also
conﬁrmed that a journalist who had
written pro-government editorials in
a local daily was paid 80 million
Paciﬁc francs (about us$800,000) by
the presidential ofﬁce. The report fur-
ther details the wasteful use of public
funds for prestige projects, including
presidential residences on the atolls of
Tupai and Fakarava, which cost 1.6
billion Paciﬁc francs (about us$16
million) and 2.5 billion Paciﬁc francs
(about us$25 million), respectively,
to build (TPM, March 2006). On 21
June, Flosse was sentenced to a sus-
pended jail term of three months for
authorizing the government’s purchase
of his son’s hotel in 2000, when the
latter was in ﬁnancial difﬁculties. Like
Vernaudon, however, Flosse was not
sentenced to ineligibility (TP, 26 June
2006). On 18 January 2006, examin-
ing magistrate Jean-Bernard Taliercio,
who had been very determined in his
investigation of Flosse’s affairs, was
suspended from ofﬁce and later per-
manently moved to another French
territory. This led to rumors of politi-
cal moves by powerful people in Paris
designed to protect Flosse (TPM, June
2006).
After the two reports had shed
some light on the past, the focus of
political debate returned to the pre-
sent and the future. In March 2006,
during a trip to the Cook Islands,
President Temaru publicly declared
his intention to lead his country to
independence from France, in his
clearest statement on the matter since
his election to the presidency. He also
questioned the country’s ofﬁcial
name, saying he preferred Tahiti Nui
(Greater Tahiti) (CIH, 11 March
2006). Two weeks later, on a trip to
the island of Tubuai, Temaru repeated
his desire for independence, arguing
that economic development will be
blocked as long as the country
remains part of France (TPM, Apr
2006).
In late March, French Minister for
Overseas Territories François Baroin
visited the country. Temaru received
him cordially but made it clear that,
as the country’s colonizer, France had
a historic responsibility to support the
process of self-determination. Temaru
proposed an “Accord of Tahiti Nui”
with France, inspired by the Nouméa
Accord of New Caledonia. This would
require France to recognize the colo-
nial fact and promise to help Tahiti
Nui prepare its independence during a
transitional period of at least a decade
leading to a referendum on indepen-
dence (TPM, Apr 2006).
Temaru’s declarations provoked a
new backlash from both the French
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government and local pro-French
politicians. High Commissioner
Boquet accused Temaru of “placing
himself outside the republican values”
and reminded him that he himself had
said at his inauguration that indepen-
dence was not on the immediate
agenda. Boquet also criticized Tema-
ru’s referring to the country as “Tahiti
Nui” (TPM, April 2006). This was
quite astonishing, given the fact that
Gaston Flosse, who had frequently
called himself “President of Tahiti
Nui,” had never been reprimanded 
by the high commission.
The Tahoeraa opposition also
intensiﬁed its media campaign against
the government. The Tahoeraa weekly
L’Hebdo as well as the party’s Radio
Maohi launched regular and virulent
attacks on Temaru and his political
ideas, discrediting the idea of indepen-
dence as catastrophic for the country,
using old stereotypes from French
colonial times, and accusing the
Temaru government of being dicta-
torial and racist.
Tahoeraa did everything it could to
polarize society between the ideas of
autonomy (implying continued French
sovereignty) and independence. At the
same time, Jean-Christophe Bouis-
sou’s Rautahi party went back into 
a political alliance with Tahoeraa,
claiming to build up an “autonomist
front” in order to ﬁght the idea of
independence. Several other small
parties that had split from Tahoeraa
earlier joined that alliance as well.
This led to the suspicion that those
small parties had really been “satel-
lites” or “submarines” of Tahoeraa
(TPM, May 2006).
While the opposition gathered its
forces, struggles within the upld were
fought more and more openly. On 29
March Hiro Tefaarere resigned from
his ministerial portfolio. When
Temaru refused to accept his resig-
nation, Tefaarere left both the upld
and the Tavini Huiraatira party. How-
ever, he reafﬁrmed his political posi-
tion in favor of independence (TP, 6
Apr 2006). With Tefaarere sitting now
as an independent, the upld lost its
overall majority in the assembly.
At the same time, Emile Vernaudon
intensiﬁed his political agitation
against Temaru. On 12 April, two
days before the scheduled vote for the
annual reelection of the assembly’s
Speaker, Vernaudon resigned from his
ministry, giving as reasons Temaru’s
pro-independence activities and the
lack of collegiality within upld. The
following day, an agreement was
signed between Flosse’s Tahoeraa,
Vernaudon’s Ai‘a Api, Bouissou’s
Rautahi, the independent representa-
tives from the outer islands, as well 
as Hiro Tefaarere, to form an “auton-
omist front.” The front included
twenty-nine representatives, thus
forming a new majority. Gaston Tong
Sang, a Tahoeraa representative and
Bora Bora mayor, was designated
their candidate for the position of
Speaker, against upld incumbent
Antony Geros. The group further
intended to overthrow Temaru in a
motion of censure, with Vernaudon 
as their candidate for president. 
Flosse himself formally kept out of
the political game, a precondition
demanded by the other partners of
the autonomist front.
However, the vote for Speaker
turned out quite differently. Philip
Schyle, the leader of Fetia Api (New
Star), a pro-French, anti-Flosse party,
had refused to take part in the auton-
omist front, but then announced his
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own candidacy for the position of
Speaker. When the secret ballot was
conducted, 29 representatives voted
for Schyle, 28 for Geros, and none 
for Tong Sang. Apparently, the mem-
bers of the autonomist front had all
voted for Schyle, preferring him as an
autonomist to the pro-independence
Geros. Schyle, however, did not want
to play their game. He said he owed
nothing to those who had voted him
in and considered himself the Speaker
for everyone. He also announced that
he would not support a motion of
censure against Temaru (TPM, May
2006).
Some days later, on 19 April,
before the vote on the assembly com-
mittees, President Temaru announced
major changes in his cabinet. The
representatives from the Tuamotu
Islands, Teina Maraeura and Michel
Yip, as well as Dauphin Domingo
from Tahiti island—who were all
considered close allies of Vernaudon
and whose names had been on the list
of the autonomist front just a few
days earlier—joined Temaru’s gov-
ernment, either as cabinet ministers
or as upld representatives. Their sup-
port gave Temaru once more a clear
majority of 30 seats in the assembly,
against 25 for the autonomist front,
and 2 for Schyle’s neutral group. The
upld was thus able to keep control
over both the assembly committees
and the executive government. Temaru
had won another round in his strug-
gle for political survival, at the price
of the loss of the assembly Speaker’s
ofﬁce (TPM, May 2006).
The political maneuverings by both
the opposition and the government to
“buy” and “re-buy” each other’s
politicians worsened the image of
politics and discredited all politicians.
Gaston Flosse, his party, and their
allies were all eager to denounce
Temaru’s tactics, while keeping quiet
about having used the same tactics
immediately before. As Tahiti
Paciﬁque Magazine (TPM) editor Alex
Du Prel reminded readers, it was
Flosse and his party who, for decades,
in collaboration with the French State,
had applied the tactics of “buying”
politicians (TPM, May 2006).
Political corruption was not the
only thing being deplored in society.
Even more dramatic were threats to
the survival of indigenous Polynesian
languages. On 12 May, the associa-
tion Te Rauti o te Reo (Exaltation of
the Language) published an alarming
study showing that less than 20 per-
cent of the population speak Reo
Maohi (Tahitian or another Polyne-
sian language). In 1975 the compara-
ble ﬁgure was 80 percent (TPM, June
2006). Especially among young peo-
ple, Tahitian has been replaced almost
totally by French or a pidgin version
of it. The Temaru government and
Education Minister Jean-Marius Raa-
poto are very keen to change this
trend, and a revision of the education
system is being prepared to that end.
On 29 March, however, the French
State Council prohibited the use of
any language other than French in the
debates of the Assembly of French
Polynesia (TPM, April 2006)—an act
seen by both the Temaru government
and Te Rauti o te Reo as a colonial
provocation.
Related to concerns for the preser-
vation of the country’s native lan-
guage are the efforts by members of
the Royal Customary Council for the
preservation of land rights, historical
monuments, and respect for historical
treaties. Founded in early 2005 by
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royal descendent Joinville Pomare,
the council advocates recognition of
customary leadership by arii (tradi-
tional chiefs). During the period under
review, the council increased its activ-
ity, ﬁnding more and more support
among both the local population and
customary leaders from other Paciﬁc
Islands. On 29 October 2005, between
2,000 and 2,500 people attended a
meeting of arii descendents around
the royal tomb in Arue. Guests
included Gabriel Paita, the president
of the Customary Senate of New
Caledonia, and members of the Cook
Islands’ House of Ariki, as well as
delegates from Rapa Nui and Hawai‘i.
Pomare and his followers once again
demanded the creation of a recog-
nized customary institution in French
Polynesia, modeled after that of New
Caledonia (TP, 29 Oct 2005; NT, 31
Oct 2005). The alleged treaty of
annexation that was signed in 1880
by Tahiti’s last king, Pomare V, and
the French authorities, was subjected
to a detailed analysis by a working
group on legal issues within the coun-
cil, led by Mareva de Montluc; the
working group found the treaty legally
questionable (DT, 24 Oct 2005). On 6
May, based on its preceding historical
and judicial research, the council
established a so-called Indigenous
Land Tribunal in order to deal with
land claims by Tahitian families.
According to the 1880 treaty, this
institution was to be preserved under
French rule, but it was later sup-
pressed. The French judiciary declared
that the tribunal had no value under
French law (TP, 9 May 2006).
Meanwhile, President Temaru was
criticized by the opposition for exces-
sive travel to foreign countries, such
as his trip to Japan in mid-May, and
for only coming back to Tahiti as a
stopover before his next trip (see, eg,
L’Hebdo, 9 March 2006). These
critics forgot, however, that foreign
relations is Temaru’s portfolio within
the government, and that for the
construction of a future independent
state, it is essential to build and
maintain a network of political and
economic relations.
In late June, Temaru traveled to
Paris to meet with French Prime Min-
ister Dominique de Villepin and sev-
eral other cabinet ministers. However,
he did not attend a scheduled meeting
with President Jacques Chirac. The
missed meeting caused a new contro-
versy in Tahiti, with the opposition
accusing the president of sabotaging
the country’s relations with France,
and the president’s ofﬁce calling it a
miscommunication (TP, 23 June 2006;
Le Monde, 25 June 2006). At the
France–Oceania summit conference in
the Elysée (French presidential) palace
on 26 June, Temaru talked about the
right of self-determination of peoples
and demanded that that issue be
included in the communiqué of the
meeting. Chirac responded that he
believed the majority of the people of
French Polynesia do not desire inde-
pendence and so there was no reason
for it (TPM, July 2006).
Back in Tahiti, another controversy
took place at the end of June concern-
ing historical symbols, monuments,
names, and holidays. Under Flosse, 29
June had been designated as the local
holiday to commemorate the signing
of both the annexation treaty in 1880
and the second Statute of Autonomy
in 1984. The Temaru government had,
in effect, abolished that holiday and
proposed 20 November, the rising of
the Matarii (Pleiades), as a depoliti-
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cized, purely cultural alternative. The
pro-French opposition, on the other
hand, continued to celebrate the
“autonomy holiday” and had a
“monument to autonomy” dedicated
on a roundabout in Papeete. On the
night before the dedication, two cabi-
net ministers unsuccessfully tried to
remove the monument, claiming it
was “hazardous to trafﬁc” (TP, 29
and 30 June 2006). The “autonomy
celebration” highlighted speeches by
Emile Vernaudon and Hiro Tefaarere
in favor of autonomy—demonstrating
again how easily local politicians can
switch from one ideology to another;
two years earlier, on 29 June, Ver-
naudon had participated in a pro-
independence ceremony in Faaa,
while in March 2006, Tefaarere had
still claimed to be pro-independence.
On 28 June 2006, the cabinet
decided to rename Bruat Avenue in
the administrative center of Papeete
after Pouvanaa a Oopa. Bruat had
been the ﬁrst French governor of
Tahiti in the 1840s, whereas Pouva-
naa a Oopa had founded the anticolo-
nial Tahitian nationalist movement
after World War II. The Temaru gov-
ernment announced that this change
was just the beginning of a process of
“name decolonization,” as most roads
in Papeete currently carry names of
colonial ofﬁcers, French presidents, or
even ﬁgures from French history hav-
ing no relationship at all with Tahiti
(TP, 30 June 2006).
In the next act in the “war of mon-
uments,” Temaru inaugurated a mon-
ument to the victims of French nuclear
testing in another park in Papeete on
2 July, the fortieth anniversary of the
ﬁrst nuclear test on Moruroa (TPM,
July 2006; TP, 2 July 2006). High
Commissioner Boquet denounced
both the monument and the street
renaming as “unfriendly gestures”
toward France (TP, 3 July 2006).
While arguments of this kind are
likely to go on and even increase in
the near future, relatively little has
been done for the economic develop-
ment of the country. TPM editor Alex
Du Prel wrote in an editorial in
March that nothing has changed one
year after the Taui Roa policy was
introduced (TPM, March 2006). Presi-
dent Temaru’s idea of an “Accord of
Tahiti Nui” is certainly a good one,
but it must be accompanied by more
detailed economic planning. Develop-
ing a solid and sustainable economic
strategy for the country’s future is
becoming more necessary than ever.
If the country is to survive in the long
run, the government budget, which is
by now almost exclusively funded by
subsidies from France, must be cut
drastically. According to political sci-
entist Jean Marc Regnault, as social
and economic problems in France
increase, funds for overseas entities are
likely to decrease (TPM, Dec 2005).
Many of French Polynesia’s current
economic problems stem from the
politico-economic system put in place
by France in the 1960s and 1970s
during the period of nuclear testing.
Regnault argues that Moruroa
resulted not only in health issues
because of irradiation, but also in
forty years of clientelism through
French capital injection, which has
profoundly impacted society (TPM,
Feb 2006). A mentality of receiving
and distributing wealth has become
endemic among the local elite. Politi-
cal corruption in that sense is not
only common among the Tahoeraa
and its allies, but also increasingly
among the new elite of the Taui Roa.
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Unfortunately, Emile Vernaudon is
only one outstanding case. While
Temaru and many of his collaborators
are serious and honest leaders with a
vision of change, many other civil ser-
vants are hardly distinguishable from
their predecessors.
The other issue that constantly
causes tensions in society is the ques-
tion of independence. Many people
still do not understand what indepen-
dence would mean, and what chances
the country would have once it over-
came the dependency on France and
became a member of the family of
Paciﬁc nations. Most people have
been affected by decades of French
propaganda, and hardly anyone from
Tahiti has ever visited an independent
Paciﬁc Island country. Instead they
have seen biased reports and docu-
mentaries emphasizing how poor and
downtrodden these islands are, com-
pared with wealthy Tahiti. The new
government has worked hard to de-
dramatize the independence issue, by
constantly raising the issue and resist-
ing pro-French criticism from French
and local people, as well as by increas-
ing cooperation with other Paciﬁc
islands. However, much more must be
done if the government wants people
to rethink their attachment to France
and share their president’s vision of a
future as Maohi (indigenous Polyne-
sians) within the Paciﬁc community. 
lorenz gonschor
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Hawaiian Issues
In the past year Native Hawaiians
faced challenges in the courts, in the
US Congress, and in the environment.
In the courts, the Ofﬁce of Hawaiian
Affairs triumphed over litigation
threatening ﬁrst to dismantle and
then to bankrupt the agency, and the
Kamehameha Schools awaits a deci-
sion on its Hawaiian-preference
admission policy. In the realm of
indigenous rights, the “Akaka Bill”
was scrutinized and denied a full
debate in the US Senate, while the
United Nations’ Human Rights Coun-
cil adopted the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In envi-
ronmental matters, Native Hawaiians
joined forces against “biopiracy,” and
the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands
became a national monument.
The latest in a string of lawsuits
precipitated by the US Supreme
Court’s 2000 Rice v Cayetano deci-
sion was defeated in June 2006. In the
Rice v Cayetano ruling, the US
Supreme Court invalidated the state’s
Hawaiians-only voting policy for the
Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs (oha). In
March 2002, sixteen plaintiffs ﬁled
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the Arakaki v Lingle case, challenging
the constitutionality of the Ofﬁce of
Hawaiian Affairs, the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act (hhca), and
other state and federal Native Hawai-
ian–focused programs and agencies.
Claiming standing solely as taxpayers,
the plaintiffs objected to the use of
general state and federal income tax
revenues for the agencies. They
demanded the dissolution of the
Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs, the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act,
and other similar programs, arguing
that they violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the US Constitution.
In November 2003, Hawai‘i’s US
District Court Judge Susan Mollway
removed the Department of Hawaiian
Homelands (dhhl), Hawaiian Homes
Commission, State Council of Hawai-
ian Homestead Associations, the fed-
eral government, and other interven-
ing parties from the suit. The district
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims
because “any challenge to the lessee
requirements of the dhhl lease pro-
gram set up by the hhca , a state law,
necessarily involves a challenge to the
Admissions Act (1959),” and the
plaintiffs had no standing to sue the
United States (Arakaki v Lingle, No
04-15306, US 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals: 9–10). In addition, the
Native Hawaiian Government
Reorganization Act of 2005 was
being discussed at the congressional
level. So, in January 2004, Judge
Mollway dismissed the case against
the State of Hawai‘i and the Ofﬁce of
Hawaiian Affairs, because the courts
should not interfere with an existing
debate over Hawaiians’ political
status (Viotti 2004).
Eleven of the original sixteen plain-
tiffs (three were dismissed because
they were Native Hawaiian, one with-
drew, and one passed away) appealed
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
(Viotti 2004). In August 2005, the
appellate court upheld the lower
court’s ruling, but reinstated a portion
of the suit challenging the funding of
the Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs from
state general funds. The ofﬁce cur-
rently receives about $2.8 million a
year from the state general fund,
about 9 percent of the agency’s
annual operating budget (oha 2006).
Arakaki v Lingle was dependent on
the plaintiffs’ legal standing to chal-
lenge state policies. In a May 2006
Ohio case (Cuno v DaimlerChrysler,
Inc, 386 F.3d 738 [6th Cir. 2004]), the
US Supreme Court ruled that a group
of taxpayers, who challenged nearly
$300 million in tax breaks for an
automobile manufacturing plant, had
no legal standing to challenge the tax
or spending policies of a state “simply
by virtue of their status as taxpayers”
(US Chief Justice John Roberts,
quoted in Kobayashi 2006). In light
of the Ohio ruling, on 14 June 2006,
the US Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiffs’ legal standing in Arakaki v
Lingle and overturned the lower
court’s decision.
While the State of Hawai‘i and the
Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs were tri-
umphant in the Arakaki v Lingle case,
another prominent Hawaiian institu-
tion continues to battle similar litiga-
tion challenging the legitimacy of its
policies. The Kamehameha Schools
‘ohana (family)—trustees, administra-
tion, alumni, students and faculty—
and the Hawaiian community wait
anxiously as a panel of ﬁfteen judges
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decides the future of the institution.
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The question at hand is whether or
not Kamehameha’s Hawaiian-prefer-
ence admissions policy violates US
federal anti-discriminatory laws.
The Kamehameha Schools is a pri-
vate educational institution founded
in 1887 by the Last Will and Testa-
ment of a Hawaiian princess, Bernice
Pauahi Bishop. Her entire estate—
more than 350,000 acres—was to be
held in trust for the purpose of sup-
porting the schools and educating
Native Hawaiian children (Kame-
hameha Schools 2006c). In a speech
at the school’s ﬁrst Founder’s Day
celebration in 1889, Charles Reed
Bishop spoke of his late wife’s con-
cern regarding the “rapid diminution”
of her people because of increasing
westernization in the kingdom. He
said she wanted to create the schools
to correct this manifest imbalance.
Later in the same speech he empha-
sized that only through proper educa-
tion would the native people “be able
to hold their own” in the face of
rapid change and encroaching exter-
nal forces. To that end, he emphasized
the intent of the late princess that
“Hawaiians have the preference” in
applying to the schools (Charles Reed
Bishop, quoted in Kamehameha
Schools 2006c).
As heirs to her estate, Native
Hawaiian children are given prefer-
ence for admission to Kamehameha
Schools, which is ﬁnancially sup-
ported by the Bishop Estate. The
Kamehameha Schools is currently
valued at about $7 billion and spends
approximately $200 million a year to
support three campuses that serve
6,550 students, more than thirty pre-
schools, and other educational out-
reach services for both Hawaiian and
non-Hawaiian children (Kamehameha
Schools 2006a).
In June 2003, an unidentiﬁed non-
Hawaiian applicant (dubbed “John
Doe”) ﬁled suit against the Kameha-
meha Schools because he was denied
admission. In Doe v Kamehameha
Schools, the plaintiff argued that
Kamehameha’s admissions policy
violates the anti-discriminatory
provisions in section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act. Enacted in 1866, this sec-
tion of the Civil Rights Act was estab-
lished to protect newly freed slaves
from racial discrimination in the for-
mation and enforcement of contracts.
“Doe” argued that admission to a
private school is a contract, and that
his exclusion was based solely on the
fact that he is not Native Hawaiian.
The plaintiff requested that the court
force the Kamehameha Schools to
admit him to any of the three cam-
puses, overturn the Hawaiian-prefer-
ence admissions policy, and award
monetary damages.
Kamehameha’s legal team argued
that the admissions policy is legally
justiﬁed under section 1981 because
it seeks to correct past and present
imbalances suffered by Native Hawai-
ians as a result of Western contact
and subsequent colonization (see US
Public Law 103-150, the “Apology
Resolution”). According to Kame-
hameha attorney Kathleen Sullivan,
the Kamehameha Schools and its pol-
icy are “entirely legal under our civil
rights laws because they redress the
continuing harm from a legacy of
devastation that Congress has
acknowledged and apologized for
against the Native Hawaiian people.”
Kamehameha Trustee Admiral Robert
Kihune added, “There are still thou-
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sands of Native Hawaiians who need
the educational opportunities pro-
vided by Kamehameha Schools to
help remedy historical harms that
continue even today” (Kamehameha
Schools 2006e).
Their argument is supported by
ﬁve sub-arguments: (1) The Kameha-
meha Schools is a private institution
that receives no federal money; (2) the
admissions policy is a remedial effort,
as was the original intent of the 1866
Civil Rights Act, to address the socio-
economic and educational disparities
faced by the indigenous people of
Hawai‘i; (3) the schools were founded
when Hawai‘i was an independent
nation and the schools were estab-
lished to address the aforementioned
disparities; (4) the US Congress has
acknowledged the historical wrongs
committed by the US and has enacted
“more than 85 statutes that provide
funding for programs exclusively
beneﬁting Native Hawaiians;” and
(5) “Kamehameha graduates have
gone on to leadership positions” in
every ﬁeld and many return to help
others in Native Hawaiian commu-
nities (Kamehameha Schools 2006b).
Based on these key arguments,
Kamehameha’s legal team requested
that the case be dismissed.
In November 2003, Federal Dis-
trict Judge Alan Kay ruled against the
plaintiff, “Doe,” thereby afﬁrming
Kamehameha’s admission policy.
Seven months later, in June 2004, the
plaintiff appealed Judge Kay’s deci-
sion to the US Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. A panel of three judges
heard arguments in November 2004,
and in August 2005 ruled 2–1 against
Kamehameha (for an analysis of the
ruling, see Harvard Law Review
2005). In response, Kamehameha’s
legal team petitioned for and was
granted an en banc hearing in front
of ﬁfteen judges from the appellate
court. (In an en banc hearing, the
entire membership of an appellate
court convenes to reconsider a deci-
sion of a smaller panel of the same
court.) The new, larger panel of
judges heard arguments from both
sides on 20 June 2006; they were
instructed not to consider the previ-
ous ruling in their decision. Until the
en banc panel rules, Kamehameha’s
Hawaiian-preference admissions
policy remains in effect. 
While it is too late for the plaintiff
to graduate from the Kamehameha
Schools, if the en banc panel rules in
favor of the plaintiff (barring further
appeals to the US Supreme Court),
the schools’ admissions policy will not
be the only one affected. Overturning
the admissions policy would also
affect ﬁnancial aid policies and allow
non-Hawaiian students to receive
funding from the Kamehameha
Schools. Every year, the institution
distributes about $15 million in ﬁnan-
cial aid to Native Hawaiian college
students from around the nation
(Kamehameha Schools 2006a). The
Kamehameha Schools is one of the
few remaining Hawaiian institutions,
and to many it is a symbol of the
health and well-being of Native
Hawaiians and the Hawaiian culture.
The elimination of one of the Kame-
hameha Schools’ deﬁning characteris-
tics could generate additional difﬁ-
culties for Native Hawaiians.
In the broader international con-
text, the United Nations Human
Rights Council adopted the UN Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous
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Peoples. The Human Rights Council
was created by the UN General
Assembly in March 2006 to replace
the UN Commission on Human
Rights. The council consists of forty-
seven member countries elected by the
General Assembly and is charged with
promoting universal respect for and
implementation of human rights
obligations. In addition, the council
must also address violations of human
rights, “respond promptly to human
rights emergencies . . . serve as a
forum for dialogue . . . [and] make
recommendations to the General
Assembly for further development
of international law in the ﬁeld of
human rights” (UN 2006a, 2–3).
On 29 June 2006, thirty member-
nations of the Human Rights Council
voted to adopt the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The two member-nations that voted
against adopting the declaration and
most of the twelve member-nations
that abstained explained that it was
not for lack of support for the rights
of indigenous peoples of the world,
but that they regretted the lack of
time to deal with certain provisions
that might conﬂict with speciﬁc
national policies (UN 2006b).
The Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples provides that
indigenous peoples “have the right to
the full enjoyment . . . of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms. . . .
are free and equal to all other peoples
and have the right to be free from any
kind of discrimination. . . . have the
right of self-determination. . . . [can]
freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development. . . .
[and] have the right to maintain and
strengthen their distinct political,
legal, economic, social and cultural
institutions, while retaining their
rights to participate fully . . . in the
political, social and cultural life of
the State” (UN 2006b). The next 
step is adoption by the UN General
Assembly.
While on the international front 
it has been a historic year for human
and indigenous rights, in the United
States, efforts to address the plight
of the indigenous people of Hawai‘i
continue to experience opposition
on national and local levels. In July
2005, in an effort to force debate and
a ﬂoor vote on the Native Hawaiian
Government Reorganization Act of
2005, s 147 (also known as the
Akaka Bill), US Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist ﬁled a petition for
cloture. (Cloture refers to the proce-
dure of ending debate in a legislative
body and calling for an immediate
vote.) But the petition was tabled to
allow the Senate to address emergency
measures for victims of Hurricane
Katrina on the Gulf Coast of the
United States. On 6 June 2006, Senate
Majority Whip Mitch McConnell
ﬁled another petition for a cloture
vote on the bill.
In the weeks leading up to the
2006 vote, supporters of the bill were
conﬁdent they had enough votes to
win. However, unfavorable recom-
mendations from the US Commission
on Civil Rights (usccr) and the
White House weakened support for
the bill and, in turn, the cloture mea-
sure. In a May 2006 usccr report,
the body recommended “against the
passage of the Native Hawaiian Reor-
ganization Act of 2005 s.147 . . . or
any other legislation that would dis-
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criminate on the basis of race or
national origin and further subdivide
the American people into discrete
subgroups accorded varying degrees
of privilege” (usccr 2006, 15).
In response, the State of Hawai‘i
disputed the idea that s 147 creates a
“race-based” government and argued
that Native Hawaiians have a special,
political relationship with the US
federal government, as demonstrated
by numerous legislative acts (Bennett
2006). Although Native Hawaiians
have frequently been grouped with
other federally recognized Native
American and Native Alaskan nations,
they have yet to be likewise recog-
nized. The state’s response to the
usccr report says that “there is
simply no legal or moral distinction
between Native Hawaiians and Amer-
ican Indians or Alaska natives that
would justify denying Native Hawai-
ians the same treatment” (Bennett
2006, 3).
At the same time, Hawai‘i’s Gov-
ernor Linda Lingle sent a letter to
Republican Congressman and Senate
Majority Leader Bill Frist that echoed
the state’s response. The governor
characterized the usccr report as a
“misguided action . . . [of] a deeply
polarized Civil Rights Commission
. . . based on a grossly ﬂawed under-
standing of the history of Hawai‘i and
of the law itself.” She also empha-
sized the inequality of treatment of
Native Hawaiians, stating, “It is a
very simple matter of justice and fair-
ness that Native Hawaiians receive
the same treatment that America’s
other indigenous peoples enjoy”
(Lingle 2006, 1).
Despite these criticisms, the White
House issued a letter from the US
Department of Justice opposing s 147,
concurring with the usccr recommen-
dation, and calling tribal recognition
for Native Hawaiians “inappropriate”
(usdj 2006). The Senate cloture vote
took place immediately after this, on 
8 June 2006. Despite their best efforts,
the bill’s supporters fell four votes
short of the sixty needed to pass the
measure. The Akaka Bill is effectively
dead for the remainder of the 2006
US congressional session.
While the US federal government
debates in Congress the issues sur-
rounding the status of the Native
Hawaiian people, Native Hawaiians
continue to debate within the com-
munity about the best way to address
their issues. Many of the Native
Hawaiian groups that oppose the
Akaka Bill and federal recognition say
that the domestic-dependent nation
status that would be created by the
passage of the bill is not enough. They
maintain that the only remedy for the
violations of Hawaiian national sov-
ereignty committed by the United
States is full independence, and have
sought help from the United Nations
in this matter (see Lance Paul Larson
v Hawaiian Kingdom in the UN
Court of Arbitration at The Hague).
Further, they argue that federal recog-
nition would merely mean additional
interference in the internal affairs of
the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.
The day before the cloture vote,
Hui Pü, a consortium of Native
Hawaiian groups, staged a demon-
stration opposing the Akaka Bill by
occupying ‘Iolani Palace and hanging
inverted Hawaiian ﬂags. Both ‘Iolani
Palace and the national Hawaiian ﬂag
continue to be symbols of Hawaiian
nationhood. ‘Iolani Palace was built
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by King David Kaläkaua in 1882 and
was the seat of the Hawaiian gov-
ernment; today, it is a museum. The
national Hawaiian ﬂag was appro-
priated by the State of Hawai‘i. It is
important to note that the inversion
of a ﬂag is an international symbol of
distress, in this case, of the Hawaiian
nation itself.
Native Hawaiians have also joined
other indigenous peoples in the ﬁght
against biopiracy. Biopiracy refers to
the “commercial development of nat-
urally occurring biological materials,
such as plant substances or genetic cell
lines, by a technologically advanced
country or organization without fair
compensation to the peoples or
nations in whose territory the mate-
rials were originally discovered”
(American Heritage Dictionary 2004).
Around the world, universities as
well as biotechnology, agrochemical,
and pharmaceutical companies are
exploiting indigenous knowledge.
Zymogenetics, Inc, a Seattle-based
biotechnology company, caused an
uproar in Brazil when it patented
chemical compounds secreted by a
native Amazon tree frog used by the
indigenous tribes in shamanistic ritu-
als. If the US patents on Basmati rice
and grains obtained in 1997 by
RiceTec, a transnational corporation,
are enforced internationally under
World Trade Organization rules, it
could seriously affect the livelihoods
of Indian and Pakistani farmers (Pri-
mal Seeds nd). In Hawai‘i in 2002, a
University of Hawai‘i (uh) researcher
was granted patents on three varieties
of kalo (taro, Colocasia esculenta).
After an epidemic of the taro leaf
blight destroyed over 90 percent of
the taro crop in American Sämoa and
Sämoa in 1993–1994, the University
of Hawai‘i began research to produce
a variety of taro resistant to the dis-
ease, which is caused by a fungus
(Phytophthora colocasiae) (Trujillo
and others 2002, 1; ascc 2000, 1).
In 1995, uh researchers crossed
Hawaiian “Maui Lehua” and
Palauan “Ngeruuch” taro cultivars
and successfully derived three disease-
resistant varieties—Pauakea, Pa‘lehua
[sic], and Pa‘akala—for which they
were issued patents in 2002 (Trujillo
and others 2002, 1; US patents
12342, 12361, 12772). As a result,
since 2002, rights to cultivate the
three varieties had to be purchased
from the university.
In January 2006, Native Hawai-
ians began voicing opposition to the
patents. According to Hawaiian tradi-
tion, Häloa, the elder brother to the
ﬁrst human being, became the ﬁrst
kalo plant and holds great signiﬁcance
in Hawaiian theology. Farmers,
Hawaiians, and others joined Molo-
ka‘i activist Walter Ritte in demand-
ing that the University of Hawai‘i
drop the patents. Kaua‘i farmer Chris
Kobayashi said that kalo farmers had
been working with the university on
similar projects, but the idea of own-
ership was never raised (TenBruggen-
cate 2006a). On 10 January 2006,
Ritte and Kobayashi sent a letter to
Andrew Hashimoto, the dean of the
uh College of Tropical Agriculture
and Human Resources, requesting
that the school abandon the patents.
On 23 February 2006, they sent an
identical letter to David McClain,
then interim uh president.
The protests received some media
coverage and support from external
groups. The Center for Food Safety,
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a nonproﬁt public interest and envi-
ronmental advocacy membership
organization, issued a press release
supporting Native Hawaiian efforts to
reclaim taro (cfs 2006). (There was
some confusion at this time about the
nature of the derivation; the new vari-
eties were created using traditional
cross-breeding techniques and were
not genetically manipulated.) How-
ever, Ritte and Kobayashi received no
ofﬁcial reply from the university. They
increased pressure on the university
by holding a rally and erecting a stone
altar with a carved ﬁgure of a man
holding Häloa (kalo) on the front
lawn of the uh administration build-
ing on 29 April 2006. To force a
dialogue, activists delayed a uh Board
of Regents meeting on 18 May by
chaining the doors of the uh medical
school, where the regents were sched-
uled to meet. Ritte announced, “You
cannot own our taro” (kitv4 News
Online 2006). When Ritte and others
opposed to the kalo patents were
ﬁnally able to speak directly to the
regents, the protest ended peacefully. 
The university offered to transfer
the patents to Native Hawaiians, but
activists refused, saying, “Nobody
should own any life form” (Niesse
2006). On 21 June 2006, the univer-
sity agreed to drop the patents, plac-
ing the kalo varieties back into the
public domain. In response, Ritte
stated, “Today is a victory. . . . The
university has taken a big step by
listening to the people they should be
listening to. It’s a huge example for
other people to follow” (Essoyan
2006).
A worldwide concern, biopiracy
combines both individual and collec-
tive intellectual property rights and
genetic engineering issues. The world’s
indigenous cultures have been utiliz-
ing and developing biological materi-
als for centuries. The idea that a com-
pany or individual can patent these
materials or the processes that created
them for proﬁt to the exclusion of
native communities is alarming. In
a related issue, scientists and bio-
pharmaceutical companies have also
been experimenting with the genetic
manipulation of organisms. In fact, in
the United States, Hawai‘i is second
only to Nebraska in ﬁeld trials of
“biopharmaceuticals—crops that pro-
duce dangerous drugs like vaccines,
hormones, contraceptives, and other
biologically active compounds”
(Kanehe 2005).
Both biopiracy and genetic manip-
ulation of organisms are relatively
new ﬁelds and as such face few regu-
latory measures. They prompt serious
moral and ethical questions that have
yet to be answered on a global scale.
For example, will similar research or
practices be conducted in nature
reserves and other conservation areas
around the world? If so, what will the
consequences be for these ecosystems?
In 2006, the United States established
the largest sanctuary in the world in
the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands;
might it, too, be vulnerable to such
potentially harmful practices? 
On 15 June 2006, President George
W Bush established the Northwestern
Hawaiian Islands Marine National
Monument (Bush 2006a). According
to a White House press release, it is
“the largest single area dedicated to
conservation” in US history “and the
largest protected marine area in the
world.” From 50 miles east of Nihoa
Island to 50 miles west of Kure Atoll,
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the 1,200-mile stretch includes about
140,000 square miles of atolls, reefs,
and landmasses. The newest national
monument is “more than 100 times
larger than Yosemite National Park,
larger than 46 of the 50 states, and
more than seven times larger” than
all US National Marine Sanctuaries
combined (Bush 2006b).
The creation of the Northwestern
Hawaiian Islands Marine National
Monument is the culmination of over
a century of concern about the area’s
invaluable, yet ﬁnite resources. It
began as early as 1900 with concerns
about the endangered avian popula-
tion on Midway. In 1903, President
Theodore Roosevelt created the Mid-
way Islands Naval Reservation, and,
in 1909, the Hawaiian Islands Bird
Reservation. The former became the
Midway Atoll National Wildlife
Refuge in 1996, and the latter became
the Hawaiian Islands National Wild-
life Refuge in 1940. In 2000, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton created the North-
western Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef
Ecosystem Reserve. In September
2005, Hawai‘i Governor Linda Lingle
established all state waters in the
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands as a
state marine refuge (up to three miles
from shore).
The Northwestern Hawaiian
Islands Marine National Monument
will “preserve access for Native
Hawaiian cultural activities; provide
for carefully regulated educational and
scientiﬁc activities; enhance visitation
in a special area around Midway
Island; prohibit unauthorized access
to the monument; phase out commer-
cial ﬁshing over a ﬁve-year period;
and ban other types of resource
extraction and dumping of wastes”
(Bush 2006b).
This immense new monument is at
the center of heated debate regarding
marine resource management and
administration. One of the major
issues under examination is commer-
cial ﬁshing. Some environmental and
Native Hawaiian groups are in favor
of a complete ban on ﬁshing in the
area. Others who depend on the reef
for ﬁsh feel their livelihoods are being
threatened and instead advocate for
“continued sustainable ﬁshing” (Wes-
Pac 2006). The Ocean Conservancy,
based in Washington dc, and kahea,
an alliance of Kanaka Maoli (Native
Hawaiian) cultural practitioners, envi-
ronmental activists, and others, favor
a total ban on commercial ﬁshing.
The Ocean Conservancy predicts that
unless bottom-ﬁshing is prohibited in
the area, “ﬁsh stocks would reach the
danger threshold by next year and
would fall into the ‘overﬁshed’ cate-
gory by 2010” (Waite 2005). kahea
seeks to protect hundreds of unique
species in this delicate ecosystem as
well as preserve Hawaiian ancestral
ties to the islands and surrounding
reefs.
In the past, management of the
area was shared by the Western
Paciﬁc Regional Fishery Management
Council (WesPac) and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration’s (noaa) Paciﬁc Islands Fish-
eries Science Center. Citing the
collapse of the lobster ﬁshery in the
1990s due to overﬁshing, the Ocean
Conservancy and other environmen-
tally concerned organizations have
accused both WesPac and noaa of
mismanaging the area. In addition,
the Ocean Conservancy has charged
WesPac, which is the main advocate
for commercial ﬁshing in the area,
with having conﬂicting interests, as
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many of the council leaders are them-
selves ﬁshermen.
Locally, the ﬁshing community is
divided on the issue. Native Hawaiian
Maui ﬁsherman Bobby Gomes, one of
eight allowed to ﬁsh the Northwest-
ern Hawaiian Islands, said that the
ban will affect his livelihood: “This is
my job. I’ve dedicated my whole life
to ﬁshing. . . . How am I going to
support my family?” He added, “I’m
born and raised here. I’m Hawaiian.
I feel they’ve taken away our land
and now they are taking away our
oceans” (Blakeman 2006). However,
another Hawaiian ﬁsherman, Isaac
Harp, said the government should
ban all ﬁshing and instead raise the
money to buy out bottom-ﬁshing
boat owners and offer them alterna-
tive employment, such as collecting
marine debris or escorting researchers
into the area (TenBruggencate 2006b).
Native practitioners, like those in
kahea, say that the Northwestern
Hawaiian Islands are “celebrated in
stories of creation as the place where
Hawai‘i began” and that “these
ancient islands are often described as
the kupuna, or ancestors” (kahea
Web site [2006]).
The Arakaki v Lingle case has
concluded, but we may yet see other,
comparable cases in the future. The
fate of the Kamehameha Schools’
admissions policy is still uncertain,
but whatever the outcome, the ﬁght
will continue. The Akaka Bill, or
something similar, may reappear on
the congressional schedule prompting
more discussion of Hawai‘i’s history
and the status of Native Hawaiians
within (or without) the United States.
Meanwhile, a more robust Human
Rights Council has managed to fortify
indigenous rights in the international
arena. And biopiracy is now an unfor-
tunate fact of life. Hawai‘i and the
world must continue to be vigilant 
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Ma¯ori Issues
The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004,
passed into law against almost unani-
mous opposition and protest from
Mäori, has continued to have ongoing
repercussions both nationally and
internationally. Mäori are the group
most directly affected by the act’s pro-
visions, yet our submissions and pro-
tests were ignored, with our spokes-
persons and leaders viliﬁed as they
sought international support against
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the ongoing racial discrimination
practiced against Mäori in New
Zealand.
In international forums in particu-
lar, governments in New Zealand
have always denied that they discrimi-
nate against Mäori. Yet even the
attorney general was forced to admit
that the Foreshore and Seabed Act is
discriminatory in terms of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights. However, with
the same arrogance and disregard that
governments have always had for the
property rights of Mäori, the attorney
general declared that such discrimina-
tion was justiﬁed. In other words, the
Mäori owners are legislatively forbid-
den from deriving beneﬁt from their
own foreshores and seabed through-
out the country while others may do
so. The government had been unable
to prove that it owns the foreshore
and seabed in the Court of Appeal. It
nevertheless saw ﬁt to abuse its pow-
ers in order to conﬁscate the fore-
shore and seabed for the beneﬁt of
non-Mäori New Zealanders using
legislative theft. Some iwi (tribal
groupings) issued statements after its
enactment stating that they did not
recognize the legislation and would
not allow it to be implemented in
their territories.
The government’s behavior in
respect to the foreshore and seabed
has now proven embarrassing for the
country. Since the legislation was
passed in 2004, two reports have been
issued by committees of the United
Nations criticizing the New Zealand
government for its ongoing and active
discrimination against Mäori. They
highlight the urgent need to address
deeply ingrained institutionalized
racism. In March 2005 the United
Nations Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination issued
a report on the compliance of the
Foreshore and Seabed Act with New
Zealand’s obligations under the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation. The report concluded that the
act discriminated against Mäori. The
process for issuing the report had
been instigated by Te Rünanga o Ngai
Tahu, the Treaty Tribes Coalition, and
the Taranaki Mäori Trust Board, who
called on the committee to urge the
government to withdraw the legisla-
tion. The decision of the committee
included a number of critical com-
ments, including the hope that “all
actors in New Zealand will refrain
from exploiting racial tensions for
their own political advantage”; con-
cern at the “apparent haste with
which the legislation was enacted and
that insufﬁcient consideration may
have been given to alternative
responses to the Ngati Apa decision
which might have accommodated
Mäori rights within a framework
more acceptable to both Mäori and
all other New Zealanders”; regret
that “the processes of consultation
did not appreciably narrow the differ-
ences between various parties on this
issue”; and concern at “the scale of
opposition to the legislation amongst
the group most directly affected by
its provisions—the Mäori––and their
strong perception that the legislation
discriminates against them.” The
committee concluded that the act
contained “discriminatory aspects
against the Mäori, in particular its
extinguishment of the possibility of
establishing Mäori customary title
over the foreshore and seabed and its
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failure to provide a guaranteed right
of redress, notwithstanding the State
party’s obligations under articles 5
and 6 of the Convention” (Bennion
2005 [March], 7).
In March 2006 a report critical of
both the government and mainstream
media was issued by Professor
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, the United
Nation Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms of indigenous peo-
ple, regarding his mission to New
Zealand in November 2005. It con-
sidered a large number of areas in
which Mäori experience difﬁculty
and discrimination. While there were
positive aspects to the report, it urged
important changes. It noted that
Mäori continue to be denied their
right to self-determination and even
to collective citizenship as tribes,
including actual decision-making
capacity of tribal collectives over
ancestrally or culturally signiﬁcant
sites.
Regarding the Foreshore and Sea-
bed Act, Professor Stavenhagen relied
mainly on the comments of the New
Zealand human rights commissioner
and the attorney general to conclude
that the act is discriminatory against
Mäori: “the Act clearly extinguishes
the inherent property rights of Mäori
to the foreshore and seabed without
sufﬁcient redress or compensation, but
excludes certain properties already
held in individual freehold”; in other
words, it removes the property rights
held by Mäori but protects those of
non-Mäori. “In the view of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur, the Act can be seen
as a step backwards for Mäori in the
progressive recognition of their rights
through the Treaty Settlements Process
over recent years.” Stavenhagen rec-
ommended that the act “be repealed
or amended by Parliament and the
Crown should engage in treaty settle-
ment negotiation with Mäori that will
recognise the inherent rights of Mäori
in the foreshore and seabed.”
On constitutional issues, the 
special rapporteur recommended that
“a convention should be convened to
design a constitutional reform in
order to clearly regulate the relation-
ship between Government and Mäori
people on the basis of the Treaty of
Waitangi and the internationally
recognised right of all people to self-
determination.” Further, he recom-
mended, “The Treaty of Waitangi
should be entrenched constitutionally
in a form that respects the pluralism
of New Zealand society, creating pos-
itive recognition and meaningful pro-
vision for Mäori as a distinct people,
possessing an alternative system of
knowledge, philosophy and law.”
With regard to human rights and
the Waitangi Tribunal, Stavenhagen
wrote, “The Waitangi Tribunal should
be granted legally binding and
enforceable powers to adjudicate
Treaty matters with the force of the
law.” The tribunal does have legally
binding powers over large areas of
land, which the Crown transferred
to state-owned enterprises and also
Crown forest lands. However, politi-
cal pressure exerted by governments
on claimants has ensured that these
have not been used, with the tribunal
only exercising its powers once, over
one small piece of land. (Ministers in
charge of Treaty of Waitangi negotia-
tions in both National and Labour
governments have warned claimants
that should they attempt to use the
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provisions for binding recommenda-
tions, not only will they face ﬁnan-
cially crippling High Court action, but
the relevant sections of the act will
also be repealed and the tribunal’s
powers reduced to even less than what
they have now. The author, as chief
negotiator for Ngäti Kahu, has been
issued such [verbal] warnings by two
successive ministers.) Given that all
major recommendations to the gov-
ernment issued by the tribunal in
recent years have been ignored, par-
ticularly those recommending the
return of lands and natural resources,
it is important in terms of governmen-
tal accountability that this recommen-
dation be followed. However, given
also that the wealth and prosperity of
non-Mäori New Zealanders is depen-
dent on their being able to freely and
exclusively exploit Mäori land and
resources without any consideration
for Mäori rights in those properties,
it seems very unlikely that they will
willingly give up such privilege.
Professor Stavenhagen also recom-
mended that “the Crown should
engage in negotiations with Mäori to
reach agreement on a more fair and
equitable settlement policy and pro-
cess.” This recommendation arises
from the fact that the current govern-
ment settlement policy was unilater-
ally determined by the Crown. It is
the Crown that has been proven to be
the guilty party in all treaty breaches.
Yet it has used the absence of any con-
stitutional fetter on its powers that
would force it to abide by its Treaty
of Waitangi and international human
rights obligations, to set itself up to
judge and determine what settlements
shall be. There have been numerous
complaints that none of the treaty set-
tlements to date have been fair and
equitable, with claimants forced to
choose between very little and noth-
ing at all. It has been calculated that
settlements to date average less than
0.6 percent of the estimated value of
lands lost (Mutu 2004). Yet despite
this, a further ﬁve settlements have
been recorded in the past year. Deeds
of settlement or legislation conﬁrming
settlement were completed for the
claims of Ngä Rauru, Ngäti Mutunga,
Ngäti Awa, Ngäti Tüwharetoa ki
Kawerau, and Te Röroa. Whether
these and other treaty claims settle-
ments are full and ﬁnal remains to
be seen.
On education, Professor Staven-
hagen recommended: “More resources
should be put at the disposal of Mäori
education at all levels, including
teacher training programmes and the
development of appropriate teaching
materials.” On culture: “The Mäori
cultural revival involving language,
customs, knowledge systems, philoso-
phy, values and arts should continue
to be recognised and respected as part
of the bicultural heritage of all New
Zealanders through the appropriate
cultural and educational channels.”
On social policy: “Social delivery
services, particularly health and hous-
ing, should continue to be speciﬁcally
targeted and tailored to the needs of
Mäori, requiring more targeted
research evaluation and statistical
data bases.” This last recommenda-
tion is aimed at reversing the reduc-
tion in funding for Mäori programs
that has been implemented over the
past few years.
On international indigenous rights,
Professor Stavenhagen wrote, “The
Government of New Zealand should
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continue to support efforts to achieve
a United Nations declaration on the
rights of indigenous peoples by con-
sensus, including the right to self-
determination.” At the Permanent
Forum for Indigenous Peoples held
in New York in May 2006, the New
Zealand government opposed indige-
nous people having self-determination
and joined Canada and the United
States to oppose the text of the draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, which was subsequently
supported by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee. The New
Zealand government took this stance
without any consultation with Mäori.
However, Mäori were present and
made sure that the forum was
informed that Mäori opposed the
New Zealand government’s stance
and supported the rights of all indige-
nous peoples (Cat Davis, e-mail
reports on the day-to-day proceedings
at the UN Permanent Forum for
Indigenous People, New York, May
2006).
Finally, the special rapporteur
made two recommendations to the
civil society: “Public media should be
encouraged to provide a balanced,
unbiased and non-racist picture of
Mäori in New Zealand society, and
an independent commission should
be established to monitor their perfor-
mance and suggest remedial action”;
and “Representatives and leaders of
political parties and public organisa-
tions should refrain from using lan-
guage that may incite racial or ethnic
intolerance.”
Mäori welcomed the report as
accurate, insightful, and helpful, with
several Mäori academics and com-
mentators having checked its draft for
accuracy. In the months following its
release, the Mäori Party referred to
its recommendations in almost every
speech they made both inside and
outside Parliament. The government,
which also checked its draft, pre-
dictably tried to suppress the report,
and when it was released, attacked its
author and the committee he repre-
sented and claimed falsely that both
had been dismissed from the United
Nations. The government also claimed
that the report was full of errors but
was unable to demonstrate what
those errors were. The government
announced well before the report was
released that it would ignore it.
One of the matters noted by the
special rapporteur was the govern-
ment’s ongoing reduction of Mäori
funding. The government used various
attacks on Mäori, which gathered
momentum in 2003, to justify the
cuts. Particular use was made of spu-
rious claims that Mäori are privileged
over others—claims that the special
rapporteur dismissed because he could
ﬁnd no evidence of any privilege
granted to Mäori but rather extensive
evidence of deprivation and discrimi-
nation. Many programs that Mäori
had come to rely on for their own
development have been abolished,
while prison accommodation for
inmates who are mainly Mäori has
been substantially increased. The
extent of the government’s determina-
tion to deprive Mäori of beneﬁts of
public funding became clear when the
minister of Mäori Affairs failed to
seek any increase in the 2006 budget
for Mäori Affairs. And this was at a
time when an increasing number of
research reports into Mäori well-being
are becoming ever more strident in
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their criticism of government policies
and treatment of Mäori. (See, for
example, Harris and others [2006],
which concludes that “Racism, both
interpersonal and institutional, con-
tributes to Mäori health losses and
leads to inequalities between Mäori
and Europeans in New Zealand” and
“the combination of deprivation and
discrimination as measured seems to
account for much of the disparity in
heath outcomes assessed”; the Minis-
try of Health and University of Otago
[2006], which highlighted alarming
and disproportionately high mortality
rates for Mäori; the report of the
Public Health Advisory Committee
[2006], which concluded that being
Mäori or Paciﬁc Islanders further
increases the risk of death or ill-health
across all socioeconomic categories;
Stavenhagen 2006; and the many
reports of the Waitangi Tribunal.)
Mäori funding programs that have
been abolished include the Manaaki
Tauira fund for Mäori tertiary stu-
dents and several programs run by
Mäori tertiary institutions. Perhaps
the most brutal attack was on one
of these institutions, Te Wänanga o
Aotearoa (twoa). Its aim is to give
people access to education in such a
way that they not only learn, but
actually enjoy their learning. It targets
those whom mainstream education
has overlooked or discarded, and
most of those are Mäori. It had car-
ried out government Mäori education
policy to the letter and as a result was
able, in a very short period, to attract
more students and hence government
funding than any other tertiary insti-
tution. This raised the ire of the uni-
versities in particular, who quietly but
successfully lobbied to discredit Te
Wänanga and persuaded the govern-
ment to launch a series of intensive
audits, which eventually crippled the
institution. When Te Wänanga o
Aotearoa called itself a university,
the universities took umbrage and
sent Te Wänanga letters saying they
were offended (Mana [April–May
2006], 67). Yet the universities could
not acknowledge the irony in the fact
that each of them calls itself whare
wänanga (which Te Wänanga o
Aotearoa is) on their Web sites and
letterheads, while they have neither
the expertise nor the qualiﬁcations
to do so in terms of the standards
required by traditional (Mäori)
whare wänanga.
As a result of government harass-
ment, Te Wänanga took a claim to
the Waitangi Tribunal, which was
heard in December 2005. It was the
second claim they had taken, with
inquiry into the ﬁrst one ﬁnding that
the government had breached the
Treaty of Waitangi by not giving
whare wänanga the same capital
establishment grants it had given
mainstream tertiary education insti-
tutions such as universities, polytech-
nics, and colleges of education. The
second claim was also upheld, ﬁnding
that the Crown had sought to impose
“unilateral, poorly co-ordinated, and,
from the claimants’ perspective,
apparently destructive” measures
(Bennion 2006, 4).
Although the past few years have
been depressing for Mäori, we always
ﬁnd major national achievements
worth celebrating. One was the Mäori
Party. It was born out of the 2004
Hïkoi, the huge protest against the
foreshore and seabed legislation. The
general election in September 2005
saw the party win four of the seven
Mäori seats, taking three from the
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Labour Party. The same ability and
expertise used to mobilize and orga-
nize Mäori for the Hïkoi was used
to organize Mäori votes for the new
Mäori Party. Other parties lacked
such ability and expertise and had
no response to the Mäori Party
onslaught. As a result, for the ﬁrst
time in the history of the New Zea-
land Parliament, Mäori have a party
that gives ﬁrst priority to the wishes
and needs of Mäori.
Mainstream politicians expected
Mäori Party parliamentarians to
assume the roles that most Mäori
elected to Parliament are consigned
to, either serving the more powerful
mainstream parties, or being largely
invisible, rarely participating in any-
thing, and taking only minor periph-
eral roles. Much to their surprise, the
four members of the Mäori Party
immediately took on huge and pun-
ishing workloads, responding to every
bill presented in the House, traveling
extensively to keep in contact with
their constituents, and presenting
views and opinions both inside and
outside Parliament that reﬂected
Mäori wishes and thinking. As
required by their constituents, they
conduct themselves as rangatira
(highly respected leaders), with dignity
and respect for others, including their
political enemies. They have refused
to descend into the gratuitous trading
of insults that demeans the New Zea-
land Parliament in Mäori eyes. They
have insisted that the status of Mäori
as an ofﬁcial language be given mean-
ing by using it every day in the House.
It has been interesting to see other
Mäori speakers in the House follow-
ing their example in this respect.
On the sporting front, where Mäori
generally do well, it was with a huge
sense of pride that the Mäori world
celebrated professional golfer, Michael
Campbell, winning not only the US
Open but also the hsbc World Match
Play championship in 2005. Although
Michael identiﬁes himself strongly and
proudly as Ngäti Ruanui and Ngä
Rauru of Taranaki, including having
his own sportswear label featuring
Mäori patterns and designs, in most
of the mainstream media he is only a
New Zealander. He was the Mäori
Sportsman of the Year and won the
Halberg Supreme Award for his
achievements.
Another great achievement was
that of Robert Hewitt, brother of the
All Black Norm Hewitt, who was lost
at sea in February 2006 for three days
but miraculously survived. He accom-
plished that feat by drawing on both
his navy diver training and knowledge
derived from his Mäori ancestors of
the physical and spiritual aspects of
the sea. Some members of the Päkehä
media made no attempt to mask their
racism when he talked of his use of
karakia (Mäori prayer); they claimed
his loss at sea was a hoax. The rest of
the country was in awe of his achieve-
ment. It took him more than six
weeks to recover from the physical
trauma, including his skin splitting,
severe sunburn, and dehydration
(Mana [April–May 2006], 20–23).
In the business world, the Univer-
sity of Auckland Business School
honored Ngäti Tüwharetoa’s Peter
Loughlin as the Outstanding Mäori
Business Leader for 2005 for his work
in fashion design. Peter dresses some
of the world’s most inﬂuential and
wealthy women through his House of
Arushi, based in Dubai. His clientele
include the royal families of the
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
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Oman. Every year, through his foun-
dation scholarships, a young Mäori
designer is supported to travel to
Dubai to work alongside Peter (Te
Aratai Productions 2006).
margaret mutu
This review covers a two-year
period from mid-2004 to mid-2006.
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Rapa Nui
The main issue of local politics on
Rapa Nui during the review period
was the proposal for a special admin-
istrative statute for the island. The
proposal, ofﬁcially presented in
August 2005, found both support and
protest among Islanders. The debate
on the island’s political future was
further boosted by Chile’s new
president, Michelle Bachelet, who
expressed her strong support for the
proposal. Meanwhile the numbers
of tourists are growing exorbitantly,
raising expectations of a wealthy
future as well as fears about being
overwhelmed by outsiders. At the
same time, plans to build a casino on
the island remain highly controversial.
The special administrative status
proposal must be seen against the
background of the current political
status of the island, which, with its
administrative complexity and multi-
plicity of local institutions, has
become the object of criticism from
various sides. According to the 1966
Ley Pascua (Easter Island Law), Rapa
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Nui is part of the Valparaiso region
on continental Chile, thus dependent
not only on the national government
in Santiago, but also on the regional
administration in Valparaiso. On the
local level, the island forms both a
province, with a Santiago-appointed
governor (since 1984 always an ethnic
Rapanui) at its head, and a munici-
pality, with a locally elected mayor
and a six-member municipal council.
Already these two local administra-
tion levels (provincial governor’s
ofﬁce and municipal administration)
are competing institutions with multi-
ple overlapping responsibilities. The
Ley Indígena (Indigenous Law) of
1993, which recognizes the Rapanui
as one of Chile’s six indigenous peo-
ples, created yet another institution,
the Comisión de Desarollo de la Isla
de Pascua (codeipa, Easter Island
Development Commission), composed
of ﬁve elected ethnic Rapanui repre-
sentatives, six representatives of
Chilean government entities, as well
as the governor, the mayor, and the
president of the Rapanui Council of
Elders. The latter council, an institu-
tion founded in the 1980s, supposedly
to represent each Rapanui family and
defend local culture and language,
had become a matter of contention
since it split in 1994 into a moderate,
pro-Chilean faction under Alberto
Hotus, and a more radical, later pro-
independence faction under Juan
Chavez, Mario Tuki, and others.
While only the ﬁrst faction is recog-
nized by Chile as a “traditional insti-
tution” under the Indigenous Law,
out of the second was formed, in
2001, the “Rapanui Parliament,”
which advocates full independence
from Chile.
Besides these various ofﬁcial and
unofﬁcial bodies headed by Islanders,
there are also ofﬁces of various central
government agencies on the island,
some of them also partly staffed with
native Rapanui: the National Com-
mission for Indigenous Development,
the National Forestry Corporation, a
state agriculture company, and many
others. The multiplicity of govern-
ment agencies and allegedly represen-
tative island institutions creates a
network of competing bureaucracies
with overlapping ﬁelds of responsibil-
ity, which constantly hinder and block
each other, thereby signiﬁcantly
impeding any sort of development
project on the island (Di Castri 2003).
In order to remedy the situation, a
special statute of autonomy for Rapa
Nui has been discussed since 2002,
spearheaded primarily by Mayor
Petero Edmunds (RNJ, Oct 2003). A
commission had then been formed—
consisting of various Chilean politi-
cians including former President
Patricio Aylwin, as well as Rapa Nui
Governor Enrique Pakarati, Mayor
Edmunds, and the president of the
“ofﬁcial” council of elders, Alberto
Hotus—with the task of reviewing the
island’s present statute and elaborat-
ing a proposal for a new one. Mean-
while, more radical pro-independence
voices of the Rapanui Parliament and
others had become more and more
vocal (Qué Pasa, 17 Sept 2003;
To‘ere, 1 July 2004).
In late August 2005, the statute
review commission presented its ﬁnal
draft of a “Proposal for a Special
Administrative Statute for Easter
Island” to Chilean President Ricardo
Lagos (NRN, Aug 2005). Under that
proposal, the island would be taken
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out of the Valparaiso region and form
a separate entity as a “special terri-
tory,” directly under Santiago, the
provincial governor’s ofﬁce, thus
assuming the responsibilities of a
regional administration as well. The
municipality would assume the role
of the local government with more
responsibilities than at present. The
development commission (codeipa)
would become integrated into the
governor’s ofﬁce as an advisory
agency. Finally, the council of elders
would be conserved in its currently
recognized form (ie, the faction under
Alberto Hotus) and become a consul-
tative institution for cultural issues
(Government of Chile 2005, 5–11).
A second part of the proposal deals
with economic development and land
tenure. The infrastructure of the island
is to be improved, especially maritime
and air transportation to Chile. The
quality of medical care should also be
improved. Special funds are to be set
up for economic development, and
immigration from the continent
should be regulated in order to keep
the Rapanui people demographically
dominant on the island. One of the
most signiﬁcant changes in the pro-
posal concerns land tenure: All state-
owned land that is not used for state
services (such as schools, ofﬁces, the
airport, and military areas) would
become the collective property of
the Rapanui community. In order to
administer that property, a new insti-
tution has to be created, a so-called
Indigenous Community with an
elected board of directors and a presi-
dent, according to provisions in the
Indigenous Law (Government of
Chile 2005, 19–22).
In order for that statute to be con-
stitutionally possible, the president
introduced a bill to amend the con-
stitution in the Chilean congress, pro-
viding for the establishment of “spe-
cial administrative territories” outside
the Chilean regional administrative
system for Rapa Nui as well as for
the island of Juan Fernández off the
Chilean coast (La Segunda, 23 Aug
2005; El Mostrador, 23 Aug 2005).
Even though the above-described
statute proposal seems to be a large
step toward political reform, in fact it
is a watered-down version of the orig-
inal proposals of 2002–2003. For
example, unlike an earlier draft, the
ﬁnal document does not use the term
“autonomous” but instead speaks
only of a “special administrative
status.” The earlier draft had pro-
posed the complete dissolution of all
current institutions and the creation
of an “autonomous island entity”
with an elected assembly and a chief
executive that would have respon-
sibility for all ﬁelds of policy except
for defense, internal security, foreign
affairs, and justice, which would
remain under the Chilean govern-
ment—an arrangement similar to that
of the statute of French Polynesia.
The council of elders was also to be
reformed and democratized (Hacia
un Estatuto de Autonomia, nd). Com-
pared to these proposals, the institu-
tional changes proposed in the ﬁnal
draft are rather minor. It seems as if
the three local leaders who under-
signed the ﬁnal draft (Mayor
Edmunds, Governor Pakarati, and
Alberto Hotus) were keen on preserv-
ing their respective institutions, rather
than constructing something entirely
new. While the administrative separa-
tion from the Valparaiso region would
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certainly simplify the administrative
relationship with Chile, critics have
pointed out that the internal adminis-
trative bureaucracy on the island
could become even more complicated
with the new statute.
While those in support of Mayor
Edmunds and Hotus’s faction of the
council of elders were pleased about
the proposal being ofﬁcially adopted,
the local opposition protested. On 30
August 2005, members of the Rapa-
nui Parliament as well as other
(mainly pro-independence) activists
staged a protest march through the
island capital, Hanga Roa. They
wrote a letter to President Lagos pro-
testing the statute project, arguing
that it was the result of closed-door
negotiations with the Chilean govern-
ment involving only Governor Paka-
rati, Mayor Edmunds, and Elders
Councilor Hotus—despite a previous
agreement that any future negotiations
on political reform should involve a
broad range of representatives from
the Rapanui community (Chavez and
others 2005).
Meanwhile, another, more radical,
pro-independence activist, Agterama
Puhi ‘Uira a Huki, proclaimed himself
“king” of Rapa Nui and created a
“national civil registry” for native
Rapanui in order to issue “Rapanui
passports.” Many people did not take
him too seriously, but Alberto Hotus
ﬁled an ofﬁcial complaint, asking the
governor’s ofﬁce to intervene against
Huki, whom he accused of perpetrat-
ing an “attack on our country and a
reasonless offense against our culture”
(El Mostrador, 23 Aug 2005; Las
Últimas Noticias, 24 Aug 2005).
While any further initiative on the
statute reform project was now left
to the Chilean government, the next
important political event on the island
was the Chilean presidential election.
In the ﬁrst round on 11 December,
Socialist candidate Michelle Bachelet,
who won 46 percent of the votes on
the continent, received an absolute
majority of 52 percent on the island.
Right-wing candidate Joaquín Lavín
(who, with 22 percent, scored third
nationwide) came second on the island
with 27 percent, while the other right-
wing candidate, Sebastián Piñera
(with 25 percent in Chile) received
only 17 percent on Rapa Nui (ﬁgures
from the Web site of the Ministry of
Interior, Government of Chile). While
Bachelet had the support of Mayor
Edmunds, Governor Pakarati, and
Alberto Hotus, Lavín was supported
by the pro-independence Rapanui
Parliament. Both Bachelet and Lavín
had visited the island before and
made promises for the development
of Rapa Nui as well as indigenous
issues in general. In the campaign
before the election, Bachelet had
promised to support the special
statute project (El Mercurio, 18 May
2005; TRN, April–May 2005). Alberto
Hotus became her main supporter in
the local campaign.
On 15 January, Bachelet won the
runoff election against Piñera, with a
slightly higher percentage on Rapa
Nui than nationally (55 percent on
the island, 53 percent in Chile).
Bachelet’s victory became once again
a boost for the local political elite,
namely, Pakarati, Edmunds, and
Hotus (TRN, Jan 2006).
Shortly after Bachelet was inaugu-
rated as Chile’s ﬁrst female president
in early March, she appointed Mela-
nia Carolina Hotu as the new provin-
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cial governor of Easter Island. Hotu,
who is the daughter of famed political
activist Jerman Hotu (1925–2003),
and Alberto Hotus’s niece, had served
as the director of the local branch of
prodemu (a national organization
for the progress of women) and was
known to be very committed to the
island’s youth (RNJ, May 2006). In
her inaugural speech as the ﬁrst
female Rapanui governor, Hotu
underlined her commitment to the
welfare of the island community and
announced as her main projects the
lowering of transportation costs from
and to the island, the improvement of
the quality of health care, the promo-
tion of alternative sources of energy,
and the improvement of the water
supply system (TRN, special issue,
March 2006; El Mercurio, 17 March
2006).
The Bachelet government also
announced its continuing support 
for the special statute project (NRN,
March 2006), and in April, the
Chilean senate ﬁnally began to set it
on its agenda (NRN, April 2006). On
5 May, Bachelet made her ﬁrst visit to
the island as president (she had been
there before as health minister under
Lagos), participating in the annual
“Ocean Month” celebrations of the
Chilean Navy, which were held this
year on Rapa Nui. Bachelet renewed
her commitment to the special statute
project and announced that she would
soon introduce a bill in congress to
create the statute. She also called on
the entire population to actively col-
laborate in local decision making. She
further promised the construction of a
new hospital as well as improvements
for the island’s educational facilities.
During her visit, the navy returned
the symbolic remains of Ariki Time-
one Riro Kainga, the last king of
Rapa Nui, to the island. Riro had
been elected king in 1892 and died,
probably from poisoning, while on a
mission of protest against colonial
abuses in Valparaiso in 1899 (Fischer
2005, 153). The symbolic remains
were received by Benedicto Riroroko,
the king’s last surviving grandson.
For the ﬁrst time during a presiden-
tial visit, the Rapanui ﬂag was ﬂown
alongside the Chilean ﬂag (Presidency
of Chile 2006; La Tercera, 6 May
2006; NRN, May 2006).
Meanwhile, as the statute project
remained controversial within the
Rapanui community, it was
announced that a referendum should
be held on the issue, while critical
voices demanded the democratization
of the council of elders, should it
become an integrated political insti-
tution under the new statute (NRN,
May 2006).
While the debate on the future
political status of the island continues,
Rapa Nui’s tourist industry is boom-
ing. In 2005, a record number of
45,000 visitors was achieved (TP, 22
Feb 2006). Because the island has
fewer than 4,000 inhabitants, this
ﬁgure represents by far the highest
number of tourists per capita of any
Paciﬁc Island entity, far exceeding
even that of Hawai‘i. In 2004 the
number of tourists was over 30,000
(RNJ, Oct 2005), and in 1999 it was
21,000, while in 1990 it had been
only 5,000 (Fischer 2005, 250). In the
last ﬁfteen years the island has thus
experienced one of the most spectacu-
lar increases in tourism in the world.
The tourism boom promises a wealthy
future for the Islanders, as the indus-
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try is to a large extent in Rapanui
hands, but it creates more and more
problems as well. With 91 percent of
the local economy based on the rev-
enues from tourism (RNJ, May 2006),
the Islanders have become unilaterally
dependent on foreigners visiting their
island, a problematic tendency given
the fragile nature of tourism, which
can easily collapse due to external
inﬂuences over which the Islanders
have no control. On a more visible
level, the explosion of mass tourism
has also created problems due to an
insufﬁcient infrastructure, with elec-
tricity blackouts caused by overloads
such as occurred during the Tapati
annual cultural festival in February
(NRN, Feb 2006), and environmental
concerns over garbage disposal and
fears of water shortage (RNJ, May
2006; TRN, Jan 2006).
An especially intense controversy
related to tourism began in June 2005
when a Chilean company, Grupo
Martinez–am Holding, announced
plans to build a casino on the island,
in a joint venture with Rapanui entre-
preneur Petero Riroroko (NRN, June
2005; RNJ, Oct 2005). Mayor
Edmunds expressed his support for
the project, arguing that besides
creating one hundred ﬁfty jobs on 
the island, 10 percent of the income
would go to the municipality. Because
there is no income tax on the island,
the casino income would make the
municipality less dependent on
Chilean state funding (TP, 14 Sept
2006). On the other hand, many
inhabitants, including Governor Paka-
rati, stated their opposition, and many
Rapanui students and academics on
the Chilean continent collected signa-
tures against the project (RNJ, Oct
2005). The opponents argue that the
casino would only increase the prob-
lems accompanying mass tourism and
would contribute to the erosion of
Rapanui culture, because visitors
coming to the island for the sole
purpose of gambling would have no
respect for the historical monuments.
Schoolteacher and pro-independence
activist Mario Tuki, an outspoken
opponent, reminded everybody that a
distinctive cultural tourism is the basis
of the island’s livelihood, and that if
people want to gamble, they should
go to Las Vegas or Monaco (Santiago
Times, 5 April 2006). Due to the pro-
tests, as well as negative economic
calculations, the project was halted
in November 2005 and scheduled for
re-examination (NRN, Nov 2005).
In early 2006, however, the project
resurfaced, awaiting a decision from
the Chilean government for the casino
to be authorized. The ﬁnal decision is
expected in December (NRN, June
2006).
Another very serious negative effect
of mass tourism lies in its lure for
immigrants. In the last few years, 
the immigration of Chilean settlers to
Rapa Nui has increased dramatically.
In mid-2006 it was estimated that, for
the ﬁrst time, probably more Chileans
lived on the island than Rapanui (RNJ,
May 2006), conﬁrming fears raised by
Rapanui about becoming a minority
in their own homeland. Attracted by
the tourism boom, most of the recent
Chilean immigrants work as taxi
drivers, or they sell cheap imitation
woodcarvings, thereby undermining
the Rapanui handicrafts trade. Pro-
posals have been made to admit only
continental Chilean visitors who hold
an entry visa and a return ticket, as is
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required for Ecuadorians in the Galá-
pagos Islands (RNJ, May 2004). But
unless Rapa Nui is given special polit-
ical status, immigration controls of
that kind cannot be imposed under
Chilean constitutional law.
Because of the tourism boom (as
well as the worldwide diaspora of
more than a thousand Rapanui),
Rapa Nui has become a global com-
munity. On the one hand, as mass
tourism and mass immigration to
other islands have shown, this situa-
tion poses a threat to the island’s dis-
tinctive island identity. On the other
hand, the Rapanui people now have
more chances than ever to reintegrate
themselves into the Paciﬁc region and
the Polynesian community from
which they had become alienated
during more than a century of
Chilean colonialism. Culturally and
socially, this reintegration is already
happening. For example, Rapa Nui
participated in the Festival of Paciﬁc
Arts in Palau in 2004 (RNJ, Oct 2004),
and in July 2006 it sent a delegation
to the Paciﬁc Youth Festival in Tahiti
(NRN, July 2006). If in the near future
the island obtains a genuine statute of
autonomy, it may be possible for
Rapa Nui to also become part of
organizations like the Paciﬁc Com-
munity and eventually even achieve
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Political developments in Sämoa
during the review period were largely
concerned with the general elections
of 31 March 2006. Thus in the six
months before the general elections,
most political activities were related
to campaigning, in one form or
another, and subsequent events had
to do with cabinet appointments and
election petitions. These were still
continuing in the latter part of 2006.
The year demonstrated the
unprecedented extent of political
power held by a single political party,
the Human Rights Protection Party
(hrpp). In the 2001–2006 sessions
of Parliament, for instance, the party
held a two-thirds majority (33 seats
out of 49), which enabled it to change
the constitution on several occasions.
Following the 2006 general elections,
it actually increased its hold on power
with 35 seats. This means it has the
capacity to again change the constitu-
tion without a need for a referendum.
In short, the Human Rights Protec-
tion Party holds a monopoly of power
in Samoan politics. This raises impor-
tant questions as to why and how this
came about.
Looking back to the events of the
second six months of 2005, it can be
argued that many of the major politi-
cal events of that period were turned
into campaign issues. In fact many of
these events, such as the doctors’
strike and Salelologa land issue, were
blamed by the ruling party on the
machinations of the opposition in
their attempt to woo votes away from
the government in the general elec-
tions. True or not, the fact remains
that these were skillfully turned into
political issues, and at the end of the
day it seemed that the voters accepted
the government version of those
events.
It is not that the opposition parties
—such as the Samoa Development
United Party (sdup), Samoa Party
(sp), Christian Party (cp), and Samoa
Progressive Political Party (spss)—
were organizationally weak or lack-
ing in political rhetoric to be able to
unseat the government. Despite their
best efforts, they were outsmarted by
a brilliant strategist and technocrat,
Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malie-
legaoi. More important, the opposi-
tion parties were ﬁghting against a
government with one of the best
records of achievement by any
Samoan government of the past, a
government that has been in power
continuously during the last 22 years
of its 27-year history, and one that
has given Sämoa social stability and
an economy that has become a model
for the Paciﬁc region.
On practically every major political
issue that preceded the general elec-
tions, the ruling hrpp government
and main opposition party, the Samoa
Development United Party, took
radically opposed views. These issues
include the strike by members of the
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Samoa Medical Association; the
report by the international Inter-
Parliamentary Union (ipu); the issue
of New Zealand citizenship rights for
Samoans; the function of parliamen-
tary undersecretaries; and compensa-
tion for customary land purchased 
by the government at Salelologa, the
major interisland port in Savai‘i.
On 1 July 2005, the government
implemented the ﬁrst part of a 42
percent salary increase over three
years for all public servants. The
doctors who served in the public
hospitals were not satisﬁed with the
increase for a number of reasons.
First, they believed the increase
should have been imposed on a 
salary structure for doctors that had
been proposed in 2004 by the Samoan
Medical Association (sma). Second,
they also wanted the government to
address major complaints raised by
the medical association in the past,
such as the low salary scale for doc-
tors in Sämoa compared with over-
seas, long working hours (which were
affecting the doctors’ health), and
poor working conditions. Most
important, they wanted the entry
point salary, currently sat$21,000
per annum, raised to sat$30,000
(currently, one Samoan tala [sat$)] =
us$.36). As events turned out, the
entry point salary became the key
issue of the doctors’ complaints, one
they were not prepared to compro-
mise. As an sma spokesperson said,
the doctors’ grievances were non-
negotiable and they were tired of
meetings that resolved nothing. Not
getting a favorable response from the
government, on 9 September 2005
the doctors went on strike (SO, 9 Sept
2005). Over thirty doctors walked 
off the job, leaving just the few in
management positions.
The government’s reaction was to
set up a commission of inquiry into
the grievances of the striking doctors,
particularly the major issue of the
entry point salary. By 30 October
2005, the commission released its
report. Remarkably, the report
endorsed all of the requests by the
doctors. For instance, it recommended
“improving allowances for doctors,
improving stafﬁng levels, reducing
working hours for doctors in the out-
patients area, and bringing in more
overseas doctors” so that local doc-
tors could go overseas for specialist
training or to complete their studies
(SO, 30 Oct 2005).
In addition, the commission recom-
mended that private doctors be hired
to cope with staff shortages in the
outpatient areas as well as in the dis-
trict hospitals; that consultant doctors
be allowed to operate part-time pri-
vate practices; and that fees for hos-
pital services be increased. But the 
key sma demand for an increase in
the entry point salary to sat$30,000
was denied.
When the government considered
the commission’s report, it approved
all its recommendations. The resulting
impasse meant a continuation of the
strike by the majority of the doctors.
A minority found employment over-
seas or had set up private practices
locally. During the ﬁrst three months
of 2006, many of the strikers returned
to work, individually or in small
groups, but a number were lost to the
public service. This is not surprising,
given the fact that in the previous two
years, eighteen doctors had resigned
from the public service for other
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employment, primarily, it is alleged,
due to low salaries, long hours, and
poor working conditions––exactly the
kind of issues that led to the strike.
Both the Samoa Development
United Party and the Samoa Party
supported the sat$30,000 entry point
salary request by the doctors and
promised to implement it if elected.
The government’s position was that
all of the doctors’ recommendations
had been approved except for this one
matter. This was because the govern-
ment had pledged to look into other
entry point salaries in the public ser-
vice as well, and Prime Minister Tui-
laepa made it clear he preferred not to
approve salary increases for one
group without taking into considera-
tion all the other entry point salaries.
In April 2005, Asiata Saleimoa
Va‘ai, the deputy leader of the main
opposition party, was suspended from
Parliament for four months after the
Privileges and Ethics Committee found
him guilty of “defamatory remarks.”
The remarks were contained in a let-
ter of complaint he sent to the Inter-
Parliamentary Union and Common-
wealth Parliamentary Association, a
copy of which was also published in
the Samoa Observer. The complaints
referred to alleged acts of misinter-
pretation of parliamentary rules,
unfairness, and discrimination against
sdup members during parliamentary
sittings. The government had no
problem with the complaint as such,
but objected to the contents of the
letter, which were felt to be defama-
tory against the prime minister, the
Speaker, and Parliament itself. As
Tuilaepa said, Asiata’s complaint
reﬂected badly on the government 
and Parliament and smeared Sämoa’s
good name worldwide (SO, 27 Aug
2005).
As a result of Asiata’s letter, the
Inter-Parliamentary Union sent a
delegation to Sämoa to investigate.
The delegation consisted of Senator
Sharon Carstairs, a senior member
of the Canadian Parliament, and Ms
Ingeborg Schwarz, committee clerk.
The ensuing report recommended
the reinstatement of Asiata Saleimoa
Va‘ai, payment of his salary in full for
the time of his suspension, recognition
by the government of the Samoa
Development United Party as an
ofﬁcial parliamentary party, reinstate-
ment of Le Mamea Ropati Mualia as
leader of the opposition, and the com-
pilation of a list of words considered
inappropriate for use in Parliament.
The delegation could not understand
the legal basis for Speaker Toleafoa
Faaﬁsi’s refusal to recognize the
Samoa Development United Party as
a parliamentary party; it considered
the absence of a formal opposition
unsatisfactory and detrimental to the
good working of the democratic sys-
tem in Sämoa (SO, 7 Aug 2005).
In their report, the ipu delegation
also questioned the procedures under
which Asiata’s suspension had been
handled and the participation of the
prime minister in the hearings of the
Privileges and Ethics Committee. It
was particularly critical of the length
of the suspension, describing it as
wholly disproportionate. In New Zea-
land, for instance, the longest period
of suspension was three days.
Predictably, the backlash from the
government was strong. But the prime
minister’s case was not helped when
he described the two (female) ipu del-
egates in Parliament as “fa‘avasivasi
250 the contemporary pacific • 19:1 (2007)
(mentally retarded) old women” (SO,
27 Aug 2005). He repeated that char-
acterization when he complained that
their report had included no recom-
mendation for how Parliament should
handle situations when offending
members did not show up to defend
themselves. No one should be allowed
to force his views on how Sämoa’s
Parliament should conduct itself, he
said. As a result, on a motion by
Minister of Education Fiame Naomi
(a woman), the hrpp majority (33
members in all) voted to inform the
Inter-Parliamentary Union of the
Samoan Parliament’s rejection of its
report; the sdup members were
opposed.
Defending the government’s policy
of not recognizing the opposition,
Tuilaepa said this had to do with
recent changes in parliamentary rules,
which prohibited members from
changing their party afﬁliation during
a session of Parliament––they must
remain with the political party under
which they were registered. Previ-
ously, the main opposition party had
been known as the Samoa National
Development Party (sndp). Early in
2005, that party chose to deregister
its party in order to merge with
another smaller party to form the
Samoa Development United Party,
despite warnings from the Speaker
that this new party would not be
recognized in accordance with the
new parliamentary rules.
This was the problem, Prime Min-
ister Tuilaepa said. If the opposition
had waited till the end of the electoral
term, rather than changing midstream,
all its subsequent problems would
have been avoided. In creating this
new party, it had failed to gain proper
legal recognition in the proceedings of
the Samoan Parliament. Needless to
say, after the 31 March elections, the
Samoa Development United Party
again acquired proper legal status.
Other major issues that divided
the parties concerned New Zealand
citizenship rights for Samoans, the
functions of parliamentary under-
secretaries, and compensation for
customary land at Salelologa. The
government supported New Zealand
legislation that canceled New Zealand
citizenship rights for Samoans born
between 1924 and 1948 inclusive, in
return for other concessions granted
by the New Zealand government. The
Samoa Development United Party
supports the campaign by the Mau
Sitiseni Mo Samoa group to reinstate
those rights. It pledged to provide
funds, if elected, for this campaign.
The Samoa Development United
Party would also do away with the
undersecretary posts—since renamed
associate ministers—on the grounds
these positions represent unnecessary
expenditures by the government and
that the funds could be better utilized
for other social services, such as fam-
ily beneﬁts and increased pensions for
the elderly. Prime Minister Tuilaepa
responded that these positions were
needed because of the increased work-
load of the ministers; further, he said
(in true Samoan fashion), many hands
were better than a few.
The Salelologa land dispute arose
when some chiefs of the village of
Salelologa sued the government for
more compensation than the several
million Samoan tala it had already
received for village customary lands
used for the port of Salelologa. The
new claim was for sat$45 million.
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The Samoa Development United Party
said the government should grant the
village’s request. But when the court
decision came out, it was in favor of
the village, and the government was
required to reconsider the amount of
compensation, taking into account
current land valuation estimates. Not
to be outdone, however, the govern-
ment simply returned 2,439 acres of
the disputed land to the village, keep-
ing just 400 acres.
The political parties that took part
in the general elections of 31 March
2006, were the governing Human
Rights Development Party, the Samoa
Development United Party, the Samoa
Party, the Christian Party, and the
Samoa Progressive Political Party. In
addition there were thirteen Indepen-
dent candidates, who had formed a
loose alliance to contest the elections.
All parties made heavy use of the
mass media, posters, newspapers,
radio, and television to spread their
message.
In a political rally on the big island
of Savai‘i, sdup Leader Le Mamea
Ropati Mualia said that if his party
was elected to government it would
pay Salelologa village the correct
compensation for the 2,800 acres of
land taken by the government; limit
the term of the prime minister to two
consecutive terms; restore the position
of auditor general to its former inde-
pendent status; review the Village
Fono Act, cause of many constitu-
tional issues in the past; review the
performance of the Land Corporation
to ensure transparency and account-
ability; review the old-age pension
with a view to lowering the retire-
ment age and increasing pensions;
support the aims of the Mau Sitiseni
Mo Samoa group, headed by former
New Zealand mp Anae Afa; protect
Samoan customary land from sale to
foreigners, as the government was
allegedly planning; and allow
Samoans resident overseas to vote in
the general elections without having
to do so in Sämoa (SO, 20 Aug 2005).
The Samoa Development United
Party also proposed to establish a
new Ministry for Social Welfare to
address the country’s social problems
such as domestic violence, incest, sui-
cide, child adoption, spouse and child
maintenance, crime, women’s rights,
infant neglect, sexual abuse, and mat-
rimonial disputes.
The Samoa Party leader, former
Auditor General Su‘a Rimoni, said his
party’s aims were to return power to
the people and eradicate government
corruption. If elected to government,
his party would reduce the parliamen-
tary term from ﬁve to four years; limit
the prime minister’s term to two con-
secutive terms; hold referendums for
any important constitutional changes;
remove the Ofﬁce of the Electoral
Commission from cabinet control;
prevent the Speaker from belonging
to any political party once in ofﬁce;
appoint an opposition member to
chair the Public Accounts Committee;
ensure that the report of the con-
troller and chief auditor is tabled in
Parliament every year, with copies
made available to the media; ensure
that the chief auditor’s report is con-
sidered only by Parliament and not
by a Commission of Inquiry, as hap-
pened during the Toﬁlau administra-
tion; ensure that the posts of police
commissioner and assistant police
commissioners come under an inde-
pendent commission; and emphasize
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the development of agriculture (SO,
14 Oct 2005).
Speaking on behalf of the Human
Rights Protection Party, Prime Min-
ister Tuilaepa said the government
wanted to see the continuation of
current development projects as
spelled out in the hrpp election
manifesto. Of these projects, priority
would be given to health and educa-
tion. Tuilaepa’s top ﬁfteen priorities
included health; education; agriculture
and ﬁsheries; infrastructure for roads,
wharves, water, electricity, airports,
and shipping; sports development;
culture and traditions; women and
village development; police, ﬁre ser-
vices, and prisons; tourism develop-
ment; communications, television, and
information technology; Parliament;
customary land, government land,
environment, and natural resources;
proposed plans for the Ministry of
Revenue; other programs to lessen the
burden on the people; and overseas
and local funding for development
projects. In other words, the Human
Rights Protection Party was riding on
the successes it had achieved in previ-
ous years in the areas of development
and good governance.
Polls conducted by staff of the
Samoa Observer showed that in the
months leading up to the elections,
voters generally favored the Samoa
Development United Party, and its
leader as prime minister. Thus in the
19 February 2006 issue it reported
that out of 200 eligible voters sur-
veyed, 90 voted for the Samoa Devel-
opment United Party, 71 for the
Human Rights Protection Party, 18 for
the Samoa Party, and the rest divided
their votes among the Samoan Pro-
gressive Party, Christian Party, and
other small parties. For prime minis-
ter, 88 favored Le Mamea Ropati, 57
Tuilaepa Malielegaoi, 18 Su‘a Rimoni,
5 Toalepaialii Toeolesulusulu (leader
of Progressive Party), 3 Tuala Tiresa
Malietoa, and 29 favored others.
By 19 March 2006, twelve days
before the general elections, the
Samoa Observer reported that the
Human Rights Protection Party was
on the rise in its electoral survey. Of
200 eligible voters surveyed this time,
108 favored the Human Rights Pro-
tection Party to be the next govern-
ment, 58 were for the Samoa Devel-
opment United Party, 7 for the Samoa
Progressive Party, 6 for the Samoa
Party, 5 for the Christian Party, and
16 were undecided.
When the elections were ﬁnally
held on 31 March, the Human Rights
Protection Party swept to victory with
30 seats; the Samoa Development
United Party won 10 seats, the Inde-
pendents 8, and there was one tie.
Several weeks later, the Human Rights
Protection Party was able to claim 35
seats, after winning the tie and gain-
ing the allegiance of 4 former Inde-
pendents. The sdup total remained at
10, and Independents had dropped to
4 seats.
In his victory speech, hrpp leader
Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi said the
key to the party’s success was that
“we enjoy good liaison with grass-
roots level.” He praised the opposi-
tion parties for putting up a good
ﬁght, but, he added, their biggest
weakness was making promises they
could not fulﬁll and thus their credi-
bility suffered (SO, 2 April 2006)—
generous words in the end, but as a
Samoan proverb says, a win is a win.
The hrpp caucus unanimously
reelected Tuilaepa as prime minister,
but for the position of deputy prime
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minister there was a tussle, which the
previous deputy, Misa Telefoni Retz-
laff, won by 10 votes. sdup Leader
La Mamea and Deputy Leader Asiata
were also reelected to their previous
positions. None of the Samoa Party,
Christian Party, or Samoa Progressive
Party candidates were elected, but
their leaders have vowed to ﬁght on.
Prime Minister Tuilaepa’s selection
of his cabinet was controversial
because some former ministers lost
out and some switched to other posi-
tions, such as former Finance Minister
Misa Telefoni and former Minister of
Education Fiame Naomi. Tuilaepa,
however, denied there were any
ministerial demotions and that the
reshufﬂing of positions was designed
to broaden the scope of the ministers’
experience (SO, 28 April 2006).
The new cabinet members and
their portfolios as announced by the
prime minister were as follows: 
Tuilaepa Sailele, Prime Minister,
is responsible for Ministry of Immi-
gration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and Ofﬁce of Attorney General; also
for Executive Council, Honors and
Awards, Totalisator Agency Board,
Non-Government Organizations,
Polynesian Airlines, and Scholarships
Committee.
Misa Telefoni, Deputy Prime
Minister, is responsible for Ministry
of Commerce, Industry and Labor;
Legislative Assembly; Audit Ofﬁce;
Accident Compensation Corporation;
Samoa Tourism Authority; Telecom
Samoa Cellular; Paciﬁc Forum Line
and Samoa Shipping Services; Trade
Negotiations—wto, acp/eu, pacer,
picta (World Trade Organization,
Africa, Caribbean and Paciﬁc /Euro-
pean Union, Paciﬁc Agreement on
Closer Economic Relations, Paciﬁc
Islands Countries Trade Agreement);
Small Business Enterprise Centre; and
Consumer Protection. 
Fiame Naomi Mataafa, former
Minister of Education, is now respon-
sible for Ministry of Women, Com-
munity and Social Development;
Public Service Commission; Remuner-
ation Tribunal; Ombudsman’s Ofﬁce;
Village Mayors and Sui o le Malo;
and Special Committee on Traditional
Salutation and Legends. 
Tuisugaletaua Sofara Aveau is
responsible for Works, Transport,
Infrastructure (including Water and
Electricity); Trafﬁc and Civil Aviation;
Government Housing; Transport
Control Board; Samoa Port Author-
ity; Airport Authority; and Samoa
Shipping Corporation. 
Faumuina Tiatia Liuga, former
Minister of Works, is now responsible
for Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment; Samoa Land
Corporation; Samoa National Parks,
Recreation and Water Conservation;
Samoa Trust Estates Corporation;
Samoa National Disaster; Meteorol-
ogy and Forestry; and South Paciﬁc
Games Authority 2007.
Niko Lee Hang is a new minister
and has taken over the important
Ministry of Finance; National Provi-
dent Fund; Financial Institutions;
Housing Corporation; Tenders Board;
Revenue Board; Offshore Jurisdiction;
Registry of Births, Deaths and Mar-
riages; and Cabinet Development
Committee.
Tuuu Anasii, another new minister,
is responsible for Ministry of Rev-
enue; Public Trust Ofﬁce; and Liquor
Board.
Gatoloai Amataga Alesana Gidlow,
also a new minister, is Minister of
Health; Oceania University of Medi-
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cine; District Hospitals and Health
Center; and Women’s Health Com-
mittees.
Mulitalo Sealiimalietoa Siafausa
Vui, former Minister of Health, is
now Minister of Communications and
Technology and is responsible for the
Samoa Broadcasting Corporation. 
Toomata Alapati Poese is the new
Minister of Education, Sports and
Culture (which includes National
University of Samoa, Polytech, Pre-
Schools); and Museum and Archives. 
Unasa Mesi, a new minister, is
Minister of Justice and Courts Admin-
istration; Film Censorship; Law
Reform Commission; and Electoral
Commission.
Taua Kitiona, a new minister, is
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and
Agriculture, and is responsible for the
Agriculture Store Corporation.
Of the twelve cabinet ministers,
two are women (Gatoloai and Fiame);
ﬁve are new ministers; and one
(Toomata) was a minister of agricul-
ture in the 1990s. Of the ministers in
the previous Tuilaepa administration,
only Fiame, Tuisugaletaua, Faumuina,
and Mulitalo were reappointed, the
other two being the prime minister
and deputy prime minister. It certainly
looked like a purge of the old mem-
bers. But in the ﬁnal analysis, the
selection was entirely the prime min-
ister’s, based on established hrpp
criteria.
The new associate ministers and
their portfolios are as follows: 
Tuiloma Lameko, Ministry of the
Prime Minister/Cabinet; Immigration;
Non-Government Organizations. 
Vaeolenofoaﬁa Tapasu, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade; Press Sec-
retariat.
Hans J Keil, Ministry of Com-
merce, Industry and Labour; Trade
Negotiations—wto, acep/eu,
pacer, picta.
Tiata Sili Pulufana, Samoa Tourism
Authority; Legislative. 
Palusalue Faapo II, Ministry of
Finance; Financial Institutions and
Samoa Housing Corporation. 
Anauli Poﬁtu Fesili, Audit Ofﬁce;
Accident Compensation Corporation. 
Lafaitele Patrick, Ministry of
Revenue.
Galuvao Viliamu Sepulona, Min-
istry of Works, Transport and Infra-
structure; Samoa Shipping Corpora-
tion; Trafﬁc and Civil Aviation. 
Aiono Tile Gafa, Electric Power
Corporation; Samoa Water Authority;
Samoa Ports Authority; Airport
Authority. 
Moefaauo Luﬁluﬁ, Village Mayors
and Special Committee on Traditional
Salutation and Legends; chairman of
Village Mayors’ Committee, Upolu. 
Tuilo‘a Anitele‘a, Ministry of
Women and Ie Samoa; chairman of
Village Mayors’ Committee, Savai‘i. 
Fonotoe Pierre Lauofo, Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment;
Research Development Institute of
Samoa; Samoa Trust Estates. 
Tapuai Sepulona Moananu, Min-
istry of National Resources and
Environment.
Muagututia Pita Ah Him, Ministry
of Communication and Information
Technology; Samoa Tel and Samoa
Broadcasting Corporation. 
Sala Fata Pinati, Ministry of Agri-
culture and Fisheries. 
Leao Talalelei Tuitama, Ministry of
Health.
Safuneituuga Paaga Neri, Ministry
of Justice and Courts Administration. 
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Pa‘u Sefo Pa‘u, Ministry of Educa-
tion; National University of Samoa;
Samoa Qualiﬁcations Authority. 
Solamalemalo Keneti Sio, Ministry
of Education, Sports and Culture
Division.
Manuleleua Lalagofaatasi, Ministry
of Police (inclusive of Prisons and Fire
Service).
In some departments, such as edu-
cation, there are two associate minis-
ters. Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele
Malielegaoi said this was due to the
heavy workload of those departments.
The new Speaker of the House is
Tolufuaivalelei Falemoe Leiataua and
the new deputy speaker is Laauliale-
malietoa Leuatea. The vote was along
party lines: the government was sup-
ported by all Independents to obtain
38 votes against 10 by the Samoa
Development United Party, and one
member abstained.
Apart from the burning of a school
building and some incidents of stone
throwing by disgruntled supporters,
the elections were generally free of
violence. Sämoa has thus maintained
its reputation for peace and stability
in the midst of rapid social change.
Sämoa will join the World Trade
Organization in the not too distant
future.
Earlier this year, the US State
Department issued a report on the
human rights situation in Sämoa. The
report, made in compliance with the
US Foreign Assistance Act and Trade
Act, was heavily critical of the
Samoan government’s record on
human rights, describing Sämoa as a
one-party state, no doubt as a result
of opinions expressed in the ipu
report. The report said human rights
problems in Sämoa included deterio-
rating conditions for male inmates,
unfair parliamentary proceedings,
violence against women and children,
and discrimination against women
and non-matai (titleholders). In fair-
ness to the Samoan government,
though, it must be said that the
Samoa Development United Party
contributed to its own “nonexistence”
in Parliament by not heeding the new
parliamentary rules affecting member-
ship in political parties. This was 
the crux of the matter, as Tuilaepa
explained. If the Samoa Development
United Party had waited until the end
of the previous parliamentary term to
register as a new party, its dire situa-
tion would have been avoided.
The local police authorities have
also reported that they had never
been consulted by US ofﬁcials about
prison conditions in Sämoa. Violence
against women and discrimination
against women and non-matai are
also complex matters. Of course, such
violence should not be condoned, but
it occurs in all societies and Samoan
society is no exception. Women have
equal rights with males in Sämoa but
presumably discrimination refers to
political matters. For instance, in one
or two villages, women may not
become matai. However, this really
emanates from the reality of custom:
men and women have speciﬁc roles,
with men becoming the chiefs, and
wives serving as their advisers. Unti-
tled men may vote but not become
candidates for Parliament—again,
in keeping with traditional practice.
Untitled men serve their matai until
they are ready to take over the chieﬂy
roles of their fathers and uncles.
Samoans are comfortable with
their own cultural system and will
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change only when they see the need.
It was for this reason that Tuilaepa
said in a press interview for the
United States to “mind its own busi-
ness” and look to its own backyard
ﬁrst. Still, the monolithic power now
held by the Human Rights Protection
Party is terrifying to some critics.
sdup Deputy Leader Asiata Va‘ai,
for instance, labeled as disgusting the
appointment of twenty associate min-
isters, an increase of seven from the
previous Tuilaepa administration. In
Asiata’s view, this action by the gov-
ernment will result in the negation of
checks and balances required of a
healthy democratic system. For in
effect, the appointment of twelve
cabinet ministers and twenty associate
ministers and the election of an hrpp
Speaker and deputy speaker signify
that every hrpp member of Parlia-
ment is also a member of the execu-
tive. Thus, these ministers and associ-
ate ministers will make executive
decisions and defend these at the
same time in Parliament.
Now that the Samoa Development
United Party is again an ofﬁcial par-
liamentary party, it will become the
lone voice of opposition, a task it has
done admirably before. But the ques-
tion remains, will the Human Rights
Protection Party use its power wisely
and with moderation? This is indeed
the big question for Prime Minister
Tuilaepa, the economic genius who
has radically changed the social and
economic landscape of Sämoa, and
who has turned an economy that was
nearly bankrupt in the early 1980s
into one that has earned the admira-
tion and respect of renowned institu-
tions such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund since
2000. Above all, he has earned the
admiration and respect of his fellow
citizens who voted his party back into
power. 
unasa l f va‘a
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Tokelau
Arguably the most important event 
in recent years for Tokelau’s political
development was the self-determina-
tion referendum that took place on 13
February 2006. Tokelau’s 615 regis-
tered voters went to the polls to deter-
mine whether Tokelau would become
self-governing in free association with
New Zealand or continue as a non–
self-governing territory of New Zea-
land. The two-thirds majority required
for changing Tokelau’s political status
by voting “yes” was not achieved, and
the status quo will continue, at least
until another referendum is held. The
February referendum had been envis-
aged as the ﬁnal step in a series of
interrelated and sequential events lead-
ing to a new self-determined political
status for Tokelau. This report seeks
to review the recent initiatives and
events preceding the referendum and
to interpret its outcome.
The question put to Tokelau by the
ﬁrst visiting United Nation mission
back in 1976 was: Would Tokelau
consider having its own government
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like the rest of New Zealand’s former
colonies? The choices provided by the
UN Committee of 24 were limited to
three: independence, self-government
in free association with an indepen-
dent state, or integration with an
independent state. Tokelau’s answer
was brief: No thanks. Underpinning
this response were anxieties as
expressed to subsequent UN visiting
missions and New Zealand govern-
ment ofﬁcials: Tokelau needed a solid
infrastructure before considering
standing alone. Education, health, a
quality public service, and Tokelau’s
mativa (poverty) were in the forefront
of these concerns.
Following the 1967 UN Mission
visit, New Zealand substantially
expanded and upgraded the Tokelau
public service in response to these
concerns. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs published a booklet in Toke-
lauan and English (English title: Toke-
lau: Its System of Government and
Administration), setting out how it
saw Tokelau operating. The booklet
contains two features of particular
note: the front cover photograph of
a carver fashioning a model double
canoe, and a line drawing of a three-
seated canoe on the ﬁnal page. The
latter canoe is used metaphorically to
demonstrate how Tokelau is governed
both nationally and locally. The canoe
hull is labeled “Tokelau people.” The
three village-elected Faipule (leaders)
collectively are represented by the
steering paddle at the stern, and indi-
vidually by the reinforcing struts that
connect the three outrigger booms
(the elders’ councils) to the outrigger
(the pan-Tokelau General Fono). The
three village-elected Pulenuku (may-
ors) are equated with the three row-
ing paddles.
This line drawing from Wellington
with the position at the stern paddle
occupied by the collective Faipule was
at odds with Tokelau ideas about how
a canoe is run with he toeaina ke i te
mulivaka (an elder positioned at the
stern); the stern of the canoe is the
place from which wisdom and knowl-
edge emanates. The cultural position
of Tokelau elders is displaced in the
diagram and the image is indicative of
the type of thinking that set the stage
for ensuing social and political initia-
tives. Wellington and Tokelau were
not talking about the same canoe, yet
each has continued to articulate the
canoe metaphor in their own ways.
In 1993, a Tokelau National Gov-
ernment came into being, with the
three Faipule forming an executive
council and assuming ministerial port-
folios. Each year one of the Faipule in
rotation is designated the Ulu o Toke-
lau (Head of Tokelau), and in this
role represents Tokelau at regional
and international meetings. The ﬁrst
Ulu o Tokelau addressed a UN Decol-
onization Seminar in Port Moresby
(1993) with an address titled “From
the Lagoon to the Dark Ocean.” The
metaphorical message was that Toke-
lau was preparing to leave the calm
waters of the lagoon and to venture
into the uncharted waters, as it
embarked on a journey toward self-
governing status. While two domains
are explicit in the symbolic language
used (the lagoon and dark ocean), a
third domain is implied—the canoe
preparing to leave the safe waters of
the lagoon and venture into the
unknown waters. This was a bold
statement by the Ulu o Tokelau as
head of the new national government,
who was well aware that the three
villages of Tokelau had continuously
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told UN missions and New Zealand
that they were not ready for change.
In discussing the address with its
speaker, I discovered that the text
only exists in English; thus the speech,
voiced by the Ulu o Tokelau from an
English text, about Tokelau’s canoe
venturing forth was inaccessible to
many Tokelauans. Tokelau as a whole
and its separate villages are indeed
often likened to a canoe. Tokelau
functions collectively, arriving at
decisions by consensus. In a planned
voyage, all aspects of the planning are
formulated and overseen by senior
elders, who allocate speciﬁc tasks to
others. This collectivity adds credi-
bility and blessings to the whole
endeavor. Yet the contents of national
statements have rarely been discussed,
let alone debated, at the village or
pan-Tokelau levels.
I have reported on the Modern
House of Tokelau previously (Kalolo
2000). In 1998 New Zealand
appointed the ﬁrst Tokelauan public
service commissioner, in partial
response to the long-held Tokelau
stand that the public service must be
localized by replacing the New Zea-
land States Services Commission with
a Tokelau one. The Council of Fai-
pule elected in 1996 had urged the
return of public service administration
to the villages and initiated proposals
for a New House of Tokelau. This
“house” concept was coined by one
of the Faipule in 1997 and was later
expressed metaphorically by another
as a desire to “house all ﬁsh under
one rock.” These ideas were intro-
duced to the villages by all the elected
Faipule and Pulenuku, who visited all
three atolls for rounds of consulta-
tions. In mid-1999, the UN Committee
of 24 and New Zealand were given
notice of these new developments by
the Ulu o Tokelau. A joint committee
for what came to be called the Mod-
ern House Project was created, com-
prising the three Faipule representing
Tokelau, the administrator of Toke-
lau, and the newly appointed Toke-
lauan public service commissioner
representing New Zealand. After a
series of meetings in Apia in 2000,
a second round of consultative visits
was undertaken by the joint commit-
tee. Meetings took place in June
2000, during which the three village
councils endorsed the project. How-
ever, the elders cautioned that the
project should proceed with care in a
slow, calculated manner. The funda-
mental principle underpinning the
Modern House Project was that the
three villages are the foundation of
Tokelau and would be the basis of
governance structures in the future.
For lack of space, I limit the dis-
cussion here to an examination of
two of the main programs of the
Modern House Project, namely, Good
Governance and Capacity/Capability
Building. I highlight these programs
because they were designed to educate
Tokelau political leaders and the pub-
lic generally about nation building
and public service practice. Numerous
workshops, seminars, and meetings
were envisaged to prepare the popu-
lation for a probable future political
status, with a village-oriented
approach. By 2000, Modern House
Transition Teams and Village Council
Ofﬁces were in place to support this
planned public education venture.
A great number of concepts, such as
self-determination, democracy, good
governance, accountability, trans-
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parency, which have no direct equiva-
lent in Tokelauan, were to be dis-
cussed, analyzed, and adapted to the
Tokelau village context. These terms
are both difﬁcult to deﬁne and difﬁ-
cult to translate or ﬁnd equivalents
for in the local context. Because of
this, the timing and duration of this
public education was crucial, a pre-
requisite to any act of self-determina-
tion. The undp ofﬁce in Apia was
willing to give ﬁnancial assistance
to these programs, but unfortunately
they never got off the ground. This
setback is signiﬁcant in that after the
February 2006 referendum, when
asked why they voted “No,” many
people responded: “Ko au e he mala-
malama” (I do not understand).
The educational program did not
happen because the Modern House
Project was dismantled by the Council
of Faipule in 2003, arguing that it
should be “mainstreamed” through
the government. Initially, the project
had been headed by a general man-
ager who was responsible to the joint
committee. Following a two-to-one
decision to mainstream the project,
the general manager was asked to
resign and the Modern House Project
was placed under the auspices of the
Ofﬁce of the Ongoing Government of
Tokelau (a six-member executive com-
posed of all the elected Faipule and
Pulenuku, which replaced the Council
of Faipule in 2004). Gone was the
envisaged village-centered public
education endeavor, and most of the
Modern House ideas and principles
were shelved.
The years 2003–2005 were prepar-
atory for a self-governing status, cul-
minating in the planned referendum.
The work was organized mainly from
Apia by a team of legal advisers with
the help of Tokelau’s constitutional
adviser, Professor Tony Angelo.
Before reporting on the referendum
proper, two documents must be ana-
lyzed: the Constitution of Tokelau
and the Treaty of Free Association
between New Zealand and Tokelau.
The constitution document was
prepared by a constitution committee
and endorsed by the General Fono in
2003: “Therefore we, the people of
Tokelau, join together for the protec-
tion of our families and culture . . .
have now established these principles
for the Constitution of Tokelau”
(General Fono 2003). In 2005, both
the English and Tokelauan versions of
the document were approved by the
National Translation Committee,
which reported to the General Fono.
The work of the translation commit-
tee was then referred to the three Vil-
lage Councils for further discussions.
The document’s “Preamble” opens
with the familiar phrase: “We, the
people of Tokelau” (ocogt 2005). It
then covers such subjects as the Gen-
eral Fono, the Ongoing Government,
the Courts, Law Making, Land, Pub-
lic Service, Finance, and Human
Rights. Compared with other Paciﬁc
nations’ constitutions, the Tokelau
document is relatively short. Most
statements are not detailed, as evi-
denced by the one on human rights:
“Individual human rights for all peo-
ple in Tokelau are those stated in the
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and reﬂected in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.” This brevity is problematic,
as the “Universal Declaration of
Human Rights” and other interna-
tional conventions may be known to
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only a few, and certainly not to the
majority of the populace. It is safe to
speculate that the vocabulary associ-
ated with these topics is not well
understood.
The 2005 “Draft Treaty of Free
Association between New Zealand
and Tokelau” is an acknowledgment
“of the long history of friendship and
cooperation between New Zealand
and Tokelau and the many historical,
social and cultural links between their
peoples.” The document was origi-
nally composed in Wellington and
then repeatedly reﬁned and adapted
to suit each partner’s point of view.
It exists in two versions, English and
Tokelauan, and contains thirteen arti-
cles, beginning with a summary that
spells out the acknowledged principles
and values shared between the two
countries. Subsequent articles state
that New Zealand recognizes the
uniqueness of Tokelau language and
culture and undertakes to work with
Tokelau to ensure their retention and
development; Tokelauans will retain
New Zealand citizenship; New Zea-
land undertakes “to provide ongoing
economic support and infrastructure
development to improve the quality
of the people”; and New Zealand will
continue administrative, technical,
and specialist support.
The remaining articles address the
issues of emergency and disaster
relief, defense, international relations,
and the Tokelau International Trust
Fund. The document was slated to
come into force on the date it is
signed, that is, pending the outcome
of the referendum, which is now
history.
In the weeks leading up to the
referendum, several issues came to
the fore that could have been inﬂuen-
tial in determining the result. Here I
discuss just three of the issues: (1) the
rights of the Tokelau people living
abroad to participate in political
development of their homeland;
(2) the lack of understanding as
expressed by many; and (3) the dis-
unity in formulating and articulating
of the voice of Tokelau by the Coun-
cil for Ongoing Government.
The ﬁrst UN mission treated the
Tokelau homeland and the Tokelau
communities in New Zealand as one.
I have participated in many discus-
sions between Tokelau elected leaders
and Tokelau communities in New
Zealand and Sämoa; I have heard
many people living abroad expressing
a wish to participate in political deci-
sion making in the homeland by
engaging in debate and elections.
Many want to be considered Tokelau
citizens once self-rule is established,
and to maintain the rights to land
plots and house sites to which they
are entitled by customary law. The
General Fono, however, ruled in the
1990s that only Tokelauans residing in
Tokelau could make decisions affect-
ing Tokelau, reasoning that those liv-
ing abroad (some ﬁve times as many
as those living in the homeland)
should not determine local political
matters. Yet, at the same time, the
sons and daughters of Tokelau over-
seas were repeatedly urged to return
and serve their homeland. This deci-
sion applied in the case of the referen-
dum, despite repeated appeals from
Tokelau communities abroad. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the
issue of Tokelauans residing abroad
participating in the referendum was
ever debated in the Village Councils
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and General Fono. In the ﬁnal days
before the referendum, letters from
individuals and groups from abroad
were read publicly, asking the home-
land to reconsider the General Fono
decision, and presenting arguments on
why Tokelau should vote no.
In the weeks before the referendum,
the phrase “I do not understand” was
often repeated, particularly in the dis-
cussions about the referendum itself
and the voting process. In 2004 and
2005, the public consultations regard-
ing political development were con-
ducted by a team of legal advisers,
but the aims of the public education
envisaged in the Modern House Pro-
ject were never achieved. This, com-
bined with the input from overseas,
resulted in confusion. One politician
advised: “If you do not understand
the issues involved, vote no.”
The Council for Ongoing Govern-
ment compounded the uncertainty by
its own disunity. In mid-2005, the
General Fono instructed the six mem-
bers of the Council for Ongoing Gov-
ernment to visit all the three commu-
nities for a round of discussions. The
purpose was to consult and enlighten
the Tokelau public not only on current
constitutional and political issues, but
also on the planned referendum. The
visit eventuated but the whole council
did not participate. This did not go
unnoticed, and from this point on the
council as a team did not speak with
one collective voice for Tokelau.
Another referendum is planned to
take place in 2007. The General Fono
reviewed the results of the referendum
and noted “that the draft Treaty
between Tokelau and New Zealand
is still on the table” (General Fono
2006). The General Fono also agreed
to refer the issue again to the three
communities.
Come what may, there are a num-
ber of important issues that need to
be addressed. First among them is a
return to a village-centered public
education strategy as envisaged by the
Modern House Project, instead of the
irregular, brief consultative visits by
an Apia-based group. Second, the
issue of Tokelau people in overseas
communities wishing to participate in
decision-making in Tokelau needs be
revisited. What might be the rights of
Tokelauans living abroad to engage in
major decisions affecting economic
development in their homeland with
regard to representation and participa-
tion? What might be the role of peo-
ple residing abroad in international
politics involving their homeland?
These and other questions must be
discussed between representatives of
the homeland and the diaspora. Care-
ful translation of ofﬁcial documents
from English to Tokelauan (and Toke-
lauan to English) is another major
issue, particularly if the documents
represent the “voice” of either Toke-
lau or New Zealand. Last but not
least is that the members of the Coun-
cil of Ongoing Government need to
speak with one voice. As representa-
tives of the Village Councils and vil-
lages, and spokespersons of the Gen-
eral Fono in the international arena,
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The last decade has seen an escalation
of social, political, and economic
changes in Tonga, but the events of
the past year have been extraordinary:
Thousands of people participated in
numerous protest marches, climaxing
in a general strike that held the gov-
ernment hostage for six weeks; royal
family insiders spoke publicly against
the authority of the king; the ﬁrst
elected and commoner member of
Parliament was named prime minis-
ter; the ﬁrst woman was appointed to
cabinet; and the king gave his assent
to the National Committee for Politi-
cal Reform. It has been a dramatic,
traumatic, and emancipatory year for
Tonga, and in these respects the con-
sequences of the popular uprisings of
2005–2006 constitute a political,
social, and psychological coup for
Tongans at home and abroad.
In March 2005, whistle-blower
revelations about Shoreline, the com-
pany holding a monopoly on power
generation, provided the impetus for
the ﬁrst major march of what became
a season of marches. Piveni Piukala, a
former computer systems manager at
Shoreline, alleged ﬁnancial misman-
agement, falsiﬁcation of audits, and
exorbitant salaries of approximately
us$400,000 each for the three main
executives, Sosefo Ramanlal, Soane
Ramanlal, and Crown Prince Tupou-
to‘a. Piukala warned that the prob-
lems at Shoreline would cause the
people to feel disloyal toward the
royal family and especially toward the
crown prince. In early May, the Peo-
ple’s Representatives ﬁled writs in the
Supreme Court against Shoreline and
the Tonga Electric Power Board. At
the same time, the Tongan Human
Rights and Democracy Movement
(thrdm) began organizing a petition
and conferring with the People’s
Democracy Party and other “Demos”
—democracy movement supporters—
about a protest. The petition listed
objections to the way the national
electricity provision had been priva-
tized, to the fact that Shoreline held a
monopoly, and to the fact that elec-
tricity was so expensive while the
company’s directors received such
high salaries. After gaining twenty
thousand signatures, on 26 May
2005 a record four thousand people
marched to present the petition to
the palace. It was read aloud by the
thrdm president, the Rev Simote
Vea. As he spoke, Vea also called on
the king to surrender power to the
people and to become a ceremonial
ﬁgurehead like the monarch in Brit-
ain. (The People’s Representatives
later disavowed prior knowledge of
these latter demands.)
The next day, parliamentarians
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considered the forthcoming budget
and appropriations for salary revi-
sions, which had been going through
committees including the Higher
Salary Review Committee. Amid the
debate, ‘Akilisi Pohiva, the First Peo-
ple’s Representative for Tongatapu,
was steadfast in moving for a delay on
the salary revisions vote. His motions
were defeated, and on 1 July the new
salary scales came into effect. Upper-
echelon civil servants were awarded
raises of up to 57 percent, while some
of those in the bottom tiers received
nothing.
The public servants’ strike was
the deﬁning event of 2005. It began,
unofﬁcially, early in July. Soon after
the salary revisions were released,
deputy ministers and other mid-level
administrators from various sections
of the public service began clandes-
tinely discussing the recently released
revised salary scales. Their cautious
discussions with each other stemmed
from the unusual way in which
salaries and departmental budgets
had been released: Previously, the civil
roll was an open document, and civil
employees were able to compare
budgets and remuneration. But in
2005, this transparency was foregone;
administrators were told that they
only needed to know the information
for their own sections. However, as
one deputy department head told me,
“The cabinet’s attempt at secrecy
was defeated in the Tongan way:
Of course, we all have family in other
parts of the civil service. After some
phone calls, we knew the whole bud-
get! That’s when we knew that the
pay rises were unfair.”
A meeting of a thousand civil ser-
vants on 13 July led to the formaliza-
tion of the Public Service Association
(psa), with Finau Tutone as president
and Maliu Takai as vice president. At
the meeting there were calls for a
national strike and another protest
march, but the newly formed psa
executive managed to convince the
members to begin with a letter of
grievance. This was submitted to
Paula Ma‘u, the deputy secretary to
the prime minister, on 15 July, with a
response requested within three days.
The prime minister was out of the
country, but on 20 July, with no
response from the prime minister’s
ofﬁce, Clive Edwards (former minister
of police but now one of Tongatapu’s
People’s Representatives) gave an
interview on television. He spoke of
the inequity of the new salary struc-
tures. As Edwards put it, while gov-
ernment ministers now earned over
t$100,000 (us$52,532) a year, police-
men struggled to survive on t$50
(us$26.27) a week. The People’s
Representatives, he afﬁrmed, would
support a strike if the Public Service
Association called for one. The fol-
lowing evening, 21 July, two thousand
civil servants met at the Queen Sälote
Hall in the capital of Nuku‘alofa and
voted for an immediate strike.
At the time of the Shoreline pro-
test, a march of four thousand people
seemed a huge turnout. But it proved
to be a mere rehearsal for the protests
to come. Despite pleas by the psa
executive to give the prime minister’s
ofﬁce more time, and buoyed by the
momentum of the turnout for the
Shoreline protest, the civil servants
had had enough. Overnight they
mobilized, and on 22 July an esti-
mated six thousand people marched
through Nuku‘alofa to Parliament.
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These numbers reﬂect roughly 8 per-
cent of the residents of the main island
of Tongatapu, and 6 percent of the
national population. The turnout for
the march and the rapidity with
which the civil action was mobilized
astonished even the organizers. Their
demand was simple: change the salary
scales.
The ﬁrst response came from Act-
ing Prime Minister Cecil Cocker. He
advised the striking workers that the
cabinet could not accommodate them;
they had to follow procedure and
seek a resolution to their salary dis-
putes from their heads of departments
and the Public Service Commission.
He also warned that if people did not
return to work, they would be dealt
with under the public service regula-
tions—a clear threat. The next day,
23 July, downtown Nuku‘alofa was
like a ghost town. Strikers had not
returned to their desks. The ofﬁces of
the Ministries of Marine and Ports,
Fisheries, Lands, Labor, Works, the
Post Ofﬁce, the Civil Service Com-
mission, and the Treasury were essen-
tially closed. A lack of ports person-
nel required one ship to bypass its
scheduled stop in Tonga. But the gov-
ernment remained steadfast: there
would be no changes to the salary
scales.
Undaunted, the Public Service
Association held a rally on 25 July,
again at Queen Sälote Hall, where
they voted to ask Parliament to sup-
port their cause. Following the rally,
some two thousand people marched
to Pangai Si‘i, a park located in cen-
tral Nuku‘alofa between Parliament,
Treasury, and the Prime Minister’s
Ofﬁces. They declared their intention
to wait there for the government’s
response to their request. The follow-
ing morning, Finau Tutone issued a
call for the civil servants to begin
meeting at Pangai Si‘i until they
received the government’s response.
Public schools throughout the country
were forced to close, as 1,466 (out of
1,600) teachers walked off the job.
The psa letter proposed increases of
80 percent to salaries for the lowest-
level employees, 70 percent for those
at the mid-level, and 60 percent for
those in the upper ranks. They esti-
mated the raises would cost t$20
million (us$10,506,409) and could
be covered without increasing taxes.
This has come to be referred to as the
“60, 70, 80 Letter.”
In Parliament, the Tu‘ipelehake,
nephew of the king and a Nobles’
Representative, made a motion in
support of the psa letter. With cabinet
members abstaining, Nobles’ and Peo-
ple’s Representatives voted to refer
the letter to the cabinet. Meanwhile,
a labor negotiator and a retired judge
arrived from New Zealand, at the
request of the Tongan government,
to act as mediators. Acting Prime
Minister Cecil Cocker demanded that
the strikers return to work while the
negotiations took place. The Public
Service Association responded that
they would, if granted an immediate
60 percent pay increase. When gov-
ernment refused, the association
refused to meet with the mediators.
When they returned to New Zealand,
the labor negotiator called on the
trade unions there to support the
Tongan strikers.
By 28 July, with imports and
exports stymied, the business com-
munity became involved. Sione Kioa,
president of the Tonga Chamber of
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Commerce, brokered a deal between
the PSA executive and most govern-
ment ministers that seemed to provide
a means for people to return to work
while negotiations continued. The
deal called for a return to the old
salary structure (the one that had
been in place prior to 1 July 2005),
but with an increase of 10–15 percent
for all civil servants below heads of
departments and ministers, and an
agreement to plan for further pay
increases as they could be afforded.
The deal also called for reforming
the membership of the Higher Salary
Review Committee so that it included
actual civil servants. The ﬁnal point
was to suspend and defer the imple-
mentation of the salary system that
had been devised by the Higher Salary
Review Committee. All that was
required for civil servants to return to
work was some sort of ofﬁcial conﬁr-
mation from the prime minister, who
had recently returned from overseas.
The prime minister, Prince ‘Ulukalala
Lavaka ‘Ata, thanked the business-
people for their interest but advised
them that government would follow
its own process.
The prime minister’s rejection of
the deal was perceived by many civil
servants as a strong-arm tactic,
rumored to be on the advice of the
crown prince. They saw it as intended
to break their solidarity and play on
their poverty. Whether these motives
were true or not, the strikers began to
show increased resolve: Pangai Si‘i
became the daily staging ground for
the striking workers to hear speeches,
sing songs, and drink kava. This
attracted supporters beyond those
working in the civil service, as well as
those working in essential branches,
such as health and police, or those
who could not afford to go on strike.
On 29 July, the cabinet offered a
unilateral raise of 12.5 percent,
funded mostly by cabinet ministers
agreeing to relinquish the raises allo-
cated to them by the Higher Salary
Review Committee. The cabinet
argued that this was all the country
could afford. The minister of ﬁnance,
Siosiua ‘Utoikamanu, said that the
psa proposal would cost t$36.8 mil-
lion, and would require raising more
taxes, contrary to what the Public
Service Association had determined.
Later, the ﬁnance minister admitted to
an error in his estimation. His error
was a source of both amusement and
derision within the ranks of the strik-
ing civil servants. As one striker told
me: “I used to look up to them, they
were the ministers, but now, I saw,
they don’t know what they are doing!
I am the one with the degree in eco-
nomics, we are the ones who have the
education, and they make decisions
but they even don’t know how. They
are incompetent and we cannot let
them ruin Tonga any more.” The 12.5
percent offer was rejected and was
later followed with other cabinet pro-
posals—20 percent, then 30 percent—
but the strikers’ resolve was solid.
“We know the money is there,” many
people said, in response to the argu-
ment that pay raises over 30 percent
would bankrupt the country.
By now, the gatherings at Pangai
Si‘i were larger and more elaborate.
Marquees, tables, and benches were
set up, and a portable loudspeaker
system allowed the growing crowds to
hear and voice their opinions. Food
was donated by local businesses, and
a local television station aired live
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broadcasts of the speeches. Sympathy
for the striking workers was expand-
ing across the country and overseas.
The interest of foreign media organi-
zations was acknowledged with pro-
test signs written in English.
On 3 August, the head prefect of
Tonga College led one hundred sing-
ing and clapping students to Pangai
Si‘i, where they declared their support
for their teachers and expressed con-
cern for their education. In response,
the minister of education, the Rev-
erend Dr Tevita Palefau, announced a
salary offer for teachers amounting to
t$2 million, with raises ranging from
60 percent to 125 percent. Two days
later, on 5 August, in the largest polit-
ical gathering in Tongan history,
teachers and other striking workers
met at the Teufaiva Stadium to dis-
cuss the offer. They voted resound-
ingly to reject the offer, seeing it as
“too late” and as a blatant attempt to
split psa solidarity. The Tu‘ipelehake
spoke in support of the strikers’ goals
and acquired the nickname, “the
People’s Prince.” The cheering and
clapping crowd of ten thousand, with
the Tu‘ipelehake among them, then
marched from the stadium to Parlia-
ment to deliver their uniﬁed response:
the only acceptable offer was “60, 70,
80, for all public servants.”
5 August was a busy day in Nuku-
‘alofa. While actively supporting the
strikers in their off-hours, most physi-
cians, dentists, nurses had remained
on the job. But this day, some six
hundred health professionals, led by
Drs ‘Aivi Puloka and ‘Ana ‘Akau‘ola,
marched to Pangai Si‘i, leaving behind
a skeleton crew to handle obstetric
and emergency cases at Vaiola Hospi-
tal. Striking health workers were
joined by students and parents from
the Nuku‘alofa Primary School, the
Catholic Women’s League, and the
Tonga Institute of Higher Education.
The civil servants’ strike was becom-
ing a general strike.
Soon thereafter, the cabinet issued
an order to close Pangai Si‘i. This led
to the ﬁrst confrontation between
strikers and police. Early in the morn-
ing on Monday, 8 August, police cor-
doned off the park entrances. When
the initial group of strikers arrived
they were told to go home. Instead, a
crowd gathered at the perimeter of
the park. The mood was deﬁant. The
potentially volatile situation was dif-
fused when the Reverend ‘Aisea Kava
began to pray: as the police ofﬁcers
joined in the prayer, the crowd of
about two hundred spontaneously
surged into the park with cries of
“Don’t fear!” One woman described
it to me afterward as “a wonderful
moment. It was like God was there
with us.” Police admonished the
crowd for disobeying the cabinet
order but did not force them to vacate
(privately, several police ofﬁcers told
me they supported the strikers’ goals
and only refrained from joining the
strike out of duty to keep the peace).
psa president Finau Tutone drafted an
immediate letter to the Privy Council,
requesting reversion of the cabinet
order, while People’s Representative
Clive Edwards requested a court
injunction. On the same day, the king
tried to appease the strikers by prom-
ising an independent audit of the
salary scales. The psa executive and
strikers responded that they would
continue to wait at Pangai Si‘i for the
results. The next day, Chief Justice
Robin Webber delivered his judgment
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that the cabinet had no right to close
Pangai Si‘i.
On Sunday, 14 August, Teufaiva
Stadium was again the site for a huge
gathering—this time a church service
in which an estimated ﬁve thousand
people came to pray with the king
for a solution to the strike. But His
Majesty was upstaged by his democ-
racy-supporting nephew, the Tu‘ipele-
hake, who received applause and
cheers when he stood to read a Bible
passage. On Monday, the Public
Service Association offered cabinet
a twelve-point proposal for how to
resume negotiations. It included the
need for two arbiters—one for the
government and one for the associa-
tion—plus a mutually agreed
“umpire.” As the association waited
for the cabinet’s response, the royal
family traveled to Auckland to cele-
brate the engagement of Princess Pilo-
levu’s daughter, Fanetupou Vava‘u,
to the grandson of the Samoan para-
mount chief, Malietau Malietoa. The
irony of civil servants struggling to
pay bills while the royal family funded
a lavish celebration did not go unno-
ticed, and led to the ﬁrst real strike-
related violence within Tonga.
On 17 August, students at Tonga
College were informed that their
principal, Tu‘amelie Faaitu‘a, and
head tutor, Lopaki Fiﬁta, were being
removed to the main education ofﬁce
in Nuku‘alofa. Both had been sup-
porting the civil service strike. Frus-
trated and angry, boys of the senior
class began to smash computers in the
school ofﬁces, then stormed outside
and attacked the cars of the new act-
ing principal, Kakala Unu, and an
administrator from the Ministry of
Education. Then they marched off
the school compound. Police arrested
two hundred students and detained
another one hundred until their par-
ents came to retrieve them. Later that
day at Pangai Si‘i, a protestor read a
letter threatening more violence if the
government did not settle in favor of
the strikers. In the early hours of 18
August, four cars parked in the Inland
Revenue Service lot were torched and
exploded. The following night, Sosefo
Ramanlal’s house was attacked with
Molotov cocktails. Damage was mini-
mal. But on 23 August, Uoleva, a
historic house in the village of Tata-
kamotonga (on Tongatapu) that
belonged to the royal family, was
destroyed by ﬁre. On the northern
island of Vava‘u, computers at the
government high school were found
smashed and classrooms ransacked.
The damage was done in the early
hours of 24 August, and police sus-
pected students. Meanwhile, the king
was still in Auckland, and his resi-
dence there was the focus of unprece-
dented protests, which were also
tinged with violence.
A surprise visit to Pangai Si‘i by
Princess Pilolevu, recently returned
from New Zealand, and acting as
regent in her father’s absence, may
have helped stem the violence, which
was shocking to Tongans on both
sides of the debate. On 25 August,
the princess wept as she spoke to the
strikers and referred to the personal-
ized attacks on her father. In response
to her request that people return to
work, Fotu Fisi‘iahi, psa secretary,
asked her politely to give the
requested raises of 60 percent, 70
percent, and 80 percent, so that they
could resume working (such boldness
was unthinkable just a few months
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before). While people were impressed
that the princess would make such a
gesture, and hopeful that she would
implement some positive action, they
continued to occupy the park. Later
that same day, two hundred support-
ers arrived from the island of ‘Eua.
They marched from the wharf to Pan-
gai Si‘i, followed by trucks laden with
produce for the cash-strapped strik-
ers. People had been without payment
for ﬁve weeks.
Meanwhile, in New Zealand, Dr
‘Ana ‘Akau‘ola, the kingdom’s only
radiographer and a member of the
psa executive, was participating in
a hastily arranged speaking circuit,
explaining why she supported the
strike. She and Sione Fiﬁta, a cleaner
in the Ministry of Works, spoke to
several groups about the strike, the
pay demands, and how they could be
funded. Their audiences were drawn
from trade unions and social justice
activists, Green Party members,
elected members of the New Zealand
Parliament, and members of the
broader Paciﬁc community. While they
were in Tonga, Thomas Goddard, a
retired New Zealand judge who spe-
cialized in employment law, was in
Tonga, attempting to negotiate an end
to the strike. Even though he had been
invited by both the government and
the Public Service Association, by 27
August he admitted defeat, saying he
had not even been able to get the
parties to agree on a process. Part
of the civil servants’ intransigence
resulted from their growing realiza-
tion that the best solution for Tonga
was democratic reform. Thus, what
started as a protest against the
inequities of higher-paid civil servants
getting raises while lower-paid and
longer-term workers received little or
nothing became a platform for advo-
cates of democratic reform. Strikers
and democracy proponents coalesced
into a natural and politically savvy
alliance. While they had been touched
by the princess’s tears, the strikers
were more profoundly affected by
their own solidarity and success.
In the end, the strikers got every-
thing they asked for. As supporters
continued to arrive from the outer
islands, bringing food and textiles as
gifts to their Tongatapu confederates,
on 1 September the Public Service
Association delivered its most startling
demand: that the cabinet resign and
put in place a democratically elected
Parliament. The People’s Democratic
Party, led by long-time People’s Rep-
resentative Teisina Fuko, had deliv-
ered a letter to the palace earlier in
the strike (11 August), asking the
king for a more democratic system in
Tonga, in which the people of Tonga
would take part in running the coun-
try by having the right to elect the
members of cabinet, including prime
minister and government ministers.
This small petition was reiterated as a
demand, one that the princess regent
and her younger brother, the prime
minister, must have taken seriously,
given the recent violence and the
overseas support for an end to the
monarchy. On 1 September the Privy
Council met, after which time the
princess regent led her brother and
most of the Privy Council members
across to Pangai Si‘i to deliver their
offer directly to the striking civil ser-
vants: If the strikers would return to
work that day, they would pay the
60-70-80 percent increases on an
interim basis while negotiating a long-
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term agreement. They would also set
up a negotiating committee made up
of the respected noble Fielakepa (who
holds a graduate degree in law), Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs (and former
diplomat) Tu‘a Taumoepeau, and
Minister of Labour, Commerce, and
Industries Feleti Sevele, a former Peo-
ple’s Representative who had been
made a cabinet minister. The ﬁnal,
and most important inclusion in the
committee’s makeup was Dr Sitiveni
Halapua, director of the Paciﬁc
Islands Development Program at the
East-West Center in Honolulu and
expert facilitator with success in the
aftermath of the latest Fiji coup.
The psa response to the Princess
Regent and Privy Council came a few
hours later. They rejected the offer
but were willing to enter into negotia-
tions with the new team. Having put
in the demand for an elected cabinet,
and after weeks of domestic and over-
seas support for democratic reforms,
there was a feeling among some mem-
bers of the psa executive that they had
an opportunity to effect real change.
Plans were already in the works for a
pro-democracy march, set for 6 Sep-
tember. During negotiations, ironically
enough, it was long-time democracy
activist ‘Akilisi Pohiva who counseled
the psa executive to accept the offer
and carry on to ﬁght for democratic
reforms. On 3 September, all parties
signed a memorandum of understand-
ing by which the civil servants would
return to work. The Public Servants
Association, established in the early
days of the strike, and with little train-
ing as labor negotiators, ended up
with a resounding win for the civil
servants. The pay raises were imple-
mented as 60-70-80, but with the
proviso that the 60 percent increases
would be immediate, while the rest
would begin in the next ﬁscal year.
Strikers were to be paid for the time
they had been on strike, and the stu-
dents who supported them (including
the vandals) would not be disciplined.
The memorandum also included pro-
visions against government down-
sizing, especially at the expense of
those who had participated in the
strike. Another important aspect of
the memorandum stipulated that the
cabinet team members would raise
the demand for a fully elected gov-
ernment with the rest of the cabinet.
On 5 September, after forty-four days
of striking, the civil servants returned
to work.
Ostensibly, the protest began over
objections to the salary revisions. In
reality the roots of the civil action
were laid several years before. For
decades, Tonga has been described as
having a mirab economy (based on
Migration, Remittances, Aid and
Bureaucracy). As the main employer,
the Tongan civil service has become
bloated, cost-inefﬁcient, and bifur-
cated: While some employees’ job
categories and skills were outmoded
(typists, drivers, ﬁling assistants),
others required years of specialized
overseas education (economists,
statisticians, environmental scientists,
health professionals). Tonga’s long-
term commitment to higher education
has enabled a brain drain that beneﬁts
the nation and individual households
in terms of remittances, but has done
far less for internal productivity or
efﬁciency.
Tonga’s King Täufa‘ähau has
consistently thought of himself as a
modernizer, and under his reign the
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government has sustained long-term
and generally positive relationships
with foreign advisers, aid donors, and
lenders, including Australia, Britain,
Canada, China, the European Union,
Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, the
United States, the International Mon-
etary Fund, and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (adb). Most recently,
Tonga has been planning for member-
ship in the United Nations and World
Trade Organization. Tupou IV’s reign
has ushered in an increasingly import
and cash-based economy, and a grow-
ing diaspora of the well-educated,
with a local economy that has for a
long time sustained an ideology of
security and well-being through fam-
ily, church, tradition, and household-
based subsistence production.
However, recent reports have
indicated household subsistence is
no longer a source of security, and
Tongans are experiencing real hard-
ship. An adb-funded team (in con-
junction with local researchers)
conducted an assessment of Tonga’s
progress towards the UN Millennium
Development Goals for Poverty
Reduction. The report, entitled
“Priorities of the People: Hardship
in Tonga,” drew on comprehensive
qualitative and quantitative research
conducted in communities from ‘Eua
and Tongatapu in the south to Tafahi
in the north. It ﬂagged problems
relating to the increased monetization
of the Tongan economy because of
high remittance rates; the urbaniza-
tion and out-migration from rural
and island areas, which created extra
burdens for remaining rural residents;
low growth rates in private economic
sectors; perceived inadequacy of gov-
ernance standards; weak private
investment; poor access to services
and opportunities; poor quality of
service delivery; lack of employment
or other income-generating and tech-
nical-training opportunities; ruptures
in the traditional Tongan kainga
(extended family) safety net; eco-
nomic hardship in a small but signiﬁ-
cant percentage of households; and
increasing income maldistribution.
The report speciﬁcally recognized
that measures to alleviate the hard-
ship required concurrent micro- and
macro-level responses, with emphases
on health, social, and educational
service delivery to the more remote
villages, opportunities for vocational
training, improved governmental
standards, private sector investment,
and ﬁscal discipline.
The assessment, conducted in
November 2003, came midway in the
government’s implementation of its
Economic and Public Sector Reform
Programs (underway since 2001),
intended to ensure equitable prosper-
ity for the nation in the future, and
based on the overseas and internal
economic advisers’ arguments that
with household income highly depen-
dent on remittances, reduced numbers
of households producing their own
food, and limited avenues for improv-
ing the foreign trade balances, Tonga
was headed for ﬁnancial collapse.
Aiming to reduce their costs, the gov-
ernment planned to downsize the civil
service and encourage private sector
and entrepreneurial businesses while
preventing a brain drain. Privatization
and corporatization of public enter-
prises would create the jobs to absorb
the public servants who would be
made redundant. Essentially, the adb
report conﬁrmed the importance of
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the Tongan government’s reform
directions and strategies.
The civil service salary scales were
part of this neoliberal strategy to
modernize the Tongan economy. They
were intended to align remuneration
with job skills, responsibilities, and
level of education, and thereby reduce
the incentive for high-skilled, priori-
tized labor to emigrate, but also to
provide disincentives for redundant
workers to remain on government
payrolls. What seems to have taken
the cabinet and royal family by sur-
prise was the degree to which ordi-
nary Tongans would object to this
strategy of remunerative inequity.
While the new civil service pay scales
mimicked principles of remuneration
common in the nations to which Ton-
gans have been migrating, they were
radically different from past practices
in which seniority, personal history of
service, job title (rather than skills),
and (unfortunately) gender factored
into individuals’ promotion and
remuneration. Rather than posing
the question as “How can we make
Tonga’s economy more productive
and competitive?” the strikers asked,
“Why should those who are already
paid so much more get raises?” and
“What kind of government allows
some Tongans to be so much poorer
than others?” Those questions merged
economic agendas with moral ones.
While such language was rarely
used in Tonga, the protests of 2005
represented resistance to aspects of
the neoliberal models of economic
reform. Reducing government
expenses through privatization,
improving efﬁciency and ﬁscal conser-
vancy through corporatization, and
depending on private sector entre-
preneurialism to stimulate jobs are
mantras that are by now familiar in
all globalization scenarios. There is no
question that some Tongan business-
men have succeeded in these sectors,
both in Tonga and overseas. But for
many Tongans, the model of corpora-
tization of public enterprises is best
exempliﬁed by the actions of the
princess royal (who controls Friendly
Islands Satellite Communications
[Tongasat], including the income
from Tonga’s highly lucrative geosta-
tionary satellite slots) and the crown
prince (who, as minister of Foreign
Affairs and chairman of the Tonga
Electricity and Power Board, con-
vinced the cabinet to give him a
twenty-year lease to manage the board
as his own company). The geostation-
ary satellite slots were supposed to
provide Tonga with the equivalent
of Iraq’s oil and keep the country
wealthy, but the nation receives very
little income from Tongasat. Tupou-
to‘a promised to make the business
more efﬁcient, thereby reducing elec-
tricity rates and improving services for
Tongans. Shoreline did buy new gen-
erators, but they also reduced their
staff from 120 to 20, borrowed heav-
ily, and paid the three owner/chief
executive ofﬁcers huge annual salaries.
As high-proﬁle models for how the
private sector will create jobs for the
forthcoming civil service redundancies
and meet the government’s goals of a
higher standard of living for all Ton-
gans, both Shoreline and Tongasat
have failed to impress.
The Tongan government’s goals—
attaining a higher standard of living
for all Tongans and creating more
efﬁcient and effective public sector
services—were, and remain, laudable.
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However, by 2005, as world prices
and local inﬂation rose, as the value
of remittances waned, and as the
changes introduced under the Eco-
nomic and Public Sector Reform
Programs began to be felt, the reality
of the experience for ordinary Ton-
gans was akin to that of East Berlin-
ers after 1989. Inﬂation hit double
digits, some 23 percent of the popula-
tion was experiencing incomes below
the poverty line (t$28/us$14 per
week), and many were having to
make tough choices between food,
school fees, and personal debt pay-
ments. Others, confronted with the
novel experience of performance indi-
cators, felt unfairly targeted by the
shift in the culture of the workplace.
Attempts to set the example for the
neoliberalization of the economy and
instill an ethic of efﬁciency in govern-
ment ministries, coupled with the pri-
vatization of state resources, a history
of poor ﬁscal decisions, and recogni-
tion that success in the changing
economic environment depended on
skills and ﬁnancial backing not gener-
ally available to those civil servants
that the government hoped to make
redundant, all helped make the public
manager of the reforms, Prime Minis-
ter Prince ‘Ulukalala Lavaka ‘Ata,
personally unpopular. It also led to
more vocal resentment of his elder
siblings, the princess royal and crown
prince, both of whom do have the
wherewithal to engage in the kinds
of private sector investment, entrepre-
neurial activities, and privatization of
public services promoted by the eco-
nomic reform plan. While the two are
seen as competitors, they have both
capitalized on their privileged status
as royals to enable their entrepreneur-
ial activities and private wealth. At
the same time, various economic and
policy mistakes over the past several
years have all come to a head. This
was the context for the general strike.
Following the signing of the memo-
randum of understanding, democracy
activism did not abate. On 6 Septem-
ber, as planned before the memoran-
dum was signed, Tongans delivered a
petition asking the king to implement
major constitutional change within
twelve months. On 12 September,
thousands of people again marched
to the palace to present the king with
a petition demanding reforms to his
absolute monarchy, dismissal of the
prime minister and all fourteen cabi-
net ministers, establishment of an
advisory committee that would
include all of the People’s Representa-
tives to discuss how political power
should be returned to the government,
and, ﬁnally, the withdrawal of Shore-
line’s development license. News
reports referred to the 12 September
event as Tonga’s largest political
march ever. Local businesses sup-
ported the march with taxis, trucks,
concrete mixers, and other heavy
equipment. Even the immigrant Chi-
nese, who are normally regarded with
suspicion, participated in the march.
At the time, people viewed the protest
as a ﬁtting ﬁnale to the civil servants’
strike and the remarkable political
turn that events had taken. In Decem-
ber, more pressure was exerted on
the king, his cabinet, and the royal
family, with proposals being pre-
sented for parliamentary reforms. In
general, people have come to express
support for a monarchy, which, like
Britain’s, is far removed from day-to-
day governance.
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These are difﬁcult issues in Tonga:
the monarchy is an important icon of
national identity, and people remem-
ber that Täufa‘ähau Tupou IV estab-
lished the ﬁrst education scholarships.
Loyalists opine that he foresaw this
result and will therefore enable the
move to democracy. Thus, even as
political reform models are discussed,
some resentment of the activists (espe-
cially ‘Akilisi Pohiva) continues to
surface among those who support
some form of engaged monarchy.
One of the results of the psa strike is
an increase in issues-based dialogue
among Tongans; the sense that their
opinions matter is perhaps greater
than ever before. Soon after the
memorandum of understanding was
signed, two committees were estab-
lished to discuss options and desires
among the domestic and diasporic
Tongan communities, especially those
in New Zealand, Australia, and the
United States. Malakai Koloamatangi,
‘Akilisi Pohiva, Sitiveni Halapua, and
the Tu‘ipelehake have helped spear-
head these various consultations. At
the same time, advocates of political
reform have been concerned by the
king’s failing health. Privately, they
worry about the crown prince’s ten-
dency to be heavy handed, impatient,
and sometimes disdainful toward
“ordinary” Tongans; his involvement
with Shoreline and concern with self-
enrichment add pressure to have the
democratic reforms resolved before
Tupou V takes the throne. (In fact,
as this issue went to press, Tupou IV
had just passed away in an Auckland
hospital, after a long illness.)
Amid the very public critiques
aimed at him, Prince ‘Ulukalala
Lavaka ‘Ata tendered his resignation
as prime minister. Long assumed to be
suffering under the conﬂicting models
for leadership exercised by his elder
brother and sister, and certainly
unpopular for having tried to imple-
ment the economic reforms that led to
the civil servants’ strike, he resigned
and removed himself from all cabinet
committees on 11 February 2006.
This was hailed as a victory by the
Public Service Association. When
the crown prince, acting as regent,
appointed Minister of Labour, Com-
merce, and Industries Feleti Sevele as
acting prime minister (a position that
was conﬁrmed on 30 March 2006),
the international media focused on
the fact that Sevele was Tonga’s ﬁrst
elected, commoner prime minister. It
was interpreted as a sign that democ-
racy was coming to Tonga.
The facts that Sevele has a graduate
degree in economics, was a successful
Tongan businessman long before he
was a parliamentarian, was a close
friend of Tupouto‘a, and had been
speaking about how much Tongans
and Tonga’s economy were going to
have to become “leaner and meaner”
seemed not to cause alarm. Prince
‘Ulukalala Lavaka Ata had seemed
incompetent partly because even
while trying to instill better business
practices in government, he was sensi-
tive to Tongan sensibilities, including
the requirement to take the advice of
his elder siblings. But Sevele (like the
crown prince) has a history of reject-
ing Tongan traditions if they conﬂict
with his ﬁnancial interests. He has
certainly initiated a number of actions
to reform government and the civil
service.
Soon after the strike ended, Sevele
introduced the need for an Employ-
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ment Relations Bill, and, despite its
being against the spirit of the memo-
randum of understanding, supported
the need for downsizing of the civil
service through a redundancy pack-
age. The cabinet hoped to let a
thousand civil servants go. At the
same time, comparing Tonga’s civil
servants to Fiji’s, Sevele pointed out
the inequity: Annually, Tongans enjoy
36 days vacation, up to 42 days of
sick leave, and a bereavement leave
of 7 days. In Fiji, civil servants receive
10 days holiday, 12 days sick leave,
and 3 days for bereavement. He made
this point as part of a general state-
ment that Tongans have to adopt
more “modern” work ethics.
Since taking ofﬁce, Sevele has
restructured the public service depart-
ments, reshufﬂed his cabinet, and
appointed the ﬁrst woman cabinet
minister, ‘Alisi Taumoepeau. Sevele
has also negotiated a t$60 million
loan from China. The loan is sup-
posed to help balance Tonga’s budget
and provide the funds to buy back
Shoreline, as well as fund develop-
ment projects such as wharfs, schools,
roads, and airport renovations, and
pay for vehicles and renovations initi-
ated for the meeting of the Paciﬁc
Islands Forum originally scheduled to
be held in Tonga later this year. (In
return for the loan, Tonga will sup-
port the One-China policy when
necessary at the United Nations.)
Yet even as Tonga is preparing to buy
back its power generation company,
Sevele is looking into an expanded
and accelerated privatization agenda,
including selling houses owned by
government for the use of ministers
and senior public servants and its 40
percent share of the Westpac Bank of
Tonga, privatizing Airport services,
and reselling Shoreline (a New Zea-
land company has expressed interest
in buying it). The civil servants’ redun-
dancy package has been negotiated,
and a total of 817 accepted early
retirement from the civil service on 30
June 2006. The early projections of a
thousand redundancies were not met,
but even with the gap, the Ministries
of Education and Works were both
considering hiring interim workers to
help cover the immediate shortfall in
labor. It seems that Tongans now
have a prime minister who is much
better equipped to be the architect of
the very neoliberal reforms that were
causing them discontent. It remains
to be seen whether these reforms will
lead to the generalized prosperity that
is one of the goals of the Eighth
Tongan Development Plan.
On the democracy front, the most
recent news is tragic: On 6 July 2006,
while in California to conduct consul-
tations for the National Committee
for Political Reform, the “People’s
Prince,” the Tu‘ipelehake, his wife,
the former diplomat Princess Kai-
mana, and a friend, Vinisia Hefa,
were killed in an automobile accident.
The sudden loss of highly placed
members of the royal family, elites
who were thought of as sympathetic
to the people’s needs, came as a shock
to the democracy movement. Sitiveni
Halapua has taken over the Tu‘ipele-
hake’s role and will complete the
report on Tongans’ ideas on political
reform to be submitted to the king.
Tongans have expressed vehement
disapproval of their government’s
decisions in the past, most notably in
1899 when King Tupou II’s choice of
wife and queen almost sparked a civil
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war, and with more frequency since
2002, when government tried to stiﬂe
a critical media. That action also trig-
gered petitions, legal challenges, and
marches. But nothing within living
memory approaches the events of
2005–2006 for drama, mass partici-
pation, and long-term ramiﬁcations.
What began as a protest against neo-
liberal reforms of civil service payrolls
became a catalyst for changes that
have already led to serious political,
economic, and, perhaps most signiﬁ-
cantly, psychological ramiﬁcations for
the Tongan people: The monarchy is
not overthrown, but the sacrosanct
status once enjoyed by the Tupou
dynasty and traditional nobles is
gone; their modern “tapu” has been
broken.
Nevertheless, though democracy
advocates can legitimately claim a
moral victory and point to the prom-
ise of real changes in governance, and
while it is likely that reforms will
move Tonga toward a more democra-
tic polity, the tangible responsibilities
of the royal and noble elites to the
nation will have been reduced, while
their economic and symbolic privi-
leges remain unchanged. At the same
time, the restructuring agenda that
stimulated the general strike has actu-
ally been accelerated by the strike’s
resolution.
In addition to the economic effects,
the general strike’s main results to
date have been cathartic and charis-
matic: grumblings long expressed in
private have been aired publicly and
internationally; traditional elites have
been forced to respond to commoners’
perspectives; alliances have formed on
the basis of relations of production,
education, and experience rather than
only on kinship ties; and Tongans
around the world have been mobi-
lized to discuss exactly what type of
political structure they want for their
homeland and nation. This has been a
peaceable coup, and once again Ton-
gans have demonstrated their remark-
able tendency to appear to be follow-
ing external trends and inﬂuences
while persisting in doing things in
their own way. 
heather e young leslie 
Thanks to ‘Aivi Puloka, ‘Akilisi
Pohiva, ‘Ana Akau‘ola, Caroline Fusi-
malohi, ‘Eseta Finau, Kahungunu
Barron-Afeaki, Katea Ulakai, Lopeti
Senituli, Malakai Koloamatangi, Mapa
Puloka, Mele Vea, Tavake Fusimalohi,
and others too numerous to mention.
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Tuvalu 
The World Summit on Sustainable
Development held in Johannesburg
in 2002 provided the impetus for
Tuvalu’s ﬁrst-ever National Summit
on Sustainable Development, which
took place from late June through
early July 2004. Invited participants
included several from each island
(chiefs, elected councilors or kaupule,
women, and youth delegates), repre-
sentatives from each of the eight
island communities on Funafuti,
senior ofﬁcials, ministers, politicians,
and representatives from youth
groups, faith-based organizations,
women’s associations, regional bodies
(South Paciﬁc Applied Geoscience
Commission, Forum Secretariat,
Paciﬁc Regional Environment Pro-
gramme, University of the South
Paciﬁc), and business houses. Four
or ﬁve expatriate Tuvaluans working
abroad (including myself) were also
invited by the government to act as
resource people at the summit. The
purpose of the summit was to consult
widely and map out strategies for
Tuvalu’s development over the next
ten years (2005–2015). An estimated
four hundred people gathered in
Funafuti at the Tausoa Lima Falekau-
pule (Council of Elders Meeting Hall)
for the summit.
In an attempt to demonstrate polit-
ical neutrality, the government agreed
that Minister of Finance Bikeni Pae-
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niu and Leader of the Opposition
Kamuta Latasi would cochair the
summit. The two of them skillfully
steered the meeting through difﬁcult
and sensitive issues, kept the interest
of the participants alive through good
humor, prompted the discussion when
there might have been a stalemate,
and tactfully managed the more vocal
participants to ensure that everyone
had a chance to express his or her
views.
The entire summit was therefore
characterized by the rich quality of
consultation and expressions of gen-
uine concern over the country’s devel-
opment needs—speciﬁc to each island
and also common to all. The diversity
of participants and the different and
rich cultural and traditional nuances
they brought to the summit added
ﬂavor to a fully consultative and par-
ticipatory meeting. The combined con-
tributions of all the delegates, their
active participation and keen interest,
and the support of various island com-
munities who provided abundant
refreshments, all made for a most
creative and enriching experience.
This was the ﬁrst time that such
an extensive consultation had taken
place at the national level regarding
the country’s development. National
development strategies have hitherto
been widely understood as the sole
preserve of the government. A few
years before, only the planning
ofﬁce—mostly staffed by expatriate
ofﬁcers—was assumed to possess the
skills and knowledge to write devel-
opment policies and strategies for
Tuvalu. In fact, an expatriate ofﬁcer
from one regional organization said
his special mission at the summit was
to develop and write the vision state-
ment for Tuvalu. However, the qual-
ity of what transpired proved that
such assumptions are no longer valid.
Eight main thematic areas were
agreed to and formed the substantive
agenda: strengthening macroeconomic
stability; improving the provision of
social services; improving develop-
ment of the islands and Falekaupule
(Council of Elders); creating employ-
ment opportunities and enhancing
private sector development; improving
capacity and human resources devel-
opment; developing Tuvalu’s natural
resources; improving the provision of
support services; mainstreaming of
women in development; and good
governance.
After each plenary session, the
large gathering usually split up into
four groups to discuss the items in
more depth and to come up with ﬁnd-
ings. Both the plenary and group dis-
cussions were considered to be of very
high quality. Visits to the islands and
the different island communities by
task groups from the Ministry of
Finance to familiarize people with the
agenda preceded the actual summit.
The submissions from the islands and
island communities were therefore
very well prepared and clearly articu-
lated. This led to focused, engaged,
and stimulating general discussions.
Such extensive consultation, especially
in a fragmented place like Tuvalu
where transportation and movement
of people is difﬁcult and requires con-
siderable effort to coordinate, does
not come cheap. However, many
delegates applauded support for the
process and the inclusion of a large
number of people; many also felt
excited at actually being part of mak-
ing the country’s development plans
278 the contemporary pacific • 19:1 (2007)
and policies. For a great number of
participants, the summit presented a
fertile arena to learn from and share
ideas with one another. A traditional
high chief described the summit as the
most important historical gathering
ever held in Tuvalu since its indepen-
dence in 1978.
However, two things appeared
to mar the summit. The ﬁrst issue
involved the absence of most of the
permanent secretaries in many of the
discussions. When questioned about
this, the secretary to government
surprised everyone by saying that the
permanent secretaries were too busy
with their work and attendance would
mean no one would be “on watch.”
Since permanent secretaries are known
to be away often on overseas trips,
the explanation did not make much
sense. The fact that the chiefs, tradi-
tional leaders, and cabinet ministers,
as well as the overseas participants
had all taken time off to attend the
summit made the absence of perma-
nent secretaries culturally and profes-
sionally unacceptable.
Second, the manner in which one
or two of the ministers asked ques-
tions and directed their concerns to
the government during the debates
had the mark of betrayal. It is one
thing to offer personal insights on
how things might be undertaken or
improved, but it is another for indi-
viduals to openly criticize government
policies as though they were not part
of the decision-making process. In
fact, the openly critical comments
foreshadowed a political coup. A
month later, Saufatu Sopoanga was
dethroned as prime minister by a
motion of no conﬁdence.
A number of major resolutions
emerged from the summit. The ﬁrst
stressed that sustainable development
was dependent on good governance
and recommended strengthening the
oversight of the functions of public
institutions to improve accountability
and transparency. Economic growth
was needed for improving standards
of living, and the summit called for a
review of the public service, state-
owned enterprises, and improvement
in budget management including pro-
viding a stable macroeconomic envi-
ronment. Recognizing the ﬂuidity of
the political leadership in the country,
the summit also resolved that the
sustainable development strategies
agreed on at the summit would
remain operational and effective
despite any changes in government
during the planning period. After the
summit, the government met with
development partners to discuss how
the plan might be funded and imple-
mented.
The summit also produced a histor-
ical document called the Malefatuga
Declaration, after the traditional name
of the area where the summit was held
(the old meaning of malefatuga is
“challenge,” the place where conﬂicts
are resolved. Its modern usage is
“place of identity and conﬁdence,
where good deeds are recorded”).
The Malefatuga Declaration was
signed by the two cochairs, all the
island head chiefs, and representatives
of the private sector, women’s council,
and national youth association, all
pledging their commitment “to the
full implementation of the strategic
priorities and key actions as adopted
through [the various] resolutions.”
The Malefatuga Declaration also
afﬁrmed a commitment to ensuring
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effective monitoring and assessing the
impact of the agreed strategies and
action plans. The resolutions and
conclusions of the summit, and the
Malefatuga Declaration, provided the
foundation for, and helped to inform,
the preparation of Te Kakeega II, the
country’s National Strategy for Sus-
tainable Development for the period
2005–2015.
The launch of the impressive new
central government ofﬁce complex
coincided with the end of the summit.
These two events were cause for much
feasting, celebration, and traditional
entertainment. Taiwan’s deputy min-
ister of foreign affairs, Michael Kau,
was the guest of honor in a celebra-
tion that marked the launch of the
new building. The imposing three-
ﬂoor administration ofﬁce complex,
which towers over the rest of Funa-
futi Island and includes large water
cisterns in the basement, was funded
by the government of Taiwan at a
cost of us$8 million. But as one par-
ticipant commented, “The test of a
new building is how well it is main-
tained, and the quality of decisions
that spring from the boardroom!”
The Tuvalu Philatelic Bureau com-
memorated the occasion of the new
building with two new a$2 stamp
issues, each one depicting Taiwan
President Chen Shui-bian and Tuvalu
Prime Minister Saufatu Sopoanga.
In mid-July 2004, Tuvalu joined
the International Whaling Commis-
sion (iwc) amid an international
chorus accusing Tuvalu of supporting
Japan in exchange for economic assis-
tance. In spite of Tuvalu’s insistence
that it has not been the subject of
inﬂuence, allegations continued to
mount that Tuvalu’s membership was
an obstacle to the push toward ban-
ning commercial whaling. While
Sopoanga’s government was trying to
fend off potential threats to Tuvalu’s
iwc membership, domestic politics
turned sour when a vote of no conﬁ-
dence removed Sopoanga from ofﬁce
on 26 August 2004. Two government
members—Elisala Pita, also from
Sopoanga’s constituency, and Speaker
of Parliament Otinielu Tausi—crossed
the ﬂoor, making it possible for the
motion to succeed. Tuvalu News
reported that Tausi was dissatisﬁed
with Sopoanga’s ﬁnancial policies and
some cabinet ministers were unhappy
with Sopoanga’s disappearance on a
visit to mainland China (Tuvalu
recognizes Taiwan and not China).
Sopoanga had previously expressed
his disapproval of the Taiwan repre-
sentative in Tuvalu associating himself
publicly with leaders and members of
the opposition and had accused the
representative of meddling in Tuvalu
politics.
In early May 2006, New Zealand
Conservation Minister Chris Carter
visited Tuvalu to discuss whaling
issues, prior to the IWC meeting that
was to be held in June. On paper, it
looked increasingly likely that the
pro-whaling nations would achieve
a majority on the commission for
the ﬁrst time. Anti-whaling nations
wanted to turn that around, and the
minister’s visit was part of a cam-
paign to inﬂuence countries in that
direction. To overturn the 1986
moratorium on commercial whaling,
a three-quarters majority is required.
Similar visits to Solomon Islands,
Kiribati, and Nauru were also
planned. Tuvalu’s response to the
“ﬂying lobby visit” was that its posi-
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tion since it joined the international
body would remain unchanged.
Tuvalu has consistently said that it
supports “the sustainable use of what-
ever resources” there are, including
whales. Contrary to the statements of
various international commentators, a
spokesperson maintained that Tuvalu
had not been bought by Japan. He
pointed out that while Japan remains
an important development partner,
its overall level of development assis-
tance for Tuvalu has not substantially
increased. Nevertheless, the visit from
New Zealand produced an agreement
for a survey of whale and dolphin
numbers in Tuvalu waters. The ratio-
nale for the project remains unclear.
Under normal circumstances, Par-
liament would have met several days
after Sopoanga’s removal to vote in a
new prime minister. However, Sopo-
anga resigned his seat in a maneuver
designed to garner support and buy
the government more time. Under the
Tuvalu Constitution, all ﬁfteen seats
should be ﬁlled before the Parliament
can vote on such important matters.
Sopoanga re-contested his seat and
won the by-election. Unfortunately,
though, he lost the prime ministership
to his deputy, Maatia Toafa, who
became the ﬁrst prime minister from
Nanumea Island and the ﬁrst from
the northern group. Some key observ-
ers in Tuvalu suspected that a great
deal of conspiracy within Sopoanga’s
own party, especially among the more
senior ministers and others, transpired
while Sopoanga was out campaigning
for the by-election. The election for
prime minister took place on 11
October 2004.
During the period from July 2005
to June 2006, two main issues domi-
nated Tuvalu. The ﬁrst relates to the
threat of global warming to the low-
lying atolls of Tuvalu. [Editor’s note:
See the feature review of ﬁve recent
videos about these concerns, pages
294–306, this issue.] The second con-
cerns the plight of Tuvaluan workers
abandoned on Nauru by the Nauru
Phosphate Corporation.
Tuvalu took every opportunity to
heighten global consciousness of the
urgent threat of global warming to its
low-lying island atolls at both inter-
national and regional forums, through
the media, and by raising the general
level of awareness of its people. In a
speech on 16 September 2005 to the
66th Session of the UN General
Assembly, Prime Minister Maatia
Toafa emphasized the slim margin of
survival associated with fragile island
environments: “Tuvalu’s long-term
security and sustainable development
is closely linked to issues of climate
change, preserving biodiversity,
managing limited forests and water
resources.” Cyclones, aggravated by
the effects of climate change, have a
devastating effect on small economies
and the lives of island communities.
For Tuvalu, the effects are alarming.
Toafa claims that the international
community should give far greater
attention to these kinds of environ-
mental and security issues.
Extraordinarily high tides in Febru-
ary 2005 exacerbated by bad weather
caused signiﬁcant ﬂooding in Funa-
futi, the capital of Tuvalu, much to
the anxiety and trepidation of the
inhabitants. Those affected were
evacuated quickly to the government
primary-school buildings, while their
personal property, animals, and gar-
dens were completely destroyed.
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Travel through these areas proved
difﬁcult, as debris, stones, and boul-
ders from the ocean side of the south-
ern part of the island had been swept
into the middle of the island by giant
waves. Most alarming was the fact
that seawater was rapidly oozing out
of the countless potholes along the
sides of the airport runway, prompt-
ing a cnn reporter to remark that
Tuvalu was bleeding or eroding from
within. These high tides and the dam-
age that they caused were widely
reported by various media sources 
in the Paciﬁc.
In February 2006, during a climate
refuge forum (organized by Friends of
the Earth as part of the Sustainable
Living Festival), a Tuvaluan living in
Melbourne commented that Tuvalu-
ans should be moved to Kioa Island
in Fiji. Kioa, a volcanic island much
higher in altitude than Tuvalu, is pop-
ulated by Tuvaluans who were moved
there in the 1950s. The argument that
relocating Tuvaluan citizens to Kioa
would ensure the survival of the
Tuvaluan culture did not ﬁnd favor
with the Tuvalu government. It was
seen as a retreat, a surrender of the
government’s basic premise that
Tuvalu’s demise is being caused by
the lifestyle and behavior of the more
industrialized countries, which must
accept the obligation to ﬁnd a suitable
remedy. Relocation of the population
was therefore not a priority, although
at the same time the government was
seriously looking at investing in the
purchase of land overseas—Australia
and New Zealand were mentioned.
Related to the issue of relocation
was the current government’s request
to resettle more Tuvaluans in Niue.
Some years ago several Tuvaluan fam-
ilies migrated to Niue under an infor-
mal scheme agreed to by then Tuvalu
Prime Minister Kamuta Latasi and
Niue Premier Frank Lui. These fami-
lies have now established themselves
in Niue and are without doubt con-
tributing to the cultural, social, and
economic life of Niue in many ways.
For instance, a few Tuvaluans played
for Niue’s national teams for soccer
and the Rugby Sevens, and their
skills in ﬁshing supplied the domestic
demand in stores, restaurants, and
hotels. However, the Niue govern-
ment is still considering Tuvalu’s
request and is treading cautiously on
the issue. Some in Niue feel that the
Tuvaluans are only using Niue as a
doorway to further migration to New
Zealand.
The stranding of about 400 Tuval-
uan and perhaps 1,300 I-Kiribati
workers and their families on Nauru
dominated the Tuvalu news agenda
throughout the year. They had been
recruited to work in the phosphate
mines by the Nauru Phosphate Cor-
poration, a company that is totally
owned by the Government of Nauru.
The company experienced severe
ﬁnancial problems and failed to either
pay the workers’ wages or repatriate
them to their home islands. It is hard
to imagine how these people have sur-
vived for so long; no doubt they have
been depending on what little gardens
they can grow around their houses,
ﬁshing, and help from their families
abroad.
In August 2005, Tuvalu’s former
governor-general, the Honorable
Faimalaga Luka, passed away in Fiji.
Since his appointment in 2002, Gov-
ernor-General Luka spent a good part
of his time traveling to Fiji for med-
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ical assistance, often with a relatively
large entourage. Prior to his appoint-
ment, he served brieﬂy as prime
minister in 2001. His tenure in that
position ended abruptly when he was
voted out as a result of a political con-
spiracy from within his own caucus,
contrived by his close associates.
A by-election in the electoral dis-
trict of Nanumaga, caused by the
resignation of one of its members of
Parliament, the Honorable Namoto
Kelisiano, saw former Cooperative
Society Purchasing Ofﬁcer Halo Tua-
vai voted in. Kelisiano was previously
on the opposition benches, and Tua-
vai’s choice to side with the govern-
ment ensured the latter of a thin
majority in the House of Parliament.
The reason given for Tuavai’s alliance
with the government was to lend sup-
port to his colleague from the same
electorate, Speaker of Parliament
Otinielu Tausi. The Honorable Kelisi-
ano, a ship’s engineer, resigned in
order to run the island’s power plant
at the request of his home community.
Prior to this, two by-elections in
the country had resulted in further
enhancing and cementing Prime Min-
ister Toafa’s majority position. The
Honorable Sio Patiale, a member of
Parliament from Nanumea Island,
resigned on medical grounds, and was
replaced by a former Speaker of Par-
liament, the Honorable Kokea Malua,
who returned as a government sup-
porter. In May 2005 another by-elec-
tion was held, following the sudden
death of one of the members from
Nui Island who had been leader of the
opposition group. His replacement,
the Honorable Taom Tanukale, joined
the government ranks and was sub-
sequently made the acting minister
of health and education, while the
incumbent went overseas for long-
term medical treatment. In a 15-seat
Parliament, the government holds 10
seats, while the opposition has 5 seats.
The position of the current gov-
ernment seems assured, providing the
possibility of a renewed political
landscape. Tuvalu has seen ten prime
ministers in the twenty-eight years
since independence—no doubt a
record in the region. The problem
with the parliamentary system is that
the prime minister does not have any-
thing to fall back on in the event of a
no-conﬁdence vote. He cannot call for
general elections in order to secure
the majority he needs to carry out
his mandate, because the constitution
does not provide for this. Neither
does it provide for a limit to the num-
ber of votes of no conﬁdence that can
be made against an incumbent prime
minister.
In an apparent case of tit-for-tat
politics, the Honorable Otinielu
Tausi, Speaker of Parliament, declared
vacant one of the seats for the Funa-
futi electoral district, which was held
by the Honorable Kamuta Latasi. The
vacancy was declared due to Latasi’s
continual absence from sessions, as
required under parliamentary rules of
procedure. The Honorable Latasi, a
former diplomat, veteran politician,
and former prime minister, was
undergoing medical treatment in Fiji
under the government’s own scheme.
Patients undergoing overseas medical
treatment under the auspices of the
scheme do so only with the approval
of the minister of health. The govern-
ment was therefore clearly aware of
the reason for the member’s absences.
It is believed that the Speaker acted
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contrary to legal advice, and govern-
ment members did not attempt to
deal with his unusual actions within
their own caucus. The chief justice
upheld an application by the member
and ruled that the dismissal was
unconstitutional, noting that the
whole matter would not have arisen
if the former prime minister had fol-
lowed the rules of procedure. More-
over, from a political perspective, the
Speaker’s decision to sack the member
only served to strengthen the latter’s
position within his own electorate.
The Funafuti community was deter-
mined to simply ﬁeld him back should
there be a by-election, and community
pressure meant that the possibility of
other candidates wanting to contest
and win would be very slim.
In mid-2005 Tuvalu hosted the
annual Forum Economic Ministers
Meeting on Funafuti Island. More
than ninety overseas visitors ﬁlled up
what limited accommodation was
available on the island, including a
guesthouse owned by Minister of
Finance Hon Bikeni Paeniu. The cost
for Tuvalu’s hosting the meeting was
conservatively estimated at a$10,000,
but it would be useful to know
whether the actual cost outweighed
the revenue generated.
When the market value of the
Tuvalu Trust Fund (ttf) exceeds its
calculated maintained value, the dif-
ference is a distribution to Tuvalu’s
treasure chest. As of 30 September
2005, the difference came to some
a$12.5 million, of which nearly a$1
million was made available to support
the 2005 budget, and the balance of
more than a$11 million was to be
made available for the 2006 budget.
The payment for the 2005 budget was
the ﬁrst in three years, and the distrib-
ution available for the 2006 budget
represents the largest single-year
payment from the fund (the largest
payout previously was a$11 million
for the 1988 budget). The fund is
invested in diversiﬁed portfolios man-
aged by international fund managers
based in Australia.
The success of the Tuvalu Trust
Fund led to the establishment of the
Falekaupule Trust Funds (ftf) for
each of the eight main islands in the
country. These were designed to
underwrite the costs and projects of
island local governments, encourage
decentralization, enhance capacity,
and achieve a signiﬁcant level of
development ﬁnance for island com-
munities. Since 2004 the Falekaupule
Trust Funds adopted an investment
structure almost identical to that of
the Tuvalu Trust Fund. In September
2005, it also announced a payment,
the ﬁrst in four years, of almost a$2
million. This ftf distribution will be
made available to the island com-
munities in 2006 to support island
development and community projects.
An unattributed report claims that
the distribution formula was reached
after immense political rumblings
and internal ﬁghting. The eight island
communities would share 75 percent
of the monies equally, and the remain-
ing 25 percent would be distributed
based on the size of the resident pop-
ulation of each island.
No distribution from the Tuvalu
Trust Fund was paid out in the previ-
ous four years (2000–2004), and the
last signiﬁcant distribution was in
1988. If budget planning assumes
more payouts, there is a real possibil-
ity of Tuvalu’s ending up with unman-
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ageably large budget deﬁcits. For
2005, the government had to draw
considerably from its consolidated
trust fund (Account b) in order to
bring the budget deﬁcit down to an
acceptable level. Incorrect revenue
forecasts and excessive government
expenditure were the main causes
for the large 2005 deﬁcit. An Asian
Development Bank economic survey
pointed out that the Tuvalu civil ser-
vice is one of the largest by regional
standards, and current indications are
that it is still growing at an alarming
rate.
Excessive expenditures on travel,
especially by ministers, have often
caused tensions in the civil service.
The level of subsistence allowances
for Tuvalu’s traveling ofﬁcials may be
the most generous in the world, and
the situation has received attention in
several audit reports. The problem is
exacerbated when ministers change
their travel itineraries, usually while
overseas, to suit their personal prefer-
ences, for example, to add stopovers
in destinations like Auckland and
Brisbane where relatives may reside.
Islands Business magazine ran a
feature article in late August 2005
on a moneymaking scheme devised by
some individuals from Lessing Univer-
sity in Berlin headed by a Dr Ronald
Bauermeister. The scheme involved
the establishment of a Bank of Com-
merce of Tuvalu, and a register of
international companies. A further
proposal was the opening of Tuvalu
diplomatic missions in Europe, pre-
sumably to be staffed by members of
this group. It was generally under-
stood that Treasurer Bikeni Paeniu,
as the minister of ﬁnance, was ﬁrmly
behind the proposal. However, senior
ofﬁcials who accompanied the minis-
ter to various talks declared that the
details of the proposal were very
unclear. Observers speculated that the
outside ﬁnanciers might be interested
in the ttf investments, or in using
Tuvalu to lend credibility for obtain-
ing letters of credit or bank loans.
Investors might also be trying to
evade or avoid taxation in their home
countries. Fortunately, pressure from
other countries, particularly the devel-
opment partners, may have persuaded
Tuvalu policymakers to drop the idea.
In 2004, the anz Bank was close
to signing an agreement to take over
the operations and management of
the National Bank of Tuvalu (nbt).
While this was a move I was strongly
opposed to, the anz Bank did prom-
ise a greater variety of banking ser-
vices not previously available under
the nbt management. However, the
emergence of the Berlin tax scheme
and the obvious ambiguities sur-
rounding it forced the anz Bank to
shelve its proposal. The Bank of
South Paciﬁc (Papua New Guinea),
which had just acquired the Westpac
Bank Branch in Niue, was reportedly
also interested in expanding its opera-
tions to Tuvalu, but postponed the
initiative because of the proposed
scheme.
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s
visit to a number of Paciﬁc Island
states in early 2006, including a tran-
sit visit through Fiji and a day’s visit
to Tuvalu, caused some consternation
in the region. Six countries in the
Paciﬁc—Tuvalu, Solomon Islands,
and the republics of Nauru, Palau,
Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands—
recognize Taiwan, and the ongoing
rivalry between China and Taiwan for
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recognition by Paciﬁc countries has
concerned policy makers in both Can-
berra and Wellington for some time.
On 10 December 2005, PacNews
reported a Taiwanese diplomat’s accu-
sations that New Zealand (and Aus-
tralia) were treating the Paciﬁc as if
they owned it, adding that New Zea-
land enjoys trade with Taiwan and
should respect Taiwan’s right to estab-
lish diplomatic links with other coun-
tries. A regional academic from the
University of the South Paciﬁc also
commented that New Zealand was as
guilty of ideological bribery as China
and Taiwan. These comments came
in response to former New Zealand
Minister of Foreign Affairs Phil Goff’s
criticisms of the Taiwan president’s
tour, saying that checkbook diplo-
macy employed by both China and
Taiwan undermines work to address
serious issues such as poverty. While
the majority of the countries of the
world follow the One-China policy,
Tuvalu, like other Paciﬁc states, main-
tains its prerogative to establish links
with any country it chooses.
President Chen Shui-bian was
accorded a traditional welcome on 
his arrival at the Funafuti Inter-
national Airport. As he and his
entourage descended from the small
plane, a group of primary school
children serenaded the president with
Taiwanese songs. They sang: “Tai-
wan’s scenery is really beautiful.
Taiwanese friends are really cute.
Taiwanese A-bian [Chen’s nickname]
is really brave. Taiwan, Taiwan, go
go go. A-bian, A-bian, go go go.”
Taiwan is probably the second
largest donor to Tuvalu after the
European Union, and has come to
Tuvalu’s ﬁnancial assistance in a
number of ways. For example, Tai-
wan agreed to rescue the Tuvaluans
and I-Kiribati stranded in Nauru;
bailed the government out of severe
budgetary deﬁcits; paid for the newly
built ofﬁce complex in Funafuti; and
paid for many government ministers’
travels abroad. However, there is
skepticism about the transparency,
accountability, and propriety of Tai-
wan’s assistance, and the repercus-
sions for good economic governance
and prudent ﬁnancial management.
Many believe that the more liberal
the donor assistance is, the more
opportunity there is for the recipient
country to become corrupt in the use
of aid donations. It is important that
Taiwan (as well as China) appreciates
the need for donor harmonization
and coordination, transparency, and
accountability, and that it provides
funding assistance in line with the
government’s stated strategic objec-
tives and priorities.
Public suspicions of misuse of
funds loomed large after allegations
surfaced in an Internet chat room
popular with Tuvaluans that a former
Telecom supervisor had misused com-
pany funds by investing them in real
estate in Wainuioumata, Wellington,
New Zealand. Investigations are now
being carried out by the Tuvalu Trust
Fund Advisory Committee, as well as
by the police.
Meanwhile, disgruntled members
of the Tuvalu Chamber of Commerce
and their supporters marched to Par-
liament House in Funafuti on 7 April
2006, the ﬁnal day of the session.
They were angry that Minister of
Finance Bikeni Paeniu was withhold-
ing an aid package of us$400,000
designated for the private sector. The
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marchers wanted Parliament to direct
the minister to have those funds paid
directly to small businesses through
the Development Bank. The marchers
held placards and signs saying to the
minister, “Give us our money,
$400,000. Do not speak about God
for you are a liar” (my translation).
As a result of this protest, the minister
reluctantly released a$100,000 to the
Development Bank to provide busi-
nesspeople with loans. It was a ges-
ture intended to ensure silence. The
Chamber of Commerce members
were far from happy, as they saw no
reason why the minister should with-
hold any portion of the funds.
For some, the future of Tuvalu
looks bleak. Many hearken back to
the days when Tuvalu was able to
secure its independence, repeal its ﬁrst
constitution drafted by the colonial
ofﬁce in London, produce a new con-
stitution more relevant to its needs
and changing conditions, and estab-
lish a trust fund that became a model
for other small nations.
tauaasa taafaki
This review covers a two-year
period from mid-2004 to mid-2006.
It beneﬁted enormously from the
comments of an external reviewer
who remains anonymous. However,
the views expressed here are my own
and any errors or omissions are
entirely my responsibility.
Wallis and Futuna
The “non-event” of the year was the
follow-up to the customary law crisis,
as reformers have decided to abandon
efforts to crown a new Lavelua (para-
mount chief, or king, of Wallis),
thereby allowing Lavelua Tomasi
Kulimoetoke to regain his throne. Pro-
cedures for dismissing a Lavelua do
exist, but they have always involved,
to a greater or lesser extent, both dis-
cussion among the families with titles
and the use of violence. This is the
ﬁrst time in the history of Wallis that
a Lavelua has held the title continu-
ously for 46 years. The average length
of reign from 1869–1959 was 5.6
years.
This exceptional longevity is pri-
marily due to the political adroitness
of the current Lavelua, who has been
able to keep his throne despite the
existence of other candidates from
various royal families, and has also
been able to maintain the important
role of customary law while adminis-
trative and political power increased.
His longevity has also been favored
by higher-level administrators, who
would like to see a strong power
emerge. Members of the Lavelua’s
close family, the people actually run-
ning the Grande Chefferie (the custom-
ary government), have also encour-
aged his continuation in ofﬁce, as the
eighty-six-year-old Lavelua has not
expressed himself in public for several
years. It would seem that the Kulimoe-
toke family cannot imagine the idea 
of abandoning all the material advan-
tages associated with ruling, even
though the position has never been
hereditary (Angleviel 2005, 2006).
During a television news broadcast
on rfo-Wallis on 14 June 2005, the
Lavelua’s prime minister called for a
demonstration of support for the for-
mer Grande Chefferie in front of the
royal palace. One hundred ﬁfty peo-
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ple showed up the next day and went
to the fale fono (meeting house) at
Mata Utu, Wallis’s main center, to
prevent the swearing in of three mem-
bers of the new customary govern-
ment advisory board (fau). A former
customary law minister, Sanele Tau-
vale (of the Reform Party) was seri-
ously injured during the incidents that
followed. The ceremony was post-
poned until the afternoon, and Clovis
Logologofalau was crowned as the
new Kivalu (prime minister) in the
presence of the bishop and Senator
Robert Laufoaulu. On 17 June, the
reformers crowned a new Kulitea
(minister of justice and culture) while
the king’s supporters (in Sagato
Soane) installed another Kulitea. The
same day, during the television news,
Gaston Lutui, one of the leaders of
the Wallisian department, criticized
the prefect (Wallis and Futuna High
Commissioner Christian Job) for
diverting the pay from the Lavelua’s
customary government to the reform-
ers’ ministers, and demanded Job’s
resignation. On 20 June the prefect
announced a one-month suspension
for Lutui. Lutui then told the prefect,
“You are going to tremble.” Tension
grew over the following weeks
between the supporters of the former
Chefferie and those supporting
change.
The reformers, feeling that rfo-
Wallis was clearly leaning in favor of
the former Grande Chefferie and that
the large Wallisian community in New
Caledonia had been misinformed,
went to Nouméa for a press confer-
ence on 9 September 2005. The dele-
gation included, among others, Clovis
Logologofolau (the new Kivalu), the
Kulitea Nivaleto Pooï Taputai, and
two Faipule (head district chiefs),
Mikaele Halagahu and Pelenato
Sione. At the press conference they
announced that a new Lavelua recog-
nized by the prefecture would be
crowned on 25 September. The new
ruler they designated was Ahu Hiasi-
nito, former Faipule of the district of
Hihifo.
On 25 September, despite the pres-
ence of nearly one hundred twenty
policemen, the old king’s loyal sup-
porters put roadblocks in place, and
some of the demonstrators had long-
distance weapons and sticks of dyna-
mite. The former Lavelua’s supporters
also occupied Hihifo International
Airport. The ceremony was post-
poned again and the government sent
a mediator over from Nouméa. On
26 September, New Caledonia Secre-
tary-General Louis Le Franc agreed 
to the main demands made by the
former Chefferie, which regained its
legitimacy, authority, and allocations.
The local newspaper Les Nouvelles
Calédoniennes observed that “the
show of strength that has been going
on since last Thursday obviously
worked for the conservatives, while
the reformers, armed only with pens,
seemed isolated and weaker yester-
day” (LNC, 27 Sept 2005). The second
phase of the crisis was therefore an
unexpected return to the initial situa-
tion following a political decision
made by the government.
At the same time, most of the cus-
tomary law delegates representing
Wallisian customary law in New
Caledonia took the side of the former
Lavelua. They went to Wallis as a
delegation around mid-September to
conﬁrm their loyalty to Tomasi Kuli-
moetoke. The head of this delegation,
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Aloisio Sako, designated Faipule for
Hihifo and president of the indepen-
dent political party called Rassemble-
ment Démocratique Océanien,
declared that the rumors circulating
about the Lavelua having pro-inde-
pendence ideas were false and that the
real problem was that the ofﬁce of the
Lavelua was the depository for prop-
erty taxes.
On 22 September, there was a
demonstration in Nouméa on the
request of the designated leaders,
gathering six hundred Wallisians in
support of the former Lavelua, as
they believed that the government
wanted to change the 1961 statute by
putting the reformers in power. The
conservatives consider this statute to
be the “most advantageous out of all
the French overseas territories guaran-
teeing free health care, free medicine,
no taxes, etc” (LNC, 22 Sept 2005).
The prefect immediately published a
declaration indicating that no project
was currently under consideration to
reform the statute.
A committee was set up in Nouméa
on 6 September under the leadership
of Sosefo Polelei to discuss and pro-
vide information on traditional cus-
toms. The people under him refused
to get involved in the debate, feeling
that they needed to clarify the situa-
tion in terms of customary law regula-
tions as well as deﬁne the relationship
between customary law and republi-
can law. Then there is the Fa‘u Fenua
Association (“Build Our Country”),
which believes that this is a domestic
issue for Wallis. This group of young
intellectuals further believes that the
customary law leaders who organized
the demonstration before going to
Wallis to support the former Lavelua’s
party “sparked the rivalries in the
community and sowed discord
between the families” (LNC, 23 Sept
2005).
On 6 October, the reform Kivalu
sent a letter to the president of France
saying that a “small number of the
current Lavelua’s supporters, thirsting
for power and over-armed, had been
terrorizing the Wallisian population 
of which a majority of the expatriate
families were subject to xenophobic
attitudes on a daily basis.”
On 10 October, reformer Sosefo
Tagatamagoni was speaking with
other young people in the village of
Vaitupu when Casimilio, a supporter
of the Lavelua on his way home from
a party, took him aside. The young
reformer had his back to Casimilio
when he received the ﬁrst saber blow
and was lying on the ground when a
second blow struck his head. The
young man died the next day and
his family refused the customary law
pardon, demanding that this criminal
matter be judged by Western law.
Because of the unstable situation in
Wallis, the accused was then trans-
ferred to New Caledonia where he
will appear before the court in
Nouméa.
Following this death, several
reformers chose to exile themselves
voluntarily to New Caledonia.
Reform Kivalu Clovis Logologofolau
stated on 17 October that “the pre-
fect of Wallis just told me again that
he wasn’t able to ensure my safety in
my own country . . . the Government
took a step back to avoid carnage, ok.
However this continuing attitude is
the same as not providing assistance
to people in danger.”
This marked the beginning of the
third phase of the crisis, and no one
knows whether the situation will
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continue to deteriorate, or if those
supporting dismissal of the current
Lavelua are just going to wait for his
death. Whatever happens, this cus-
tomary law crisis has had a clearly
negative effect on how Wallisians
(and Futunians) perceive the custom-
ary government and the government
of France.
On the political front, the French
government appointed former Terri-
torial Assembly President Patalione
Kanimoa (of the Union pour un
Mouvement Populaire [ump]) to 
the position of economic and social
adviser. In February 2005 the Territo-
rial Assembly presidency had changed
from ump to an alliance between the
Union Pour la Democratie Française
(udf) and local leftists. The new
assembly president, Albert (Apeleto)
Likuvalu, is a history professor.
On the cultural front, Saatula, the
customary law minister from Malae
(Alo, Futuna) has been designated
president of the International Board
of Folklore Festivals and Traditional
Art Organizations for the South
Paciﬁc. On 14 July, the French war-
ship Jacques Cartier was present in
Wallis to participate in Bastille Day
events. Five sailors, including two
Wallisians, received medals for
national defense after a mass cele-
brated by the bishop of the archi-
pelago.
Relations between Futuna and the
rest of the world are still difﬁcult, as
usual. In mid-February the Jacques
Cartier went to Futuna to cover the
absence of the twin otter air service
for three weeks due to bad weather.
The beginning of the school term was
postponed for a week. Both kings of
Futuna went to Paris between 13 and
19 March, accompanied by Deputy
Victor Brial. They met with the min-
ister of foreign affairs and French
President Jacques Chirac. The kings
requested more autonomy in their
relationship with Wallis, which was
granted because each kingdom will
soon have its own sub-prefect and
general administration. Both kings
were given a royal kava ceremony
when they stopped in Nouméa—the
king of Sigave (Visesio Moeliku) on
11 March, and the king of Alo (Soane
Patita Maituku) on 12 March. In
terms of gifts (katoaga), they received
more than ﬁfty pigs.
In other news, a teacher from
France was attacked on 22 June 2006
by a hitchhiker, who ﬁrst punched
her and then hit her with a hammer.
She managed to escape and run to a
police station. The person guilty of
this sinister sexual attack was trans-
ferred to the New Caledonian Peni-
tentiary.
There is still a very large Wallisian
and Futunian community in New
Caledonia, making up 10 percent of
the population there. Each year a tra-
ditional dance competition is orga-
nized on 14 July, which is both French
independence day and the anniversary
of the 1961 establishment of overseas
territory status for Wallis and Futuna.
The Wallisian and Futunian youth
organization gathers over forty dance
groups and more than six thousand
visitors attend the event. 
The victims of Ave Maria continue
to demand compensation for their
expulsion from Saint-Louis between
2001 and 2003. Out of the 171 fami-
lies expelled, 49 are still waiting for
the possibility of buying a home. On
17 December 2005, the Southern
Province of New Caledonia gave ﬁve
million Paciﬁc francs to each of the
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171 families concerned. The president
of the association for Saint-Louis and
Ave Maria victims expressed the view
that “we absolutely have to avoid
regrouping everyone by community.
We live in a multi-ethnic country and
we mustn’t recreate a new Ave Maria”
(LNC, 13 July 2006).
On 14 September 2005, eighty-ﬁve-
year-old Pere Sagato Iau, chaplain for
the Wallisian and Futunian commu-
nity, was made a knight in the Legion
of Honor. On 10 December, Cyprien
Setiano, a Futunian born in Koné, was
ordained a priest by the archbishop of
New Caledonia in the Cathedral of
Nouméa. He has been assigned to the
Bon-Pasteur parish in Vallee-du-Tir
(Nouméa).
In science, a research group from
the University of New Caledonia
studied the “Dynamics of sea cucum-
ber (Holothuria) populations” in July
2005.
In sports, the new Wallis Hihifo
Golf Association course, currently
offering nine holes, received the spon-
sorship of the Dumbea City Golf
Association on 19 July 2005. Wallisian
Laurent Simutoga, who plays post for
the team Stade Calédonien (rugby)
and is former captain of the territorial
cadet team, began studying at Lindis-
farne College in Hasting (New Zea-
land) in February 2005. Two other
Caledonians joined him in February
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